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We analyze a wide range of corporate finance and governance characteristics in all active 
Norwegian firms with limited liability over the period 1994-2005. This sample includes about 
77,000 nonlisted (private) firms and 135 listed (public) firms per year. Nonlisted firms have 
barely been addressed in the finance literature, despite our finding that they employ four 
times more people than listed firms, have about four times higher revenues, hold twice as 
much assets, and constitute over 99% of the enterprises. Indirect evidence suggests that this is 
also the typical situation worldwide. The unexplored nature of nonlisted firms makes us 
address a large set of characteristics, and to focus more on describing overall patterns in the 
data rather than making elaborate tests of behavioral hypotheses. 
We find that the size distribution of firms in the economy is close to lognormal, which is 
consistent with independence between size and growth for the individual firm. Most nonlisted 
firms are small, but there are still many more large firms in the economy that are nonlisted as 
opposed to listed. Nonlisted firms have more liquid assets, invest less, but still grow like 
listed firms of comparable size, possibly because capital constraints cause underinvestment 
and hence higher marginal returns. Their debt is considerably higher and has shorter duration, 
which may be due to stronger information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders or to 
asset-liability matching. Nonlisted firms distribute much more of their earnings once they pay 
dividends. This may reflect that their owners value dividends more highly due to high 
transaction costs of selling illiquid stock, and that strong owners of nonlisted firms pay high 
dividends to reduce expropriation threats to weak owners. 
Ownership concentration is much higher in nonlisted firms, particularly when persons control 
them. Concentration decreases with firm size, but is still very high even in large nonlisted 
firms. Persons hold most of the equity except in listed firms, where indirect ownership 
through corporations dominates. Ownership control through pyramids is rare, but holdings 
that are legally critical for control (i.e., 1/3, 1/2, or 2/3) are widespread. 
The typical  board is very small, stable over time, and homogenous in terms of gender and 
stakeholder mix. Larger boards, which are more often found in large, old, listed firms with 
low ownership concentration, tend to have younger directors, female directors, and employee 
directors. The much higher insider holdings in nonlisted firms makes the agency conflict 
between managers and owners negligible. In contrast, the potential conflict between inside 
and outside owners is large. Listed firms are in the opposite situation.  
The operating performance (ROA) is higher when personal ownership is high, the board is 
small, the CEO is a director, when earnings are paid as dividends, and when the firm is 
nonlisted. This evidence suggests that personal ownership reduces agency costs more than 
ownership through intermediaries, that good boards are small boards, and that high dividend 
payout benefits owners by increasing the liquidity of their wealth and aligning their interests. 
And, most importantly, these findings show that listing status per se matters not just for 
corporate finance and governance, but also for the ability to create economic value. An 
exciting arena for future research is to uncover where this excess performance of nonlisted 
firms comes from, particularly in a setting where thousands of firms can choose whether to 
stay private, go public, or to delist. 
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We start this chapter by providing background and motivation for our study in section 1.1. 
The outline of the study is specified in section 1.2, followed by a summary in section 1.3. 
1.1 Motivation 
Existing research on corporate finance (Eckbo, 2007) and corporate governance (Becht et al, 
2003) is heavily biased towards firms that are listed on a stock exchange (public; widely 
held) as opposed to nonlisted (private; closely held). There are at least two reasons why. First, 
listed firms may look more attractive to financial economists because the quality of these 
firms’ behavior may be estimated by their observable market value and not just their book 
(accounting) value. Second, more is publicly known about listed firms because regulation 
puts stronger requirements on their information production. In particular, listed firms must 
produce standardized, audited accounting statements for the general public at least once a 
year, and data vendors like Compustat and Datastream make such information easily 
accessible to investors, analysts, and researchers worldwide. In contrast, reliable accounting 
data for nonlisted firms is much harder to obtain, although recent efforts by Amadeus to build 
a database for nonlisted European firms is a promising first step. Correspondingly, data on at 
least some corporate governance mechanisms in listed firms is public information in most 
countries. In contrast, no broad database exists for the governance mechanisms of nonlisted 
firms, such as their ownership structure, insider equity holdings, and board composition.1 
This missing research on the corporate finance and governance of nonlisted firms is 
problematic for at least two reasons. First, nonlisted firms account for a much larger fraction 
of the macro economy than listed firms. Chapter 5 will show that Norwegian nonlisted firms 
have in the aggregate four times more employees and sales, twice as much assets, and 
constitute more than 99% of all limited liability firms in the country. Although we lack 
comparable data from other countries, the indirect evidence we report will suggest that the 
relative size of nonlisted firms in the Norwegian economy is also a representative case 
internationally. Thus, nonlisted firms are probably more significant than listed firms in most 
other countries as well. Nevertheless, much less is known about how nonlisted firms behave 
and perform as economic entities.  
Second, existing research findings on corporate finance and governance in listed firms 
may not be valid for nonlisted firm. This is because nonlisted firms seem fundamentally 
different. We will show repeatedly that listing status correlates systematically with key 
characteristics of the firm and its environment. For instance, nonlisted firms are less 
transparent to outside observers, cannot finance themselves in the public equity market, their 
shares can only be traded at high transaction costs, and their minority stockholders are less 
protected by regulation. The firms tend to have more concentrated ownership than listed 
firms of comparable size, higher insider ownership, smaller boards, be more often dominated 
by families (persons), and more often have their CEO as the chairman. According to the 
theory of corporate finance and governance, such differences in the firm’s environment and 
governance structure may matter for the firm’s behavior, such as its real investments, capital 
                                                 
1 Amadeus provides data on ownership concentration from 2003 on for most countries they cover and on board composition 
as of the reporting date. As the reporting of governance data is not mandatory in most of the countries covered by Amadeus, 
the quality of their governance data is difficult to evaluate.  
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structure, dividend policy, and risk management. They are also potentially important for the 
firm’s economic performance, such as its growth and return on capital invested. 
Apart from addressing these two biases of existing research, access to micro-economic 
data on nonlisted firms also enables us to better understand the unique features of being 
listed. For instance, by analyzing the economic history of IPO firms before they go public, 
one may better understand why some IPO candidates choose to stay private when others go 
public, and how the pricing at the IPO depends on the firm’s pre-listing characteristics. 
Another example is the role of stock liquidity in dividend policy. As nonlisted firms tend to 
have less separation between ownership and control than listed firms, their dividend 
payments are less important both for disciplining management and for signaling growth 
prospects to outside investors. Rather, dividends may primarily serve as a liquidity provider, 
since the stock is illiquid and is held by owners with very concentrated wealth. Nevertheless, 
almost all tests of dividend theories have been limited to listed firms. Finally, by studying 
boards in both listed and nonlisted firms, one may better understand the mostly ignored 
tradeoff between a director’s conflicting roles as monitor and adviser (Adams and Ferreira, 
2007). As the adviser role is probably more important in nonlisted firms because ownership 
concentration is high and the management team is small, the handicap of independent 
directors may be more easily observable than in listed firms (Bøhren and Strøm, 2008).2 
The comprehensiveness of our data set is also potentially useful per se. First, it may 
allow the researcher to more precisely describe how a given firm characteristic varies across 
the full spectrum of firms, such as the shape of the frequency distribution for firm size in the 
economy. This is important not just for improving the power of statistical tests, but may also 
help us understand the dynamics of firms and industries. For instance, if a firm’s growth is 
independent of its size, it can be shown theoretically that the distribution of size in a large 
group of firms is lognormal (Sutton, 1997). Thus, we may test this so-called Gibrat’s law 
either by its assumptions (i.e., check whether size and growth are independently distributed 
variables) or by its implication (i.e., check whether  the frequency distribution of size across 
firms has a lognormal shape). Either way, we need a large sample of firms and preferably the 
whole population to test a hypothesis of this kind. The second benefit of more comprehensive 
data is that it allows the researcher to explore a wider set of corporate finance and governance 
mechanisms, such as how the relative performance of listed and nonlisted firms depends on 
the joint impact of a battery of governance mechanisms, e. g., ownership concentration, 
insider holdings, joint ownership and management by families, and board turnover.  
The existing literature has just recently started addressing the corporate finance and 
governance of nonlisted firms.3 Bennedsen et al (2006, 2007) analyze board size endogeneity  
and CEO succession using a small number of firm characteristics from a large sample of 
nonlisted and listed Danish firms. Four recent studies use data from the Amadeus database, 
which contains 44 accounting variables  and some ownership characteristics for samples of 
listed and nonlisted firms in 40 European countries (chapter 4 provides more details on 
Amadeus). Giannetti (2003) explores how cross-national differences in capital market 
development influence the use of debt financing by listed and nonlisted firms. Giannetti and 
Ongena (2008) analyze how foreign bank entry influences growth and financing across small 
and large nonlisted firms. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) study how regulatory 
restrictions on firm startups influence the entry and exit of firms. 
                                                 
2 After Sarbanes-Oxley, the overriding concern in corporate governance codes worldwide is to ensure sufficient monitoring 
by means of independent directors. As indicated above, this emphasis may be misplaced when the firm is nonlisted. 
3 Studying family firms in the US and Europe, respectively, Villalonga and Amit (2006, 2006a) and Maury (2006) describe 
some of their governance mechanisms, a few corporate finance variables, and relate these characteristics to performance. 
Despite the fact that almost every family firm in any country is nonlisted, all their sample firms are listed. 
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Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) use Amadeus data from 19 European countries to 
describe how blockholdings, asset structure, leverage, and performance vary with listing 
status in large corporations. This study, which is the one that comes closest to ours, gives a 
useful first look into how corporate finance and governance characteristics differ between 
private and public firms within a small subset of the population. However, it also reflects that 
most of the work remains and that certain of their conclusions are premature. For instance, 
Claessens and Tzioumis cannot separate outside owners from inside owners, as Amadeus 
does not provide the latter. This distinction may be crucial for the relationship between 
governance and performance, at least in public firms (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Becht et 
al, 2003). They also ignore board composition, which is known to interact both with other 
governance mechanisms and with performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Also, their 
conclusion that industrial firms are the most common ultimate blockholders is misplaced. 
Industrial firms are owned by someone, and ultimate owners can only be identified by going 
behind potentially several layers of firms in a pyramid until one gets to persons or the state, 
who are the only ultimate owners by definition (La Porta et al., 2000). Finally, Claessens and 
Tzioumis (2006) only study large firms, which we will show differ considerably from the 
typical nonlisted firm in terms of basic finance and governance characteristics. 
1.2 Outline 
We use three approaches to improve on the situation described in section 1.1: 
i. Build a comprehensive, reliable database on corporate finance and governance 
characteristics for the population of listed and nonlisted firms with limited liability 
(aksjeselskap). 
ii. Describe these characteristics in an unusually detailed way, letting the firm’s listing 
status (i.e., listed vs. nonlisted) be one of its governance characteristics. 
iii. Analyze how the firm’s corporate finance and governance interact with performance.  
Differences between listed and nonlisted firm will be highlighted under both item (ii) and 
(iii), and we pay particular attention to differences between nonlisted family firms and other 
nonlisted firms under (iii). As we currently lack data on family relationships, we will use 
personal owners as our proxy for family ownership.4 
As a joint background for all three components of our study, chapter 2 briefly presents 
key elements of the existing theory and empirical evidence. We focus on corporate finance 
and governance differences between listed and nonlisted firms, and on how performance 
interacts with ownership and board characteristics. Chapter 3 summarizes major regulatory 
restrictions on corporate governance and on financial reporting.  
Part (i) of our study as defined above starts in chapter 4, where we describe the database, 
which covers all Norwegian firms with limited liability over the period 1994-2005. We call 
this the CCGR database, since it is financed and operated by the Centre for Corporate 
Governance Research (CCGR; www.bi.no/ccgr) at the Norwegian School of Management 
(BI). Unlike in most other countries, Norwegian law mandates every limited liability firm to 
publish an audited annual report each year. This report consists of a profits and loss 
statement, a balance sheet with accompanying footnotes, a cash flow statement, the board of 
                                                 
4 Data on kinship and marriage will be added to the CCGR database by year-end 2008. This will enable us to determine 
genuine family relationships in terms of both owners, officers, and directors. 
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directors report, and the auditor’s report.5 The firm must also publish the identity of its CEO 
and its directors, and the fraction of equity held by every owner. 
The CCGR database as of September 2008 has 12 years of accounting data on corporate 
finance (1994-2005) and 6 years of data on corporate governance (2000-2005). There are 
about 130,000 firms with limited liability in a typical year, rising gradually from about 
100,000 firms at the beginning of the sample period to 160,000 at the end. Applying a series 
of consistency filters, ignoring subsidiaries and instead using the consolidated accounts of 
their parents, and also requiring all firms to have positive sales, assets, and employment, our 
sample has on average roughly 77,000 firms per year. About 135 of these firms are listed on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. The database has approximately 130 items of accounting data and 
80 items of governance data per firm year.  
Chapter 5 estimates the macro-economic significance of listed and nonlisted firms in 
Norway and elsewhere. Chapter 6 overviews the firms’ corporate finance characteristics by 
reporting summary statistics for key variables, such as size, asset structure, capital structure, 
debt maturity, dividend payout, growth, and return on assets. We also analyze the shape of 
the frequency distributions for these characteristics, such as the distributional form for size 
across firms in the economy. Moreover, we relate some of these characteristics to each other 
and analyze how they depend on the firm’s listing status and industry.  
Part (iii) of the study is reported in chapter 7, where we first analyze ownership structure 
in considerable detail. We describe key non-financial governance mechanisms (ownership 
concentration, owner types, and insider ownership) and relate them to potential determinants, 
such as firm’s size, industry, and listing status. Because our data set includes all firms in the 
economy, we can describe the ownership structure of any firm in terms of its direct (first-
layer) owners as well as its ultimate (all-layers) owners. This means we can trace indirect 
ownership through all levels of a pyramid and show whether direct ownership is sufficient or 
whether we need to know ultimate owners, which requires much more comprehensive data.   
We describe board composition by a series of characteristics that distinguish one board 
from another, such as board size, CEO-chairman duality, employee directors, and gender 
mix. Like for ownership structure, we look for potential determinants, such as the relationship 
between board size, firm size, and listing status. We complete part (iii) by analyzing how the 
economic performance of the firm interacts with its corporate governance system, including 
its listing status. Particular attention is paid to how performance relates to different owner 
types, such as inside vs. outside owners and personal (family) vs. corporate owners. Chapter 
8 provides an overall summary. 
1.3 Summary 
Existing research on the corporate finance and governance of firms with limited liability is 
extremely biased towards firms that are listed on a stock exchange. This is probably due to 
missing public data in most countries regarding nonlisted firms’ market value, accounting 
statements, ownership structure, and board composition. Our study is special because it 
constructs and analyzes a high-quality database for an unusually wide range of corporate 
                                                 
5 As will be explained in section 3.2, small firms can opt out of the cash flow statement. They may also drop some of the 
footnotes or use simplified accounting rules for complicated transactions or transactions that require particularly difficult 
estimates, such as leasing obligations, stock-based payments, and financial instruments. Unless audited financial statements 
are  submitted to a central registry within 17 months after fiscal year end, the firm is automatically liquidated by the court 
(www.brreg.no/presse/pressemeldinger/2007/04/regnskap_mangler.html). 
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finance and governance in the population of listed and nonlisted Norwegian firms with 
limited liability over the twelve-year period 1994-2005. 
The lacking economic insight into nonlisted firms is problematic in a macro-economic 
setting, as we will show that these firms constitute a much larger share of the economy than 
listed firms. Existing findings from listed firms may also be invalid for nonlisted, which are 
less transparent, cannot tap public equity markets, and have very illiquid shares. Moreover, 
we will show that they are often smaller, have much higher insider ownership, and are 
family-dominated. Theory suggests that such firm characteristics, which are seldom observed 
in listed firms, matter for behavior and performance. Also, benchmarks from nonlisted firms 
make it easier to discover the uniqueness of the listed, such as why some choose to go public 
whereas others prefer to remain private. Existing research has barely addressed such issues. 
Chapter 2 sets the stage by presenting key elements of the existing theory and evidence, 
whereas chapter 3 summarizes the regulation of corporate governance and financial reporting. 
Chapter 4 describes the CCGR database, which is considerably more extensive than what has 
been available for research purposes in the past. This is probably because Norwegian law is 
special by mandating every limited liability firm to publish an audited annual report 
consisting of a profits and loss statement, a balance sheet with footnotes, a cash flow 
statement, the board of directors report, and the auditor’s report. The firm must publish the 
identity of its CEO and its directors, and the holdings of every owner. The CCGR database 
has twelve years of corporate finance data and six years of corporate governance data. 
Applying several consistency, activity, and double-counting filters, the sample used in our 
study has roughly 77,000 firms in a given year, of which 134 are listed.  
Chapter 5 documents the macro-economic significance of listed and nonlisted firms, and 
chapter 6 reports corporate finance characteristics, such as asset structure, capital structure, 
debt maturity, and dividend payout. We relate some of these characteristics to each other and 
to listing status. Chapter 7 on corporate governance analyzes ownership concentration, owner 
types, insider ownership, and board composition, and we relate these characteristics to 
potential determinants. Ownership structure is described by both direct and ultimate 
ownership. Board composition involves characteristics like board size, director tenure, CEO-
chairman duality, board turnover, employee directors, and gender mix. Finally, we analyze 
how the governance mechanisms interact with performance, paying particular attention to 
whether listing status per se matters for this relationship.  
Every chapter is ended by a short summary, whereas chapter 8 recaptures the major 
points from all the preceding chapters. 
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2. Theory and existing evidence 
Section 2.1 summarizes theory and empirics on the difference between listed and nonlisted 
firms, and section 2.2 discusses how corporate governance mechanisms relate to agency costs 
and economic performance. Since the literature on corporate finance is too comprehensive 
and often tangential to our study, we refer to the survey by Eckbo (2007) and limit ourselves 
to issues that are particularly relevant to our setting, such as relationships between financing 
mix and listing status and the use of dividends as a liquidity provider. 
2.1 Listing status 
This literature studies the firm’s choice between being listed and nonlisted and how the 
anatomy of corporate finance and governance differs between listed and nonlisted firms. We 
start by summarizing the most important theory.  
One stream of the literature analyzes the advantages listed firms offer their owners 
through better stock liquidity, increased diversification opportunities, and more efficient risk-
sharing (Pagano, 1993; Admati, Pfeiderer and Zechner, 1994). Agency theory argues that if 
listed firms have less concentrated ownership than nonlisted firms, these liquidity and risk 
benefits may be offset by the cost of reduced monitoring incentives (Coffee, 1991; Bhide, 
1993). However, Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and Maug (1998) show that even moderate 
ownership concentration produces a positive net listing benefit. 
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) and Pagano and Roell (1998) study the optimal level 
of monitoring under tradeoffs  between closer monitoring and lower management incentives. 
This setting is particularly relevant for firms with powerful owners and professional 
managers with low equity-based incentives. The authors show that high ownership 
concentration, which is more prevalent in nonlisted firms, may produce excessive monitoring, 
as tight outcome control by active owners reduces the manager’s incentive to exert effort.  
Recent work by Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2007) integrates several of these ideas by 
showing that stock liquidity is a two-edged sword. In their model, different owners may have 
different views on the firm’s best strategy, and managers may also differ from each other in 
terms of beliefs and abilities. The authors show that the major determinant of optimal listing 
status in such a setting is the cost and benefit of having a liquid stock.  
According to their model, the benefit of being listed is the reduced cost of capital caused 
by the owners’ ability to trade their shares at low transaction costs. This liquidity is costly, 
however, as high liquidity allows the ownership structure to change more easily. The 
resulting higher uncertainty about future ownership structure exposes management to more 
unpredictable owner intervention and hence to a more random level of alignment between 
managers and owners. This potential mismatch reduces managements’ incentives to exert 
effort and hence lowers the value of the firm. In contrast, although nonlisted firms have a 
higher cost of capital due to an illiquid stock, agency costs are lower due to a more stable 
ownership structure and accordingly a better fit between the beliefs of managers and owners.   
Stated differently, being listed is costly because the current employment contract for the 
manager can only reflect an expectation of what different future owners consider the optimal 
degree of management discretion. The employment contract in a nonlisted firm with a stable 
ownership structure can handle any discrepancy between the beliefs of owners and managers 
by tailoring the level of managerial flexibility to the known and stable differences in beliefs. 
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Thus, Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2007) posit that the optimal listing status involves a 
tradeoff between the cost and benefit of liquid ownership rights. The new insight is that 
because higher liquidity makes the ownership structure more unpredictable, governance costs 
increase. The authors also show that being nonlisted is more attractive the lower the market 
price of the stock, and the higher the volatility of this price. Although the model ignores the 
out-of-pocket listing costs and also the free-riding cost in firms with low ownership 
concentration, adding these costs to their model would increase the benefit of being nonlisted. 
To conclude, the theoretical literature on listing status suggests that the benefits of being 
listed consist of lower transaction costs, better diversification opportunities, and improved 
risk-sharing in the market for ownership rights. The costs are out-of-pocket listing expenses, 
reduced monitoring, and less tailor-made employment contracts. 
Switching to empirics, no existing study relates directly to the theories on listing status as 
summarized above. However, two papers come reasonably close. Analyzing the 
announcement return to bidders in acquisitions across 17 Western European countries, 
Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2006) distinguish between transactions involving listed targets 
and nonlisted targets. They find no excess bidder returns when the target is listed, but a 
significantly positive return of 1.48% with nonlisted targets. Similar bidder return differences 
have been documented in US acquisitions (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004).  
Officer (2007) takes the next step by exploring the determinants of abnormal bidder 
returns when the target is nonlisted. The sample is US firms where a listed parent sells its 
nonlisted subsidiary. He finds that the acquisition discount for a nonlisted target depends on 
the seller’s liquidity constraint. First, the discount is larger the more liquidity-constrained the 
seller prior to selling. Second, it is larger the more costly the seller’s debt and the lower its 
stock return the year before the sale. Officer (2007) concludes that the price obtained when 
selling a nonlisted firm is lower the more serious the seller’s liquidity problem. This effect is 
stronger when the asset being sold is illiquid as well, such as the shares of a nonlisted firm.6  
Giannetti (2003), Claessens and Tzioumis (2006), Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006), 
and Giannetti and Ongena (2008) all use data from the Amadeus database, and they all study 
nonlisted firms in many European countries. Only Giannetti (2003) and Claessens and 
Tzioumis (2006) address the role of listing status.7 Giannetti (2003) analyzes how the legal 
protection of creditor rights in a country influences the firms’ capital structure and debt 
maturity. She finds that firms use more debt when equity markets are less developed, and that 
stronger creditor rights protection improves the ability to finance intangible assets with debt. 
Moreover, for a given level of creditor rights protection, nonlisted firms have more debt and 
shorter debt maturity than listed firms. Giannetti concludes that stronger protection of 
creditor rights primarily benefits nonlisted companies. 
Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) is the only paper we know that describes corporate 
finance and governance differences between listed and nonlisted firms at any length. They 
analyze how blockholdings, assets, leverage, and performance correlate with listing status in 
large corporations across 19 European countries. The authors find that in most countries 
except in Eastern Europe, nonlisted firms more often have majority blockholders. Unlike in 
                                                 
6 What happens if the bidder is nonlisted? According to Bargeron et al. (2007), the announcement gain to target shareholders 
is significantly lower when the bidder is privately held. However, this effect is driven by the fact that management owns a 
higher equity fraction in nonlisted bidders than in listed bidders. Thus, the key in their sample is the difference in managerial 
incentives for the bidder rather than listing status per se.  
7 Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) study how regulatory restrictions on market entry influence the characteristics of new 
firms and the growth of incumbent firms. Giannetti and Ongena (2008) analyze how the entry of foreign banks in Eastern 
European countries changes the financing and growth of nonlisted firms. 
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listed firms, the most common ultimate owner of a block in nonlisted firms is not a family, 
but an industrial firm. Moreover, nonlisted firms have on average more intangible assets, 
higher asset turnover, and more debt financing. Finally, controlling for country, industry, 
size, and age, they find that in 644 matched pairs, nonlisted firms have lower EBIT and 
higher returns on assets and equity. As we argued in section 1.1, however, some important 
unresolved questions remain in this study. First, Claessens and Tzioumis do not distinguish 
between inside and outside owners, do not identify families as an owner type, and ignore 
board composition. The obvious reason is that Amadeus does not contain such data. Second, 
their conclusion that industrial firms are the largest ultimate owner is misleading, as industrial 
firms are not ultimate owners. To find such owners, one needs to eliminate all intercorporate 
shareholdings, which requires access to the population of firms in the economy.8  
2.2. Corporate governance mechanisms 
Agency costs are driven by potential conflicts of interest between the firm’s stakeholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 2001; Becht et al., 2003). In 
our setting, it is particularly useful to decompose this overall agency problem into the first 
and the second agency problem, respectively (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). The first agency 
problem concerns potential conflicts of interest between owners and non-owners, such as 
stockholders vs. managers. The second agency problem is due to lacking unanimity between 
owners with unequal power, such as majority vs. minority owners. 
It is generally believed that whereas the first agency problem produces the more serious 
cost in listed firms, the second dominates in the nonlisted (La Porta et al., 2000, Faccio et al., 
2001; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). This is because each stockholder tends to be small in 
listed firms, both relative to managers and to each other. Thus, the monitoring and incentive 
problem between owners and managers is major, whereas the potential conflict between 
majority and minority stockholders is minor. In contrast,  because owners are thought to have 
larger stakes in nonlisted firms, they are less at the mercy of managers (i.e., the first agency 
problem is minor). However, the controlling owners may more easily induce decisions that 
benefit themselves at the minority’s expense (i.e., the second agency problem is major). 
Corporate governance mechanisms are vehicles for reducing agency costs, i.e., tools for 
reducing the value destruction caused by the first and the second agency problem. We 
classify these mechanisms as ownership structure (2.2.1), board composition (2.2.2), financial 
policy (2.2.3), endogeneity and optimality (2.2.4), and corporate environment (2.2.5). Each 
section outlines the major theoretical ideas and summarizes key empirical findings, focusing 
on the relationship between economic performance and the governance mechanism in 
question. Much more comprehensive expositions are available in the surveys of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Becht et al. (2003). 
                                                 
8 As Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) use the Amadeus classifications, it seems Amadeus does not track down ultimate 
owners through the full ownership pyramid, but stops at the second layer due to lack of ownership data for all firms in the 
economy. Moreover, Amadeus reports ultimate owners’ control rights, but not their cash flow rights. Finally, it seems 
Amadeus reports ultimate owners by what they call total ownership. Whether or not this item is reported for a given country 
seems to depend on whether Amadeus’ national data supplier produces such data. For instance, Amadeus does not report 
total ownership for Norway, which may be because their Norwegian data provider (CI) does not estimate this variable. 
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2.2.1 Ownership structure 
This section discusses three basic ownership dimensions within a governance-performance 
framework, which are concentration, types, and insiders, respectively.9 
 We distinguish between inside ownership (i.e., equity holdings by the firm’s directors 
and officers) and outside ownership (i.e., equity holdings by owners who are neither on the 
board nor on the management team). The important point to notice about outside ownership 
concentration is that its theoretical relationship to performance is unclear. This is because 
ownership concentration reflects the net impact of several benefits and costs which are hard 
to rank ex ante. Outside owners with high equity stakes may be beneficial by ensuring that 
the principals have sufficiently strong incentives and power to monitor their agents, and by 
reducing the free-riding by small shareholders. These benefits make the seriousness of the 
first agency problem fall as ownership concentration increases.  
The costs of concentrated ownership are reduced liquidity of the stock, lower 
diversification benefit for the large owner, increased majority-minority conflicts, and reduced 
management initiative due to excessive monitoring. This makes the second agency problem 
more serious as ownership concentration grows. Since theory cannot specify how the sum of 
the two agency costs varies with ownership concentration, the shape of the relationship 
between outside ownership concentration and performance must be determined empirically.  
 Empiricists measure ownership concentration by either the Herfindahl index,10 the 
fraction held by the largest owner, or by the aggregate holding of several large owners, such 
as the three largest. Performance is normally measured by Tobin’s Q or by book return on 
assets (ROA). Among the 33 empirical ownership-performance papers from 1932 through 
1998 surveyed by Gugler (2001), 27 deal with outside concentration. They mostly find either 
a positive or no link between outside concentration and performance. Recently, however, 
Lehmann and Weigand (2000) estimate a negative relationship in German listed firms. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2006) find the same result in Norwegian listed firms over 1989-1997. 
 Agency theory argues that for given ownership concentration, owner type matters 
because the identity of powerful owners makes a difference for how governance is executed. 
Direct ownership represented by personal investors is considered a better monitoring and 
incentive vehicle than indirect ownership, where widely held corporations or the state invest 
other people’s money. It has still been argued that indirect ownership through institutions 
may outperform ownership by persons, provided the institutions’ lower monitoring costs due 
to higher professionalism dominate the negative incentive effect of delegated monitoring. 
Finally, since foreign investors may be informationally disadvantaged relative to national 
investors, they may primarily invest abroad to capture diversification benefits rather than to 
improve governance. Thus, it has been argued theoretically that because increased holdings 
by foreigners reduce monitoring quality, performance may suffer. The empirical evidence on 
the role of owner identity is mixed, and Gugler (2001) considers the issue as remarkably 
                                                 
9 The governance literature has mostly ignored ownership duration, where the issue is whether the holding period of 
influential owners matters for the firm’s performance (Bøhren et al., 2008). Since our data set is probably too short to 
analyze ownership duration properly, we will ignore it except by referring to the non-documented popular opinion that 
controlling shareholders in family firms often hold their shares longer than other owner types. 
10 The Herfindahl index is the sum of squared equity fractions across all the firm’s owners or a subset of them. It has a 
maximum of one when a single investor owns everything and approaches its minimum of zero as the ownership structure 
gets increasingly diffuse. 
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unexplored. In general, the answer is still open as to how owner type interacts with 
performance. The exception is family ownership, which we discuss separately below. 
The primary governance role of outside owners is to monitor management from a 
distance, including the use of hands-off strategies like voting by foot. In contrast, inside 
ownership concentration reduces the need for such indirect control, as owners are directly 
involved with the firm’s strategic decision-making in the board room. Thus, compared to 
outside ownership, inside ownership addresses the first agency problem more directly and 
comprehensively. The convergence-of-interest hypothesis predicts that insider holdings and 
economic performance are positively related (i.e., reduces the first agency problem). On the 
other hand, powerful insiders may entrench themselves and expropriate wealth from outside 
owners (i.e., the second agency problem grows). However, as insiders carry a larger fraction 
of destructed market value the higher their stake, the threat of expropriation may diminish as 
the insider stake becomes sufficiently large. Consequently, like for outside concentration, 
governance theory cannot specify the relationship between insider ownership and 
performance without a priori restrictions on each separate cost and benefit. 
Four of the six empirical insider papers surveyed by Gugler (2001) find a non-monotone 
relationship between performance and insiders. Performance increases with insider holdings 
at low insider stakes, then decreases, then either still decreases, slightly increases or stays 
constant. Like McConnell and Servaes (1990) find for US firms, Bøhren and Ødegaard 
(2006) find that the relationship between insider holdings and performance for Norwegian 
listed firms increases with insider holdings up to around 40% and then decreases. This is 
consistent with the notion that the first agency problem dominates at low insider holdings, the 
second dominates at high, and that the sum of the two is lowest around 40% insider holdings.  
Family ownership involves both ownership concentration, owner type, insider owners, 
and management. By definition, family firms are dominated by a family, either through 
ownership, directorship, management, or some combination. Thus, the first agency problem 
is small in family firms, as ownership concentration is high, ownership is executed directly 
rather than through intermediaries, the large owner is often on the board, and this owner may 
also be the CEO. Thus, family owners are good owners relative to the first agency problem, 
provided this benefit is not offset by a tendency to recruit officers and directors based on 
kinship and marriage rather than competence. The second agency problem works against the 
family firm, however, as  their owners are not just large, but may also be an unusually 
coherent group. This may make it particularly difficult for small shareholders to protect their 
rights. Thus, the first agency problem is minor in family firms, but the second is potentially 
more serious than elsewhere. 
Within the subsample of listed firms, family firms are at least as common as other firm 
types around the world (Faccio and Lang, 2002). Still, the empirical literature on the 
governance and performance of listed family firms counts less than ten papers in the leading 
finance journals over the last ten years (Claessens et al., 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003, Maury, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 
2007). These papers mostly find that family firms outperform non-family firms in terms of 
market value. Thus, the benefit of a minor first agency problem seems to dominate the cost of 
a major second agency problem. However, Villalonga and Amit (2006) show in their sample 
of very large US family firms that the existence of a superior market valuation depends 
critically on the family’s role in ownership, control, and management. First, history matters, 
as superior performance is only found in the first generation. Compared to similar non-family 
firms, family firms in the second generation are underperforming, whereas third and later 
generation family firms are like other firms. Second, the founder is critical, as abnormal value 
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creation only happens when the founder is either the CEO or a chairman monitoring a 
professional CEO. Typically, the equity of first generation family firms with active founders 
is worth 25% extra, but family ownership without active board or management involvement 
produces no excess value, even in the first generation. Third, mechanisms that separate 
ownership from control, such as pyramids and dual class shares, destroy market value. 
Using a sample of listed firms from 13 Western European countries, Maury (2006) finds 
that higher market value for family firms is limited to countries with high minority 
protection, and to firms where the family does not have majority control. This is consistent 
with findings by Faccio et al (2001) from Asia, supporting the notion that sufficiently weak 
minority protection makes the second agency problem dominate the first. However, Maury 
finds that book returns on assets is higher in family firms regardless of minority protection, 
provided the family holds at least one top officer position. Also, unlike for market value, 
profitability is stronger the more the active family owns. 
Overall, the limited empirical evidence mostly shows that listed family firms have higher 
book returns to capital invested than other listed firms. This suggests that the sum of private 
benefits and security benefits is higher in family firms than elsewhere. In contrast, the market 
value of these firms, which only reflects the security benefits shared by all stockholders, is 
not higher unless the family provides certain combinations of ownership, control, and 
management. In particular, the market value benefits if the family is not too strong relative to 
the other owners, if the family takes officer and director positions, and, most importantly, if 
the founder is actively involved. This is consistent with the basic agency idea that firms are 
more efficiently run when the first agency problem is small, and that the second agency 
problem reduces market value when powerful stockholders capture a high portion of the 
underlying value creation in terms of private benefits. 
2.2.2 Board composition 
The board structure may matter for performance by influencing the alignment of interest 
between principals and agents, the production of information for the directors’ monitoring 
and advice functions, and for the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. As for interest 
alignment, having owners on the board concerns insider ownership, which we discussed in 
section 2.2.1. Alignment may also depend on director independence, the argument being that 
independent directors may be better monitors, but weaker advisors. Regarding information 
production, directors with multiple directorships may provide valuable information networks 
to other firms, but may also become too busy. Finally, decision-making effectiveness 
concerns the costs and benefits of a heterogeneous board. Increased diversity may be 
obtained by increased board size, gender mix, age differences, and  more employee directors. 
The cost of such diversity is less focus, higher conflict levels, and longer decision-time.   
 The empirical state of the art is reflected reasonably well by a recent study of all 
boards in Norwegian listed firms from 1989 to 2002 (Bøhren and Strøm, 2008). The authors 
find that owners on the board (alignment) and directors with multiple directorships 
(information) relate positively to performance. Increased diversity produced by larger board 
size, more gender mix, and more employee directors (effectiveness) all correlate negatively 
with performance. No significant link exists between independence and performance, 
supporting  the notion that although more independence increases monitoring incentives, it 
reduces management's willingness to share private information with the monitors. The 
negative association between board size and performance and the lacking relationship 
between independence and performance are also robust empirical results internationally.  
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2.2.3 Financial policy 
The firm’s financing and dividend decisions can be used to limit management discretion over 
free cash flow. In particular, investments may be financed with debt rather than equity, and 
earnings may be paid out as dividends rather than retained in the firm (Easterbrook, 1984; 
Jensen,1986). Thus, owners may reduce agency costs through high leverage and high cash 
payout. This governance mechanism is particularly useful for outside owners, who are often 
unable to monitor management closely. Inside owners are in a different position, as they can 
exert control closely in the board room rather than just block management’s access to 
corporate resources by forcing cash flow out of the firm as dividends or debt repayment 
(Khan et al., 2006). On the other hand, inside owners can use high payout to reduce the 
second agency problem. Thus, the use of financial policy as a disciplining mechanism may 
depend on the ownership structure in general and the mix of owner types in particular. 
Except for Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), who model the debt to equity ratio as one of 
seven governance mechanisms, existing research tends to treat financial policy as control 
variables that reflect governance-independent determinants of performance, such as the 
interest tax shield. There is no clear empirical evidence that corporate finance variables are 
used as disciplining mechanisms along the lines suggested by corporate governance theory. 
2.2.4 Endogeneity and optimality 
We have thus far described many corporate governance mechanisms and argued that they 
may matter for performance. This raises two questions which are particularly relevant in 
empirical tests. The first is whether governance mechanisms are endogenous or exogenous, 
both relative to each other and to performance. The second is how an optimal governance 
structure can be detected in the data.   
Governance mechanisms may substitute or complement each other. For instance, high 
dividend payout may be less important when insider ownership concentration is high 
(substitutes), and gender diversity may be easier to obtain when the board is large 
(complements). This makes governance mechanisms endogenous relative to each other. They 
may also be endogenous relative to performance, which happens when causation runs from 
performance to governance rather than just the other way, which we have assumed so far. 
Such reverse causation may for instance occur when firms with high performance attract 
particular owner types, as opposed to when certain owner types make the firm perform well. 
Either way, endogeneity makes empirical tests more challenging. First, single-equation 
models have performance as the dependent variable and governance mechanisms and control 
variables as independent variables. Therefore, internally related governance mechanisms 
create multicollinearity, which may bias the tests towards too seldom finding significant 
relationships between governance and performance. Thus, one should ensure that failure to 
reject the null hypothesis is not due to endogenously related governance mechanisms. 
The second challenge is that single-equation models are generally misspecified when the 
independent variables are endogenous. The relationship is better described as a system of 
equations, where mechanisms and performance alternatively appear as independent and 
dependent variables in the different equations. However, as theory has little to say about the 
relationship between the governance mechanisms, there are few ex ante arguments for 
restricting coefficients and choosing instruments in a systems estimation. Thus, although 
single-equation models are known to be misspecified, a system approach is not an obviously 
better alternative. With access to a time series, like in the CCGR database, a better option 
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may be to lag the independent variables by regressing performance on governance 
mechanisms from a previous period. We will follow such an approach in chapter 7. 
The single-equation approach has also been criticized by Demsetz (1983), but for a 
different reason. He argues that if governance mechanisms are optimally installed, every 
mechanism satisfies the zero marginal value condition. This means small changes in any 
mechanism leaves firm value practically unaltered. Moreover, the set of optimal governance 
mechanisms may vary from firm to firm, depending on governance-exogenous characteristics 
like risk and size. Thus, the equilibrium condition implies that no governance mechanism is 
significantly related to performance in a cross-section. Conversely, Demsetz argues that 
significant relationships reflect disequilibrium and a potential for value improvement.  
Coles et al. (2007) question the validity of this idea by showing that when managerial 
ownership is optimally tailored to the productivity of management and capital, reasonable 
parameter values produce a quadratic cross-sectional relationship between managerial 
ownership and Tobin’s Q. Thus, the curve is not horizontal, as suggested by Demsetz’ logic. 
Moreover, the equilibrium hypothesis assumes every governance mechanism can be chosen 
freely, which is not the case in practice. For instance, any Norwegian firm with more than 
200 employees must choose one third of its directors by and from its employees, no investor 
can hold more than 10% of the equity in a bank, and every listed firm must have at least 40% 
of each gender among its directors from 2007 on. Thus, as regulation may force governance 
mechanisms away from their free optimum, the equilibrium hypothesis cannot be used to 
argue that the expected coefficients are zero in a regression of performance on governance. 
2.2.5 Corporate environment 
The governance mechanisms considered so far are specific to the investor, such as owner 
type, or specific to the firm, such as dividend payout. However, these mechanisms and their 
relationship to performance may also be driven by exogenous factors in the firm’s 
environment. Two such factors are legal regime and competition, respectively.  
La Porta et al. (2000) initiated a new research tradition in governance by arguing 
theoretically and showing empirically that the ownership concentration in a country depends 
on how well the legal regime protects owners in general and minority owners in particular. 
The evidence is generally consistent with the idea that legal protection and ownership 
concentration are substitutes. However, since we analyze governance differences between 
firms within a given country, legal regime per se plays no role in our study.11 
Competition may influence not just the governance mechanisms, but also their 
relationship to the firm’s performance. In particular, competition in the firm’s product, labor, 
and takeover market may act as substitutes for the governance mechanisms discussed so far. 
The general idea is that more competition reduces admissible inefficiency, including bad 
management. Product prices move closer to marginal production costs in the most efficient 
firm as competition gets tougher, making it harder for any firm to survive. Conversely, 
monopoly power enables inefficient firms to persist. Thus, regardless of the firm’s 
governance system, i.e., the specific design of its ownership structure, board, and financial 
policy, competition disciplines management towards making value-maximizing decisions. 
                                                 
11Norway has a civil law regime, which generally provides weaker owner protection than common law. Nevertheless, the 
protection of ownership rights in Norway is better than in the average common law country (La Porta et al., 2000). This may 
be one reason why Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) find that Oslo Stock Exchange firms in the period 1989-1999 have less 
concentrated ownership than any other European country except the UK. For instance, the average holding of the largest 
owner in a listed firm in the mid-1990s was 3% in the US, 14% in the UK, 45% in continental Europe, and 30% in Norway. 
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This means the firm’s governance system will only matter for managerial effort when 
competition is soft. Thus, the competition argument predicts that the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance is weaker the stronger the competition. 
Several attempts at formalizing this intuitive idea have shown that the theoretical 
relationship between competition and managerial effort is ambiguous.12 However, the very 
limited empirical literature supports the basic intuition. Palmer (1973) finds that the 
relationship between ownership structure and performance in US manufacturing firms is 
stronger the higher the firm’s market power. Giroud and Mueller (2007) study what happens 
to the performance of US firms when takeover threats are reduced through new antitakeover 
provisions at the state level. They find that in industries with strong product market 
competition, neither the firm’s market value nor its operating performance changes as the 
takeover threat falls. In contrast, firms in non-competitive industries experience both 
abnormally low stock returns at the announcement of the new law and reduced operating 
performance once the law is in effect. These findings suggests that the significant relationship 
between governance and performance found in the literature over the years may be driven by 
firms in non-competitive industries. Giroud and Mueller conclude that future tests of the 
governance-performance relationship should include competition as a control variable.  
2.3 Summary 
The academic literature on listing status studies the decision to go public and how the firm’s 
corporate finance and governance depends on the listing status. The theory posits that the 
listing benefit consists of lower transaction costs, better diversification opportunities, and 
improved risk-sharing. The costs are the out-of-pocket listing expense, reduced monitoring 
activity, lower private benefits, and less tailor-made incentive contracts. Data from the US 
show that nonlisted targets create more wealth for bidders than listed targets, and more so the 
less liquid the seller of the target and the assets of the target. Nonlisted European firms have 
more blockholders than listed firms, more intangible assets, more debt, and shorter debt 
maturity. The literature on listing status is very limited, probably due to the lack of data for 
the listed firm’s pre-listing period and for the vast majority of firms that choose not to list. 
The first agency problem concerns conflicts of interest between owners and non-owners, 
whereas the second is due to lacking unanimity between owners with unequal power. 
Corporate governance mechanisms are tools for reducing the value destruction caused by 
these two agency problems. The mechanisms we discuss are ownership structure, board 
composition, financial policy, and disciplining forces in the firm’s environment.  
Ownership structure reflects outside ownership concentration, owner type, and inside 
ownership. The theory specifies costs and benefits of ownership concentration, but not their 
net effect on performance, which can so far only be determined empirically. The theory on 
owner types posits that direct monitoring through personal ownership is better than indirect 
ownership through intermediaries. Generally, the first (second) agency problem is expected 
to be more (less) serious the lower the ownership concentration, and personal ownership will 
have a stronger effect than indirect ownership under either one.  
                                                 
12 More competition always produces stronger incentives for agents to work harder. This is because more competition 
reduces profits, increases the liquidation risk and reduces the value of firm-specific investment in human capital. On the 
other hand, as more competition produces lower product prices and thereby erodes the value of cost-reducing efforts, it may 
be optimal for the principal to induce less effort by the agent. Schmidt (1997) shows that the net effect of these two opposing 
forces is ambiguous. The empirical IO literature tends to find an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and 
innovation. The strongest effect of competition on effort occurs in oligopolistic markets, such as computers and automobiles. 
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The empirical literature on ownership focuses exclusively on listed firms and mostly 
finds a positive or no link between outside ownership concentration and performance. The 
evidence on owner identity is mixed and underexplored, and insider ownership mostly 
correlates positively with performance up to insider holdings around 40% and negatively 
thereafter. This is consistent with the notion that the first agency problem dominates at low 
insider stakes, the second at high, and that their net cost is lowest somewhere in between. 
Family ownership involves ownership concentration, owner type, insider ownership 
concentration, and management. The first agency problem is particularly small in family 
firms, but the second may be more serious than elsewhere. The evidence mostly shows that 
listed family firms have higher book returns to capital than other listed firms, suggesting that 
the sum of private benefits and security benefits is highest in family firms. In contrast, the 
market value, which only reflects the security benefits shared by all owners, is only higher if 
the family is moderately strong relative to the other owners, if the family takes officer and 
director positions, and, most importantly, if the founder is active. This is consistent with the 
notion that firms are more efficient when the first agency conflict is small, and that the 
second agency conflict destroys market value when strong owners reap large private benefits. 
The board structure may influence the alignment of interest between principals and 
agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's decision-
making effectiveness. The evidence suggests that owners on the board (interest alignment) 
and directors with multiple directorships (information production) relate positively to 
performance. In contrast, increased diversity through larger board size, more gender mix, and 
more employee directors (effectiveness) correlate negatively with performance. No 
significant link exists between independence and performance. Thus, good boards are small 
and have members with high ownership stakes, wide networks, and homogenous background. 
Owners may lower the first agency problem through high leverage and high cash payout, 
as this financial strategy reduces the free cash flow and thereby management’s possibility to 
finance value-destroying projects. This governance mechanism is particularly useful for 
outside owners, who cannot monitor management in the boardroom. However, there is no 
clear evidence that corporate finance variables are consistently used for such purposes. 
Estimating governance-performance equations in practice is not straightforward. First, 
governance mechanisms may substitute or complement each other and hence be internally 
related. They may also be endogenous relative to performance, creating reverse causation. 
Such endogeneity may produce multicollinearity and misspecifications in single-equation 
models, whereas a system of equations is difficult to estimate due to a weak theoretical 
rationale for choosing instruments in the system. Thus, although single-equation models are 
known to be misspecified, a system approach is not necessarily better. This is why we will 
utilize the time series nature of the CCGR database by using single-equation models, but 
regress performance on governance mechanisms that are not contemporaneous, but from a 
previous period. Second, it has been argued that if governance mechanisms can be chosen 
feely and are optimally installed, equilibrium implies that no governance mechanism relates 
significantly to performance in a system of equations. This argument is weakened by the fact 
that governance mechanisms in every country are subject to regulatory restrictions.  
Competition may substitute for governance mechanisms that are specific to the investor 
or the firm. Thus, regardless of the firm’s ownership structure, board composition, financial 
policy, and listing status, competition may discipline management towards making value-
maximizing decisions. Recent empirical tests support this intuition by showing that the 
stronger product market competition weakens the link between performance and governance. 
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3. Institutional framework 
This chapter summarizes major regulatory restrictions on the governance (section 3.1) and 
the financial reporting practice (section 3.2) of Norwegian firms with limited liability. 
Regulatory differences between listed and nonlisted firms are discussed as we go along. 
3.1 The regulation of corporate governance 
The legal tools for influencing a firm’s governance system consist of the two corporate laws 
(Aksjeloven and Allmenaksjeloven), the securities law (Børsloven), the listing requirements of 
the Oslo Stock Exchange (Børsforskriften), and the Corporate Governance Codes issued by 
the Oslo Stock Exchange (Norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og selskapsledelse).13 This 
section describes this judicial regime from a corporate governance perspective. Our 
discussion of how listed firms are regulated draws heavily on Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000, 
sect
protection of minority 
stockholders, and the reporting and disclosure system for ownership. 
3.1.1 The legal form 
 Norwegian firms with 
limited liability were organized as an ASA. 165 of them were listed.  
3.1.2 The fiduciary duty 
corporate governance. This tendency is evident worldwide in the corporate governance codes, 
                                                
ion 2.2). 
We start by clarifying the differences between the two alternative legal forms of a 
limited liability corporation. Subsequently, we discuss the role of the fiduciary duty, the 
regulation of the stockholder meeting, legal restrictions on board composition, mechanisms 
for separating cash flow rights from voting rights, regulatory 
The corporate law from 1976 was changed by an amendment in 1996 stating that a limited 
liability firm can be an AS (aksjeselskap) or an ASA (allmennaksjeselskap).14 An ASA must 
have a share capital of at least 1 million NOK. A listed firm must be an ASA, whereas a 
nonlisted can always choose the AS form, where the minimum share capital is  0.1 million 
NOK. Further regulatory differences between these two legal forms will be clarified 
throughout this chapter. By year-end 2005, only 446 of the 157,710
Unlike in the US, but consistent with the European stakeholder idea of the firm (Allen, 
Carletti and Marquez, 2007), there is no law, public regulation or consistent legal practice 
giving the board and the management team an explicit duty to maximize share value. On the 
other hand, no regulation obliges the firm to prioritize other stakeholders than owners or to 
trade off conflicts of interest between stakeholders in specific ways, such as rules for 
handling lacking unanimity between owners, creditors, and employees. Therefore, owners 
cannot rely on the courts to enforce equity value maximization. Nevertheless, the general 
disciplining pressure on professional managers towards equity value maximization has 
probably increased over our sample period, both for listed and nonlisted firms. This is due to 
a growing use of earnings-, stock-, and options-based incentive contracts and also to the trend 
in Europe and Asia to challenge the stakeholder idea by the narrower stockholder approach to 
 
13Aksjeloven,  Allmenaksjeloven, Børsloven, and  Børsforskriften are available at www.lovdata.no. The Corporate 
Governance Codes can be downloaded at www.oslobors.no/ob/norskeselskaper. 
14 This amendment is referred to as law no. 80 of 1995 and was introduced to align Norwegian corporate law with EU law. 
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which have been issued by more than 50 countries and mostly by stock exchanges (see 
www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes). 
Corporate governance codes make explicit recommendations beyond the mandatory 
limits set by the law. In particular, they make normative statements on issues like the 
structure of the shareholder meeting, the board of directors, and the management team. Firms 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) must publish a statement in their annual report 
specifying item by item whether or not the firm complies with the OSE governance code. 
Non-compliers are expected to give a valid reason. This is called the principle of comply-or-
explain. Like in other countries, the OSE code focuses on owners as the key stakeholder, and 
the recommendations mostly try to ensure that shareholder interests are met. 
There is no governance code for nonlisted firms. Chapter 7 will show that their 
governance system is fundamentally different from what it is in listed firms. This means the 
nature of the agency problem is also different. Hence, good governance structures in listed 
firms may be bad in nonlisted firms and vice versa. Also, because so little is known about 
how governance and performance interact in nonlisted firms, making governance codes for 
such firms is premature from an academic point of view. 
3.1.3 The stockholder meeting 
Any owner can put items on the agenda for the regular stockholder meeting 
(generalforsamling). Owners with at least 5% of the cash flow rights in an ASA (10% before 
1999) and 10% in an AS can force an extraordinary stockholder meeting. As voting rules 
apply to attending owners rather than all owners, ownership without presence has no power. 
Companies with less than 20 owners are not required to have standard-form stockholder 
meetings. Instead, the board may mail the issues to the shareholders, who in turn vote by 
mail. Stockholders cannot vote by mail in any other companies. 
Changes in the corporate charter (vedtekter) require a 2/3 super-majority, whereas most 
other issues need simple majority (1/2). Non-voting shares are not powerless relative to 
voting shares in charter amendments. Although there must be a super-majority of 2/3 of the 
voting shares is required, there must also be a 2/3 super-majority among all shareholders as 
well. According to this second requirement, non-voting shares have full power. 
3.1.4 The board 
Limited liability firms with more than 200 employees must have a two-tiered board unless a 
majority of the employees vote against it. Firms with 200 employees or less can still have a 
two-tiered board if owners and employees agree.15 The supervisory board 
(bedriftsforsamling) elects the regular board (styre) and makes the final decision on 
significant new investments and  rationalizations which reduce the number of employees.  
If the firm employs more than 200 people, one third of the directors in both boards must 
be elected by and from the employees. The use of labor representation presupposes a majority 
vote among the employees if the firm employs less than 201.16 This lower bound and the 
flexible system for firms passing the bound means that many quite large firms have no 
employees on the board. Also, the fraction of employee directors will vary considerably in 
firms where employees are on the board. All votes in both boards are on a one-person-one-
                                                 
15 The newspaper, shipping, petroleum, and financial services industries are exempted from the two-tiered board regulations. 
16 Employees may elect up to one third of the directors and at least two directors if the firm employs between 51 and 200. 
Labor may also elect one director in firms with more than 30 and less than 51 employees. 
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vote basis except when the charter assigns double voting rights to the chair. Therefore, even 
though the two-tier system assigns formal voting rights to employees, the decisive power is 
still in the owners' hands, since they never have less than 2/3 of the votes.17 
The CEO cannot be the chairman if the share capital is at least 3 million NOK. As of the 
end of 2007, the board of all ASA firms must have at least 40% of each gender among its 
stockholder-elected directors. There is no corresponding gender rule for employee directors. 
3.1.5 Cash flow rights and voting rights  
One-share-one-vote is the basic principle in the corporate law. However, the law opens up for 
two exceptions which enable the firm to separate ownership (cash flow) rights from control 
(voting) rights by, provided the exceptions are stated in the corporate charter. First, an ASA 
can issue up to 50% of its shares as non-voting. There is no upper limit for an AS. Second, 
firms may write voting right restrictions into the charter.18 
There is no general regulation on voting restrictions (stemmerettsbegrensning).19 
Stockholders may increase their power by establishing voting pacts (aksjonæravtale) with 
each other, which is only regulated to a limited extent. If a listed firm is aware of a voting 
pact between its shareholders, it must file the pact with the OSE. As the parties themselves 
have no filing obligation, however, public information on voting pacts from the OSE is rather 
useless. Moreover, the charter may rule that shareholders with a voting pact are considered 
one shareholder. In private communications with former and current OSE officials, we are 
told that voting pacts in Norwegian listed firms are rare. Hence, this lack of data may not 
seriously limit our ability to capture a realistic picture of separation in listed firms. However, 
we lack reliable information about the use of voting pacts in nonlisted firms. Finally, a 
stockholder may transfer voting right to others by proxy votes (fullmakt). There are no 
restrictions on the use of proxy votes, but their existence can only be observed if they are 
actually used at the stockholder meeting. 
Unlike countries like Italy, which has a cap on how much two firms can reciprocally own 
in each other, Norway has no general regulation on intercorporate investments.20 To fully 
capture the effect of intercorporate investments, all equity stakes in a firm must be traced 
through all layers of intermediate corporate shareholdings (like mutual funds or interlocking 
                                                 
17 The board of commercial banks is regulated by both the corporate law and the bank law (forretningsbankloven). These 
regulations impose the same type of two-tier board structure on banks as for non-banks.  The supervisory board of the bank 
(representantskap) elects the regular board, and the control function of the supervisory board is similar to that of non-bank 
supervisory boards. As will be discussed in chapter 4, financial firms are not in our sample. 
18 As pointed out in section 3.1.3, non-voting shares cannot vote on matters that require a simple majority, but enjoy full 
rights in one of the two voting rounds for charter amendments, which require a 2/3 super-majority.  Examples of cases 
involving charter amendments are new stock issues, mergers, voting right restrictions, and changes in corporate objectives. 
 
19 In financial institutions, however, no investor can own or vote for more than 10% of the share capital except by special 
permission from the Ministry of Finance. As this rule is stated in terms of both cash flow rights and voting rights, the 
ownership cap also applies to non-voting shares. By putting a ceiling on the maximum gap between the cash flow right and 
the voting right, this regulation limits the ability to separate these two rights in banks. As stated earlier, financial institutions 
will only be included in our sample as owners and not as owned. 
20 Financial firms cannot freely hold other firms' shares. Insurance companies can hold up to 15% of the cash flow or voting 
rights in other firms, and mutual funds can own up to 10%. Banks have no such direct restrictions on fractions, but there is 
one cap on the total amount of equity investments across all firms and another cap on the investment in each separate firm. 
The upper limit on total equity holdings is a certain percentage of the bank's equity and subordinated debt. The general 
property of this regulation is that the smaller the investing bank and the larger the firms it invests in, the smaller the 
maximum fraction that can be owned. 
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pyramids of listed and nonlisted firms) back to the ultimate personal owner or the state.  Our 
data set allows for this approach, which we follow in chapter 7. 
3.1.6  Minority protection 
The basic regulatory tool for minority protection is the principle of equal proportional rights 
(en-aksje-en-stemme). The law states that no corporate charter can limit the owner's right to 
attend the stockholder meeting, be present by a proxy representative, bring along an advisor, 
put a case on the agenda for voting, receive the same information as any other stockholder, 
and to bring decisions made at the stockholder meeting up for the courts. The law also gives a 
pre-emptive right for every stockholder to participate in equity issues. This right can only be 
waived by a 2/3 majority vote of the outstanding shares (voting plus non-voting).  
Several other regulations prevent the transfer of wealth from small to large stockholders. 
A flagging system informs small investors of listed firms when shares are transferred to or 
from large investors. The rules at the end of the sample period is that investors passing up or 
down through the thresholds of 5%, 10%, 20%, 33%, 50%, 67% and 90% of the outstanding 
cash flow or voting rights must notify both the firm and the OSE.21 Stockholders in listed 
firms passing the 40% voting rights threshold (45% before December 1997) must give a 
tender offer (pliktig tilbud) to all the other stockholders.22 
There is neither a flagging system nor a 40% mandatory bid rule for nonlisted firms. 
However, the 90% freezeout (tvangsinnløsning) rule is independent of listing status. In 
particular, an investor holding over 90% of the shares is obliged to buy the shares from any 
stockholder who wants to sell. This rule is symmetric, as the 90% majority owner has the 
right to buy the remaining shares from the minority. 
The insider trading (innsidehandel) rules state that regardless of whether or not you are 
affiliated with the firm, it is illegal to trade in its shares based on private information which is 
pricing relevant and currently not reflected in the price. Key employees in listed firms are 
barred from trading around certain corporate events, like the management team two months 
before the annual report is published. Such firm insiders in listed firms must report all their 
trades to the OSE no later than the morning after the trading day.23 In a nonlisted ASA, such 
information must be reported to the board, which keeps the information in a register which is 
not open to the public. A stockholder in an AS has no such reporting obligations.  
These stockholder protection rules are independent of the number of shares held or 
whether they are voting or non-voting.  Several additional ownership rights are granted to 
shareholders who represent a certain minimum of the share capital. Holders of at least 5% of 
the outstanding share capital in an ASA or 10% in an AS can force the appointment of an 
additional auditor and initiate an extraordinary stockholder meeting. Shareholders owning at 
least 10% of the outstanding share capital in either firm type can prompt an investigation of 
management's actions or sue any member of the management team, the two boards, the 
                                                 
21 The steps of the flagging rules have changed over the sample period.  From 01.01.94 to 01.12.97, they were 10, 25, 50, 
and 75%. After 01.12.97 to the end of the sample period, the thresholds specified in the main text have remained unaltered. 
22 The listing requirements ensure a minimum shareholder dispersion at the initial public offering (IPO). At least 25% of the 
shares must be owned by the general public, and at least 500 investors (50 investors for small firms) must own at least one 
round lot. After the IPO, there is no explicit regulation of ownership dispersion except that if a concentrated ownership 
structure produces a sufficiently low trading volume, the firm may be delisted at the discretion of the OSE. As of April 2008, 
the minimum requirement on the number of shareholders does not exist anymore. 
23 Before 1997 the regulation allowed a delay of up to 3 months in reporting insider trades. 
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auditor, and other stockholders.24 However, minority shareholders are not protected by a 
cumulative voting system, and they cannot vote by mail except when the board of firms with 
less than 20 owners choose to have their stockholder meeting by mail (see section 3.1.3). 
3.1.7 The recording of ownership 
Every ASA must report each transaction of its equity to the VPS (Verdipapirsentralen), 
which is the securities registry. The notification specifies the identity of the buyer and seller, 
the time of the transaction, the number of securities traded, and the price.25 A change in the 
number of securities outstanding must be reported, such as stock splits, treasury stock issues, 
and issues of new shares. Thus, the VPS files contain the full ownership structure for every 
listed and nonlisted ASA. The database is computer readable and has been operative since 
1989. It provides a consistent time series of complete ownership structure data for any owner 
over nineteen years, which is exceptional by international standards. More details can be 
found in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000, section 2.3). 
Firms organized as an AS must keep a so-called Ownership Book (Aksjeeierbok), which 
keeps track of all trades in the firm’s stock. This register is open to the public. However, it is 
only available on a firm-by-firm basis, and is not computer-readable. 
3.2 Financial accounting regulation 
The accounting law (Regnskapsloven), which was passed in 1998, does not distinguish 
between ASA and AS firms, but between small, medium-sized, and large firms. ASA firms 
are automatically large, and the accounting rules of large and medium-sized firms are fairly 
close.26  This section summarizes the major differences in financial reporting requirements 
between small firms and other firms. These rules are specified in Accounting Standard 08.27 
A small firm in a financial reporting sense is an AS that meets at least two of the 
following three requirements: 
1. Less than 60 million NOK of sales  
2. Less than 30 million NOK of assets 
3. Less than 50 employees.28 
 
Starting with the population of all 157,710 limited liability firms in 2005 in table 4.1, we 
find that 82,569 pass the sample filters (to be presented in chapter 4). 76,767 of these firms 
are small in a financial reporting sense. Thus, the accounting rules for small firms apply to 
93% of the basic sample. However, because a subsidiary may use its owner’s accounting 
principles, the actual fraction of firms following the small firm rules is probably lower.  
                                                 
24 These hurdles are lower for ASAs with more than 100 employees. Just 10% of the shareholders of such firms are needed 
to support the claim, even if they represent less than 10% of the share capital. 
25 Unlike many European countries, Norway does not allow the system of bearer shares. This means the identity of any 
owner is known from the VPS database except when international investors deposit their shares in nominee accounts with an 
investment bank.  
26 All limited liability firms were exposed to the same accounting regulations until January 01 1999. From 2005 on, the IFRS 
(International Financial Reporting Standards) is mandatory for consolidated accounts unless the firm follows  US GAAP. 
27 The Accounting Law is available at www.lovdata.no, whereas the Accounting Standard 08 is at www.regnskaps-
stiftelsen.no. 
28 Up until January 01 2004, the lower bounds were 40 million, 20 million, and 50 employees, respectively. 
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The accounting regulation for small firms is special along two dimensions. First, certain 
items do not have to be reported. A small firm may choose to not report the cash flow 
statement and does not have to account for its subsidiaries by a consolidated accounting 
statement, provided the consolidated accounting variables do not exceed the firm size 
threshold as specified above. The cost of stock-based incentive pay does not have to be 
expensed, and production costs may only reflect the variable part. Small firms may neither 
specify the value of the deferred taxes nor the insured pension liabilities.    
The second difference is that although the profit and loss statement, balance sheet, 
footnotes, and the board report are mandatory components of the financial reporting for all 
firms, some of these items can be specified by simpler procedures in small firms. This option 
relates to about 15 items. For instance, income from multi-component contracts may not have 
to be recognized until every component is sold, lease obligations may not be capitalized, and 
stocks may be reported at their historic cost. Some footnotes may be ignored, such as 
breakdown of wages, specification of extraordinary items, and transactions with subsidiaries. 
From a data quality point of view, it is important to notice that all firms must have their 
accounting statements audited by a statutory auditor. Listed companies must have an state-
authorized auditor, whereas other companies can choose between state-authorized or state-
registered auditors.29 The audited accounting statements must be submitted to the Public 
Accounting Register every year (Brønnøysundregistrene; www.brreg.no/english). Failure to 
do so within 17 months after fiscal year-end produces automatic liquidation by the court. 
Chapter 4 describes how the CCGR database relates to this register. 
3.3 Summary  
The regulation of corporate governance occurs through the corporate law, and listed firms are 
also regulated by the securities law, the listing requirements of the Oslo Stock Exchange 
(OSE), and the OSE Corporate Governance Code. A firm is either an AS or an ASA, the 
ASA legal form is mandatory for listed firms, and nonlisted firms above a minimum size can 
choose between the two. Less than 1% of the firms are ASA firms.  
Charter amendments require a 2/3 majority vote by all stockholders, regardless of 
whether the stock is voting or non-voting. Most other issues need simple majority by voting 
stockholders. Any owner can put items on the agenda for the ordinary stockholder meeting, 
and no charter can limit the owner's right to attend, be present by proxy, bring an advisor, put 
a case on the agenda, receive the same information as other stockholders, and bring decisions 
made at the stockholder meeting to court. Unless waived by a 2/3 majority, every stockholder 
has a pre-emptive right to participate in new equity issues. You need at least 5% of the cash 
flow rights in an ASA and 10% in an AS to call an extraordinary stockholder meeting or ask 
for an additional auditor. A flagging system informs all investors of a listed firm when large 
                                                 
29 According to Hope and Langli (2007), “The educational requirements for state-authorization are the most extensive and 
demanding. Several European countries have a similar arrangement of two types of auditors within the profession, for 
example, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In particular, the Danish and Norwegian 
two-level systems of auditors are very similar. The law reserves exclusive rights to perform all statutory audits for the 
registered and state-authorized auditors. However, the registered auditors are excluded from auditing joint-stock companies 
with more than 200 employees, all listed companies, and some companies in specific fields like banking, financial services, 
and insurance. Eilifsen (1998) concludes that, except for Norwegian statutory auditors’ additional responsibility related to 
controlling their client firms’ tax obligations, the Norwegian regulatory arrangements and the statutory auditor’s 
responsibilities bear close resemblances to those found in other countries, especially in the other Nordic countries. Similarly, 
in their study of auditing regulation in Europe, Buijink, Maijoor, Meuwissen, and Van Witteloostuijn (1996) classify 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden as one cluster.” 
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investors trade in its stock, and stockholders in listed firms passing the 40% voting rights 
threshold must give a tender offer to all remaining stockholders. Whereas the flagging rule 
and the mandatory bid rule only apply to listed firms, only, a 90% freezeout rule applies to all 
firms. Stockholder with at least 10% of cash flow or voting rights can prompt an investigation 
of management's actions or sue management, the board, the auditor, and their co-owners. 
Limited liability firms with more than 200 employees must have a two-tiered board 
unless vetoed by the employees or if the firm belongs to a few exempted industries. The 
supervisory board elects the regular board and makes the final decision on large investments 
and disinvestments. One third of the directors come from the employees in firms with more 
than 200 people. CEO-chairman duality is illegal if the share capital exceeds 3 million NOK, 
and ASA boards must have at least 40% of each gender among its stockholder-elected 
directors as of year-end 2007. Trades by corporate insiders in listed firms must be reported to 
the OSE the next morning. Insiders in nonlisted firms have no such reporting obligations. 
Cash flow rights can be separated from voting rights through non-voting shares and by 
voting restrictions in the charter. Stockholders may establish voting pacts, transfer voting 
rights by proxy votes, and build pyramids by intercorporate investment. The CCGR database 
has no information on share classes, voting pacts, voting caps, and proxy votes. Since we 
know the ownership structure of all firms, however, we can undo all pyramiding of cash flow 
rights. 
ASA firms must report each transaction of its outstanding equity to the securities 
registry. AS firms must keep track of all trades in the stock in a register which is open to the 
public, only available on a firm-by-firm basis, and not computer-readable. 
The accounting law does not distinguish between ASA and AS firms, but between small, 
medium-sized, and large firms. ASA firms are automatically large firms, and the accounting 
regulation of large and medium-sized firms are rather similar. Small firms, which account for 
the vast majority of the population, can choose not to report certain accounting items, certain 
items can be specified by simpler procedures, and some footnotes may be ignored. All firms 
must submit audited accounting statements to a public register every year. If this does not 
happen within 17 months after the end of the fiscal year, the firm is automatically liquidated 
by the court. 
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4. The CCGR database  
Section 4.1 specifies the data sources of the CCGR database, describes its contents, and 
compares it to alternative databases. We report the size of the population, the filtering 
procedure, and the resulting size of the sample of listed and nonlisted firms in section 4.2. 
The  system for classifying firms into industries and industry sectors follows in section 4.3. 
4.1 Sources and contents  
As pointed out in section 3.2, every Norwegian firm with limited liability is legally obliged to 
publish full accounting statements every year. It must also report the identity of its CEO, the 
directors, and the owners, as well as each owner’s equity holding in the firm. This 
information is submitted to a state agency (Brønnøysundregistrene). The core of the CCGR 
database is constructed from data delivered by CreditInform (www.creditinform.no), which 
specializes in credit ratings and buys data from the state agency partly in electronic format, 
partly and mostly in paper format. The CCGR database includes every firm with limited 
liability registered in Norway.30 It covers the period 1994-2005 for accounting information 
and general firm information, whereas data on governance (ownership structure, board 
composition, and CEO identity), founding year, auditor remarks, and credit ratings is for the 
years 2000-2005. We will extend the time series with data for 2006 and 2007 during the 
project period. This means there will be 14 years of accounting data (1994-2007) and 8 years 
of governance data (2000-2007) in the database by the end of 2008.31 
Appendix 4.A1 provides a full specification of the entries in the CCGR database. There 
are about 130, 70, and 40 data items per firm per year in the accounting, governance, and 
misc. category, respectively.32 The governance data contains all equity holdings of at least 
5%, and also smaller holdings for some firms. Although we know the holding of every owner 
of an ASA firm from the VPS database, this has limited value for our purpose, as the owners 
in the VPS database are anonymized and cannot be matched with the owner or insider data in 
the CCGR database. The governance data includes both first layer and ultimate (all-layers) 
ownership. It also provides group structure (konsern) information, such as what subsidiaries a 
parent owns and what parent a subsidiary is owned by.  
The only alternative database we are aware of is Amadeus, which has about 45 
accounting items (starting around 1995 for the countries with the longest time series) and 
ownership data (from 2003 on) reflecting the size and type of blockholders. Unlike the 
CGGR database, Amadeus does not report insider equity holdings, family ownership, family 
directorships, family management, group structures, or time series of board composition. 
Items like credit ratings and auditor remarks are not included, and industry classifications 
only refer to the most recent date. 
                                                 
30 The database also has corresponding data on all other organizational forms of enterprise, such as partnerships, 
foundations, and mutuals. Our study will not use this type of data. 
31 The CCGR database serves as a joint infrastructure for several projects under the CCGR umbrella. The data may also be 
made available on a case-by-case basis for BI faculty and students who are not associated with the CCGR. Therefore, we 
have spent considerable effort setting up a database with a minimum of errors and a maximum of functionality. The 
requirements on data quality and traceability as well as the size of the database necessitate close attention to procedures for 
loading, storing, transforming, querying, and extracting the data. Pål Rydland has built the CCGR database and performed 
the data quality tests. Since it contains sensitive personal information via the social security number of owners, officers, and 
directors, we have been granted permission to store data by the Data Inspectorate (Datatilsynet; www.datatilsynet.no). 
32 An additional 126 data items are reserved for consolidated accounting data. 
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4.2 Population, filters, and sample size 
Table 4.1 shows details of the sample construction for all limited liability firms in panel A 
and for the subsample of firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in panel B. 
[Table 4.1] 
Panel A initially allows all business enterprises of any organizational form into the 
sample, such as partnerships, mutuals, foundations, and limited liability firms. The first filter, 
which excludes firms without limited liability, generates the relevant population for our 
study, which has around 130,000 AS and ASA firms on average per year and more firms later 
in the sample period than in the beginning. Filters 2 and 3 are activity restrictions, ensuring 
that the firm has positive sales and assets, respectively. These filters reduce the average 
number of firms from roughly 130,000 to 120,000. Filter 4 deletes firms that do not pass non-
negativity restrictions on various accounting statement items, whereas 5 and 6 put 
consistency restrictions on the relationship between a sum and its components. Filter 7 
excludes firms that never have employees over the sample period, whereas filter 8 adds the 
requirement for nonlisted firms that employees are either positive or missing in that year. The 
two employment filters are the most restrictive of all filters, reducing average sample size 
before the filter by almost 30%. 
To produce our sample, we consider the first and the last year a firm passes all these 
filters and include all years between. These firms are called the sample candidates in the 
table. Next, we exclude financial firms. Finally, we exclude subsidiaries and instead use the 
consolidated (group) accounts of the parent company to reflect the combined activity of 
parent and subsidiary in the absence of double-counting.  
This filtering procedure leaves us with the basic filter and the basic sample, which we 
will use in the following. This sample has about 77,000 firms per year, rising from about 
59,000 in the beginning to 83,000 in the end of the sample period. Only 134 of the firms are 
listed on average. That is, 99.8% of the firms are nonlisted and 0.2% are listed.  
Panel B shows the details of the filtering process for the listed firms. The major 
reduction in sample size occurs in filter 2, which excludes so called PCC banks 
(grunnfondsbank).33 Whereas panel A shows that the number of firms is constantly 
increasing over time both for the population and the basic sample, panel B documents that 
this tendency is less clear for listed firms. For instance, the number of firms in the basic 
sample grows until 1998, declines thereafter until 2003, and then rises again. 
                                                
In the chapters that follow, we state amounts in terms of bill. NOK as of December 31 
2005, which is the end of the sample period. Growth rates are in real terms, i.e., percentage 
change in excess of observed inflation. We use the consolidated accounts of the parent 
company rather than its unconsolidated accounts except when the firm’s consolidated assets 
are less than 85% of its non consolidated assets. 
4.3 Industry classification 
All firms are classified according to its NAIC industry code as specified in Appendix 4.A2, 
which also assigns industries to nine aggregate industry sectors. For expositional simplicity, 
we will only deal with these industry sectors in the following. Table 4.2 shows alternative 
measures of aggregate size across these industry sectors in 2005. 
 
33 A PCC is partly an ownerless foundation, partly a regular stock company owned by holders of listed PCC securities. 
24
[Table 4.2] 
Table 4.2 documents that the service and trade sectors jointly account for 68% of all 
firms with limited liability in 2005. At the opposite extreme, the energy sector has only 0.4% 
of the firms. However, energy is the largest sector as measured by sales and assets, whereas 
service holds this position by employments. Chapter 6 will have more to say about the 
distribution of firm size across the sectors. 
4.4 Summary 
The CCGR database, which includes every firm with limited liability registered in Norway, 
currently covers twelve years of accounting data and six years of governance data. The 
available data set is considerably more extensive than what has been available for research 
purposes in the past. This is because Norwegian law mandates every limited liability firm to 
publish an annual report each year that consists of a profits and loss statement, a balance 
sheet, accompanying footnotes, a cash flow statement, the board of directors report, and the 
auditor’s report. The rules governing the structure and contents of these accounting 
statements, which must be audited by a publicly certified auditor, apply to all limited liability 
firms, independently of listing status, age, and industry. The firm must publish the identity of 
its CEO, directors, and owners, and the fraction of equity held by every owner. This 
information, which is stored centrally in a public database, is the major source of the CCGR 
database, which has about 240 items per firm year. This data set includes credit ratings, 
founding year, zip code, and also the NAIC industry code, which we use to classify firms into 
nine broad industry sectors. 
There are about 130,000 firms with limited liability in the CCGR database per year, 
rising from about 100,000 firms at the beginning of the sample period to 160,000 at the end. 
Applying a series of consistency filters, requiring all firms to be active, and excluding 
financial firms and subsidiaries, our sample has on average roughly 77,000 firms per year. 
About 0.2% of them are listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
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5. Macro-economic significance  
We start this chapter by documenting the absolute and relative size of nonlisted and listed 
firms in the Norwegian economy. Section 5.2 focuses on listed firms by first relating the 
aggregate market value of their equity (i.e., market cap) to Norway’s GNP. To better 
understand whether the relative importance of listed firms in Norway is a typical case 
internationally, we compare the ratio of market cap to GNP across a wide range of countries. 
5.1 Norwegian firms with limited liability 
The most common economic measures of firm size are sales, assets, and employees. Table 
5.1 shows such figures for our sample as defined in table 4.1. The table documents that the 
aggregate sales of firms with limited liability is about 50% of GNP. The book value of assets 
is around 55%, and these firms employ 1.2 million people.34 The separate figures for 
nonlisted and listed firms at the bottom of the table show that sales and assets represent about 
40% of GNP in nonlisted firms and about 15% in listed firms. The nonlisted firms employ 
close to 1 mill. of the 1.2 mill. people working in Norwegian firms with limited liability. 
[Table 5.1] 
Table 5.2 looks more closely at the relative size of nonlisted and listed firms by showing 
their aggregate size as a fraction of all limited firms. Nonlisted firms have in the aggregate 
about four times higher revenues than listed firms, employ four times more people, and hold 
two times more assets. The fraction for employees  is higher in the second part of the sample 
period than in the first, whereas the opposite is true for sales and assets. 
[Table 5.2] 
The table documents that according to standard measures of size, nonlisted firms are 
much more significant than listed firms in the national economy. We are unaware of similar 
statistics from other countries, but we will get a feeling for the general validity of the 
Norwegian case by comparing the ratio of market cap to GNP across countries in section 5.2. 
5.2 Listed firms across the world 
Although we lack data like those in table 5.2 for other countries, we may use some indirect 
evidence. The most common way of measuring the significance of listed firms in the overall 
economy is by the ratio of market cap to GDP, estimating market cap as the stock price times 
the number of shares outstanding.35 Table 5.3 documents this ratio over the sample period 
across a wide range of countries.  
[Table 5.3] 
Panel A shows the ratio of market cap to GDP in 26 European countries, which are 
ranked from lowest to highest according to their mean ratio over the twelve years in the 
rightmost column. The mean and median EU ratios per year and for the period as a whole are 
reported in the two last rows. According to the figures for Norway as stated in bold, the 
market value of listed firms is on average 41% of GDP. The ratio is generally increasing over 
time from 29% at the beginning of the sample period to 67% at the end. The volatility of the 
                                                 
34 The total 2005 labor force in Norway was 2.3 million (Source: Statistics Norway). 
35 The GNP, which we use in table 5.1, would probably be a more suitable measure of domestic value creation. However, the 
data source we use for table 5.3 is based on GDP, only. 
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ratio around the long-term trend is primarily due to fluctuating stock market valuations rather 
than large ups and downs in the fraction of economic activity that is listed. 
Panel A reveals large differences in the ratio of market cap to GDP across European 
counties. Not surprisingly, Eastern European countries have lower ratios than others, 
although their ratios grow strongly in the second half of the sample period. If we compare 
Norway to the overall EU figures at the bottom of panel A, we find that the Norwegian ratio 
of market cap to GDP is somewhat lower than the EU average, but quite close to the median. 
Thus, if the relative significance of listed firms in the economy can be measured by market 
cap to GDP, the situation in Norway as documented in table 5.2 is rather typical for European 
countries. 
Panel B shows market cap to GDP across three levels of GDP per capita (high-middle-
low income) and for the world as a whole. These figures generally support the impression of 
Norway as being a rather typical country in this respect. It seems fair to conclude that 
nonlisted firms in the aggregate account for a much higher portion of economic activity than 
listed firms in most countries in the world. 
5.3 Summary  
Nonlisted firms have in the aggregate four times higher revenues than listed firms, employ 
four times more people, and hold twice as much assets. Thus, nonlisted firms as a whole are 
considerably more significant than listed firms in the Norwegian economy. Although the data 
we use to establish this conclusion is not available for other countries, one may get a feeling 
for the general validity of this case by comparing the ratio of listed firms’ market cap to GDP 
in Norway to what it is in other countries. This comparison suggests that the relative 
importance of nonlisted firms we have found in the Norwegian economy is a typical case. 
Thus, it is also true internationally that compared to listed firms, nonlisted firms account 
in the aggregate for a much higher portion of economic activity. This finding makes it even 
more remarkable that so little is known about the corporate finance and governance of firms 
that are not on the stock exchange. The next chapter takes a first step towards addressing this 
lacking insight by showing key corporate finance characteristics of nonlisted firms and 
comparing them to those of listed firms. 
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6. Corporate finance 
This chapter presents a wide range of corporate finance characteristics for Norwegian 
companies with limited liability, using the basic sample from table 4.1. We classify these 
characteristics into seven groups in sections 6.1-6.7, calling them size, asset structure, capital 
structure, profitability, growth, dividends, and technology, respectively. The corporate 
finance variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. 
Our objective is to describe the corporate finance characteristics per se rather than 
making strong attempts at explaining how they have come about. Doing the latter for every 
characteristic would takes us too far astray, given the overall objective of this report, which is 
to give a first look and to pinpoint interesting patterns which may be analyzed later in a more 
focused and elaborate way. Thus, we describe a given corporate finance characteristic the 
way it turns up in the data, mostly trying to understand it only in terms of a small set of 
simple, general firm properties, which are firm size, listing status, age, and industry. For 
instance, we explore whether the asset structure seems to vary with firm size, industry, and 
listing status, but do not test for theoretically well-founded determinants of asset structure. In 
the capital structure and dividends sections, however, we move somewhat closer to a 
hypothesis testing mode, such as when exploring how the relationship between dividends and 
firm size depends on whether the firm is listed or nonlisted, young or old,  and whether it is in 
manufacturing or service.  Similarly, we relate the firm’s capital structure to several classic 
determinants from the theory of corporate finance. Even there, however, the objective is not 
to test theories per se, but to demonstrate the richness of the CCGR database. 
The analytical tools we use in chapters 6 and 7 are descriptive statistics tables, 
histograms, and statistical regressions. Since the combined set of characteristics and 
analytical tools is so large, we have chosen not to report histograms except in a very few 
illustrating cases. Cross-sectional results for a given year always refer to 2005, which is the 
most current sample year. Time-series results cover the full sample period, i.e., 1994-2005.  
Table 6.S1 summarizes descriptive statistics of the corporate finance variables that will 
be discussed in the following (S is short for Summary). Table 6.S2 shows the corresponding 
corporate finance variables by industry sector and then by firm size. While these two tables 
refer to the final sample year (2005), the third summary table 6.S3 shows the pattern year by 





Table 6.1.1 presents descriptive statistics for firm size, classifying a firm as small if it has less 
than 20 employees, medium if it employs between 20 and 99, and large otherwise.36  Two 
striking patterns emerge in panel A. First, most firms (92%) are small. In fact, we will show 
later than more than half the firms employ less than five. Second, large firms only represent 
1% of all firms, but account for roughly 60% of activity as measured by employment, assets, 
or sales. Medium sized firms constitute 6% of the sample and  about 15% of the activity. 
                                                 
36 This definition of a small firm as one with less than 20 employees differs from the cutoff of 50 used by the accounting 
regulation (section 3.2). The present definition is more consistent with the literature on small and medium-sized firms. 
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[Table 6.1.1] 
Panel C shows the corresponding distribution for listed firms. This panel tells a very 
different story. More than two thirds of listed firms are large, and these large firms account 
for almost all the activity. In fact, listed firms with more than 1,000 employees represent 
about one fourth of these firms and about 90% of the activity.  
The fact that the nonlisted firms in panel B represent 99.8% of all firms explains why the 
distribution across small, medium, and large firms corresponds to what we found for all firms 
in panel A. Although the vast majority of nonlisted firms (93%) are small, it is important to 
notice that almost 900 nonlisted firms are large. This is almost ten times more than in the 
listed firms sample. Thus, finding enough nonlisted firms to match listed firms according to 
the 100 employees size minimum is easy in the CCGR database.  
The distribution of aggregate activity across industry sectors is reported in table 6.1.2. 
While the energy sector has the lowest number of firms, energy firms are more often large 
than in any other industry sector (12%). Moreover, 91% of the employment in energy firms 
takes place in large firms. In contrast, there are roughly five times more firms in agriculture, 
but large agricultural firms only account for 37% of that industry sector’s employment. 
Finally, the service industry sector has by far the largest number of firms. 94% of them are 
small, but the majority of their employment and sales still occurs in large firms.  
[Table 6.1.2] 
Looking more closely at the distributional properties for size, panel B of the summary 
table 6.S1 shows that a median nonlisted firm recorded assets of 1.8 million NOK in 2005, 
sales of 2.7 million NOK, and 2.3 employees. In contrast, the median listed firm in panel D 
has 638 million in assets, 271 million in sales, and 248 employees. Thus, a typical listed firm 
is 100-350 times larger than a typical nonlisted firm, depending on the size measure used. 
This table also reports many additional characteristics of the frequency distribution, which 
can also be visualized in terms of histograms. To save space, we only show one example in 
figure 6.1.1, which is the histogram for size as measured by sales across all firms with limited 
liability in 2005. Notice that this distribution closely resembles a lognormal, although the 
statistical test for log normality is rejected.37  We find the same close resemblance to a 
lognormal distribution in the subsamples of nonlisted and listed firms. The corresponding 
histograms based on assets and employees have the same feature. 
[Figure 6.1.1] 
We report time variation for the corporate finance variables in table 6.S3. The median 
nonlisted firm (panel B) becomes gradually larger over time in terms of assets, whereas the 
median listed firm (panel D) gets smaller both in terms of employment, assets, and sales. 
Summarizing, we started this section by classifying firms as small, medium and large, 
depending on whether they have less than 20 employees, 20-99, or at least 100. Whereas over 
two thirds of the listed firms are large, the vast majority of nonlisted firms are small. Still, 
there are about ten times more large firms among the nonlisted than the listed firms in our 
sample. The distribution of size across firms is also very different across industries. For 
instance, 91% of the employment in energy firms takes place in large firms, but only 54% 
does in the service industry, which has by far the largest number of firms. Regardless of 
whether we measure size by sales, assets, or employees, the distribution of size across the 
sample closely resembles a lognormal. Thus is true regardless of whether we consider all 
firms, listed firm, or nonlisted firms. 
                                                 
37 The insert in the bottom right corner reports the goodness-of-fit statistics and p-values for the Anderson-Darling (A-D), 
the Cramér-von Mises (C-von-M), and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Kolmogorov) test, respectively.  
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In the following, we often want to compare nonlisted and listed firms of similar size. For 
this purpose, we construct a subsample called large nonlisted firms, defining it as the 5% 
largest nonlisted firms by sales. That is, a large nonlisted firm is not defined by the 100 
employees minimum from now on, but by being among the nonlisted firms with the top 5% 
sales. This subsample has about 4,000 firms in a given year. Although the median large 
nonlisted firm is still considerably smaller than the median listed firms (e.g., 33 vs. 248 
employees), there are still many nonlisted firms that size-match a listed firm. For instance, 
about 800 nonlisted firms are larger than the median listed. About 400 nonlisted firms have 
sales above 1 bill., whereas only about 40 listed firms do. Thus, in general, it is easy to find 
nonlisted firms that match listed firms quite well in terms of size. 
6.2 Asset structure 
We first examine the asset structure in 2005 as reported in table 6.S1. The median nonlisted 
firm has 1.8 million in total assets, 1.0 in current assets, no inventory, 0.3 million in cash and 
receivables, and 0.2 million in working capital (panel B). The median listed firm has 638 
million in total assets, 231 in current assets, 2 million of inventory, 89 million in cash and 
receivables, and a working capital of 82 million (panel D).   
To control for the finding in section 6.1 that most nonlisted firms are much smaller than 
listed, panel C shows the corresponding figures for what we from now on call the large 
nonlisted firms, which are the top 5% nonlisted firms by sales. Whereas listed firms report a 
median current-assets-to-assets ratio of 36%, it is 78% in nonlisted firms of similar size 
(panel B shows it is 79% for nonlisted firms as a whole). Thus, the assets are indeed much 
more liquid in nonlisted firms. Finally, table 6.S3 shows no clear time pattern in the asset 
structure of listed firms, whereas large nonlisted become less inventory-intensive over time.  
We next examine investment in depreciable assets (IDA). Although table 6.2.1 shows 
variation across industries, tables 6.S2 and 6.S3 document that the median IDA is 
surprisingly low for nonlisted firms and decreases to 2%-3% at the end of the sample period. 
The corresponding figure for listed firms is typically 20%. Also, median depreciation is 
around 24% of depreciable assets in nonlisted firms, but is mostly below 20% in listed firms.  
[Table 6.2.1] 
The difference between the depreciation ratio and IDA decreases with size (table 6.S2), 
suggesting that larger firms have higher net investment. Moreover, and remarkably, panel C 
of table 6.S1 shows that the median IDA in 2005 is 16% for large nonlisted firm, whereas 
panel D shows it is and 31% for listed.  The corresponding median depreciation ratios are 
24% and 19%, respectively. This suggests that while listed firms plentifully replenish fixed 
assets and increase capacity year by year, nonlisted firms of similar size do not.38 
Summarizing this section, we find that listed firms have a less liquid asset structure than 
nonlisted firms. Listed firm also invest considerably more in fixed assets relative to the 
depreciation rate. In particular, whereas nonlisted firms hardly keep constant capacity by 
investing to offset depreciation, the real investment of listed firms tends to be considerably 
higher than their depreciation.  
                                                 
38 For the subsample of nonlisted firms that report 2005-adjusted assets above 10 million NOK, the IDA varies over time, 
but is always below the depreciation ratio (table 6.S3, panel B).  For listed firms (table 6.S3, panel D), the IDA varies 
considerably over time, being around 40% in the early part of the sample and in the low teens in 2002 and 2003. 
Nonetheless, the corresponding depreciation-to-IDA also changes over time and is almost always below the investment ratio. 
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6.3 Capital structure   
Table 6.S1 describes the distribution of the main capital structure characteristics in 2005. For 
the median nonlisted firm, total debt accounts for 77% of total assets, 90% of the total debt is 
current, and the working capital comprises 15% of the assets. In the median listed company,  
47% of the assets are financed with debt, 64% of the debt is current, and the working capital 
is 10%.39 Panel C shows that this pattern also holds for large nonlisted firms: The median 
large nonlisted firm is more leveraged than similar listed firms (75% vs. 47%), has more 
current debt (82% vs. 64%), and more working capital (16% vs. 10%). 
Table 6.S2 examines corporate finance characteristics across industries.  For nonlisted 
firms, leverage is very homogenous except in energy, where debt financing is considerably 
less common. We find more industry variation in listed firms, but leverage is still smaller 
than for nonlisted firms in every industry. The stronger heterogeneity for listed firms also 
occurs for debt maturity, which is unusually long in energy and very short in construction.40 
Capital structure dynamics is shown in table 6.S3.  Leverage stays very stable around 50% in 
listed firms, but increases over time for the large nonlisted. Debt maturity decreases over the 
sample period in both firm types. 
Table 6.3.1 estimates the relationship between leverage and a series of determinants. 
Based on existing theory and empirics, Giannetti (2003) posits that regardless of listing 
status, leverage correlates positively with asset tangibility (tangible assets provide better 
collateral), firm age (older firms have better reputation), and firm size (larger firms have 
lower business risk). A negative relationship is expected between leverage and growth (high 
growth triggers more asset substitution), non-debt tax shields (better tax-reduction substitutes 
for interest payments), and ROA (profitable firms can finance more from earnings).  
[Table 6.3.1] 
We examine a similar model, which we estimate with different samples and econometric 
techniques to check for robustness. In particular, we use all firms from the whole sample 
period in model (1), all firms from 2005 in (2) to check if the pooling in model (1) matters, 
nonlisted firms from 1997 in (3) to check if the estimated equation is stable over time, and 
finally large firms in model (4) to check if more size homogeneity matters. We define large 
firms by sales in model (4) as the 90% largest of the listed firms and the 5% largest of the 
nonlisted firms. We add squared terms for size and age in every model to account for 
nonlinearity, and we control for industry effects. Finally, we restrict the sum of the estimated 
coefficients to be zero for the two listing dummies as a group and for the ten industry 
dummies as a group. Thus, any coefficient shows the expected effect of the type compared to 
the average effect in the group. For instance, the coefficient for the nonlisted dummy shows 
the expected leverage effect of being nonlisted relative to the average effect of listed and 
nonlisted firms as a group.41 
The first thing to notice from table 6.3.1 is that the estimated relationships are very stable 
across the four models, which explain about one fourth of the variation in leverage. Second, 
                                                 
39 One fourth of the nonlisted firms have current debt as their only debt type, while this is only the case for about 5% of the 
listed. The distribution of total debt resembles the log normal distribution for both listed and nonlisted firms, although the 
lognormality tests are rejected for a sample truncated at 5% and 95%. 
40 This larger heterogeneity across industries in listed firms may also be due to the fact that with approximately 135 listed 
firms a year and with nine industries, the sample per industry becomes very small. 
41 Since we use listing status dummies for each firm, we cannot also control for unobservable fixed effects at the firm level 
by using, say, demeaned variables. Random effects estimation may handle this problem, but that would involve the 
restrictive assumption that the leverage effect of observable and nonobservable firm effects are independent (Hsiao (2003)). 
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and most importantly in our setting, having controlled for a series of other determinants such 
as size, growth, and industry, nonlisted firms have significantly higher leverage than listed 
firms. Thus, listing status matters for capital structure, as nonlisted firms have consistently 
higher debt than similar listed firms. This is also what Giannetti finds in six of her eight 
countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, UK), whereas the relationship is insignificant in 
the remaining two (Netherlands and Spain). 
Third, the table shows that leverage correlates positively with asset tangibility, 
negatively with asset returns, and that industry matters. All these results are consistent with 
the prediction. Fourth, leverage is higher when firms are small and when they grow quickly.42 
Both findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis, but in line with Giannetti’s result that 
these relationships differ from country to country, possibly reflecting differences in legal 
creditor protection.43 Finally, leverage and age are inversely related in the subsample of large 
firms, but positively elsewhere. This lack of robustness suggests one should specify the 
samples carefully and not just bundle nonlisted and listed firms of all kinds into one sample. 
Summarizing, we find that financing patterns vary systematically with listing status. 
Compared to listed firms, nonlisted firms of any size finance their assets with more debt and 
use more short-term debt. Leverage is more homogenous across industries in nonlisted firms. 
The finding that nonlisted firms use more debt persists across several multivariate regression 
models where we control for many potential leverage determinants, and where we use several 
alternative samples. These tests also show that regardless of listing status, firms use more 
debt when they are small, when they grow, and when they have low profitability. 
6.4 Profitability 
Distributional properties of the profitability variables in 2005 are shown in Table 6.S1. 
Overall, nonlisted firms tend to have higher book returns to capital invested than listed firms, 
the median return on assets (ROA) being 7% in nonlisted firms and 5% in listed. The median 
return on equity is 35% and 11%, respectively. As the ROE depends on leverage and ROA 
does not, we focus on ROA in the following.44   
The ROA difference becomes larger if we compare firms of similar size. Panels C and D 
demonstrate that the median ROA is three percentage points higher in large nonlisted firms 
than in listed firms (8% vs. 5%). In fact, the ROA is highest for the nonlisted at every 
percentile in the histogram except for the very lowest. We will make a comprehensive 
analysis of the relationship between profitability and listing status in section 7.3, controlling 
for several other variables such as corporate finance, ownership structure, and firm size. 
Summarizing, we find that nonlisted firms have higher returns to assets than listed firms, 
the median ROA being 7% and 5%, respectively. This difference grows by one percentage 
point if we instead compare to the subsample of large nonlisted firms. We will analyze the 
relationship between ROA and firm characteristics in section 7.3. 
                                                 
42 The inverse relationship we find between leverage and size is particularly robust, as it persists if we alternatively measure 
size by employment and sales. 
43 For instance, leverage and size correlate negatively in Italy and the Netherlands and positively in France and the UK. 
44 Panel D of table 6.S3 shows that the median ROA for listed firms is falling towards the middle to the sample period to 




This section analyzes the real growth in assets, sales, and net operating income. According to 
table 6.S1, assets in the median nonlisted firm have grown by 2% in 2005, while sales have 
grown by 5%.  The median net operating income has decreased by 34%, reflecting a much 
higher variation in earnings than in size.  In contrast, median assets in listed firms have grown 
by 16%, sales by 13%, and net operating income dropped by 7%. Large nonlisted firms are 
more comparable to listed, as their median growth rates are 9%, 10%, and 4%, respectively.  
Table 6.S3 shows growth rates over the sample period. They vary considerably over time 
regardless of whether we focus on assets, sales or earnings. Also, there is no clear pattern, as 
no particular combination of size and listing status generates unique growth rates. Thus, our 
finding for 2005 is not the typical case for the full sample period. For instance, large 
nonlisted firms have on average median asset growth of 7% and sales growth of 8% per year. 
The corresponding figures for listed firms are 8% and 9%, respectively. 
In summary, we find that growth rates in both assets, sales, and net income vary 
considerably over time, and that there is no clear relationship in the aggregate data between 
growth on the one hand and firm size and firm type on the other. However, in order to better 
understand whether size and growth are indeed independent as assumed in Gibrat’s Law 
(Sutton, 1997), one needs to formally relate size and growth to each other at the firm level. 
This is an elaborate procedure that we will not pursue in this study. 
6.6 Dividends 
Table 6.6.1 shows the percentage of firms that pay dividends (payers) and the fraction of 
earnings paid out by those that decide to pay (payout ratio). Since 2005 appears to be a very 
unusual year, we exclude this final sample year from the time series summary statistics in the 
rightmost column. The table shows that roughly one third of all limited liability firms pay 
dividends in a given year. Although there is no striking difference between listed firms and 
nonlisted firms as a whole, large nonlisted firms pay dividends considerably more often than 
other firms; typically every second firm as opposed to every third. The payout propensity 
increases over time from the middle of the sample period.   
 The payout ratios are strikingly different. The median nonlisted firm that has decided 
to distribute dividends pays out almost twice as much of its earnings as the median listed 
firm; typically 75% vs. 40%. Among the nonlisted, the payout tends to decrease with firm 
size. These relationships are stable over time, and the payout ratios grow over time in every 
sample, particularly after year 2000. 
[Table 6.6.1] 
The higher payout by the nonlisted firms that decide to pay is consistent with the 
transaction cost idea that dividends and capital gains are substitutes. The more costly it is for 
the firm’s owners to create home-made dividend policy by trading the company’ shares in the 
market, the more dividends the company will pay. The data is also consistent with the notion 
that the majority owners pay high dividends to reduce the second agency problem, i.e., the 
potential conflict of interest between the strong and weak stockholders, which is more serious 
the more concentrated the ownership structure. 
The fact that nonlisted firms pay much higher dividends than listed firms once they 
decide to pay apparently suggests that listed firms actually pay less than what their owners 
prefer. Such a conclusion would be premature, however, since it implicitly assumes that any 
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existence of dividend clienteles is independent of the firm’s listing status. However, the 
distribution of dividend preferences among the owners may depend on listing status. Chapter 
7 will shed light on the validity of this assumption by showing how the ownership structure 
differs between listed and nonlisted firms. It will also show how ownership concentration 
differs, which is relevant for the agency explanation. 
Table 6.6.2 examines the proportion of payers and the dividend payout ratio in a 
regression setting. The potential determinants are listing status, firm size, age, growth, and 
ROA. We also control for industry membership, and we test the models on the sample of all 
firms and the subsample of large firms (i. e., the 90% largest among the listed and the 5% 
largest of the nonlisted).  
The logistic regression shows that firms pay dividends more often when they are old, 
slow-growing, and profitable. Larger firms pay more often in general, but the opposite is true 
within the subsample of large firms. Similarly, nonlisted firms pay dividends more often in 
general, but the relationship is not statistically significant among large firms.  
The second model shows that a dividend payer in the sample of all firms tends to pay out 
more of its earnings when the firm is old, grows slowly, has low returns to assets, is small, 
and nonlisted. This relationship is also observed in large firms, but listing status and growth 
are no longer statistically significant determinants. 
 [Table 6.6.2] 
Summarizing, we have found that although the propensity to pay dividends does not 
differ remarkably with listing status, the typical fraction of earnings paid out once the firm 
decides to pay is much higher among nonlisted firms. Regardless of listing status, the payout 
is also higher the smaller, older, slow-growing, and unprofitable the firm. This may suggest 
dividend payments are vehicles for reducing the cost of low stock liquidity and for mitigating 
the conflict of interest between strong and weak stockholders. The relationship between 
listing status and dividend payout is less clear when we only study large firms of either type. 
6.7 Technology 
This section briefly describes distributional properties of the assets-to-employees ratio (AtE) 
and the sales-to-employees ratio (StE). These two ratios, which are alternative measures of 
labor intensity, may be thought of as crude proxies of production technology. The higher the 
ratios, the less labor intensive the production.45 
Table 6.S1 shows that the median AtE in 2005 is 2.3 for listed firms and 0.5 for 
nonlisted. The median StE is 1.2 and 0.9, respectively. The frequency distribution of either 
ratio resembles the lognormal distribution for both samples, although our tests for log 
normality are rejected. Thus, for the sample as a whole, nonlisted firms are more labor 
intensive than listed firms. Panel C shows, however, that although large nonlisted firms are 
more labor intensive than listed firms according to AtE, the opposite is true according to StE. 
Finally, both ratios for nonlisted firms increase monotonically throughout the sample period, 
reflecting higher asset intensity.  For example, panel B in table 6.S3 documents that the 
median value of assets to employees in a nonlisted firm has grown from 0.31 to 0.47 million. 
A similar pattern can be observed in the other subsamples.  
                                                 
45 Cross-sectional differences in such ratios may also reflect differences in operational efficiency, particularly within a given 
industry. This alternative interpretation is less of a problem in our setting, as we only compare listed firms as a whole to 
nonlisted firms or large nonlisted firms as a whole to get a rough feeling for potential technology differences. 
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Summarizing, this section documents that for the sample as a whole, nonlisted firms are 
more labor intensive than listed. However, the difference is less obvious for large firms. 
Labor intensity drops over time regardless of listing status and firm size.  
6.8 Summary 
This chapter presents key corporate finance characteristics in the basic sample of firms as 
specified in chapter 4. We classify these characteristics into firm size, asset structure, capital 
structure, profitability, growth, dividends, and technology, respectively. Our major objective 
is to provide rich descriptive statistics rather than test existing theories of corporate finance. 
Although listed firms are much larger than most nonlisted firms, there are still 
considerably more large firms in the economy that are nonlisted. For the sample as a whole, 
nonlisted firms are more labor intensive, but not when we only compare large firms. Labor 
intensity falls over time regardless of firm size and listing status. 
Growth rates in assets, sales, and net income vary considerably over time, and there is no 
obvious relationship between growth and listing status. Regardless of whether we measure 
size by sales, assets, or employees, the histogram of size in the basic sample closely 
resembles a lognormal distribution. This is consistent with independence between growth and 
size at the individual firm level. 
Listed firms have less liquid assets than nonlisted firms, and they also invest more 
relative to depreciation. In particular, nonlisted firms tend to keep constant capacity by 
investing to offset depreciation, whereas the real investment of listed firms is considerably 
higher than depreciation. As we also find that their growth rates in sales and earnings are 
fairly similar, this may suggest the marginal value of investments is higher in nonlisted firms, 
possibly because capital constraints make them underinvest. 
Financing patterns vary systematically with listing status, as nonlisted firms fund their 
assets with more debt and use debt with shorter duration. The finding that nonlisted firms use 
more debt persists across a series of multivariate regression models. In thee models, we 
control for many potential leverage determinants, and we use several alternative samples. 
These tests also show that regardless of listing status, firms use more debt when they are 
small, when they grow, and when they have low profitability. 
Nonlisted firms have higher returns to assets than listed firms, and the difference grows 
when we only compare large firms of both types, where the median ROA is 8% in nonlisted 
firms and 5% in listed firm. The propensity to pay dividends does not vary much with listing 
status, but the typical fraction of earnings paid out is much higher both economically and 
statistically when the firm is nonlisted, although the relationship is weaker among large firms. 
Regardless of listing status and firm size, the dividend payout is higher the smaller, older, 
slow-growing, and unprofitable the firm. This may suggest that high dividend payments are 
vehicles for reducing the cost of low stock liquidity and for mitigating the conflict of interest 
between strong and weak stockholders. More elaborate analysis is needed to settle this issue. 
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7. Corporate governance 
Based on existing theory and empirics of corporate governance from chapter 2, we report our 
findings on ownership structure in section 7.1, board composition in 7.2, and the relationship 
between governance and performance in 7.3. 
We present the descriptive statistics for ownership structure and board composition in 
terms of joint summary tables. Table 7.S1 shows distributional properties per ownership and 
board variable for 2005, and table 7.S2 reports three of these properties (the 75th percentile, 
the median, and the mean) by year for the sample period 2000-2005. Tables 7.S3 and 7.S4 
group the 2000-2005 governance variables by industry sector and firm size, respectively. To 
save space, the three latter tables only report the findings for all firms as a group. We will 






Because the CCGR database includes all firms in the economy, we can describe the 
ownership structure by both the standard direct (first-layer) equity holdings and by the 
ultimate (all-layers) holding. That is, if a stock in firm A is held by a Norwegian corporation 
B and not by a person, the state, or a foreigner (i.e., the three ultimate owner types in our 
setting), we can trace the identity of the corporate owner through firm B and possibly through 
other firms owning B until we find the ultimate owner in terms of a person, the state, or a 
foreigner. The ultimate fraction in firm A held by a person, the state, or a foreigner is the sum 
of direct and indirect fractions in A held by such an ultimate owner. The indirect fraction is 
the product of the equity fractions held along the path of indirect holdings from the ultimate 
owner to firm A (LaPorta et al, 1999).46 By comparing the results based on direct and 
ultimate ownership, we can clarify whether first-layer ownership is sufficient or whether it is 
crucial to undo ownership pyramids and pin down the ultimate owners behind all layers, 
which requires much more comprehensive ownership data which seldom exists.47 Since the 
nonlisted firms dominate the sample of all firms by any standard for aggregate size, we 
mostly focus on the three samples of all firms, large nonlisted firms, and listed firms. 
We report the findings on ownership concentration in section 7.1.1, owner types in 7.1.2, 
and insider ownership in 7.1.3, respectively. All the corporate governance variables are 
defined in Appendix 7.A1. 
                                                 
46 The control right, as opposed to the cash flow right described above, is the direct voting fraction held in A plus the 
minimum of the voting fractions held at any point along the indirect path. We will only use cash flow rights in the following. 
47 The CCGR database currently lacks ultimate ownership for insiders. Moreover, the VPS database, which is our source of 
detailed ownership data for listed firms, only provides direct holdings by anonymized investors. Therefore, we only have 
first-layer ownership for listed firms. Ultimate ownership for insiders in nonlisted firms will be produced at a later stage. 
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7.1.1 Ownership concentration 
Table 7.S1 shows ownership concentration statistics for all firms in panel A, nonlisted firms 
in panel B, large nonlisted firms in panel C, and for listed firms in panel D. Every panel 
reports the findings on ownership concentration based on direct holdings (subscript D) first 
and ultimate holdings (subscript U) next. The ownership concentration measures we report 
are the holdings by each of the five largest owners, their cumulative holdings as coalitions, 
the holdings of the largest and smallest outside owner, the Herfindahl index, the number of 
owners, the mean and median holding per owner, the number of blockholders with at least a 
5% stake and a 10% stake, and the aggregate fraction held by these two blockholders types. 
The largest direct (first-layer) owner in a Norwegian AS or ASA holds on average 70% 
of the firm’s stock in 2005. This exceeds the 2/3 super-majority required for charter 
amendments by a comfortable margin. The second largest owns 19%, there are ten owners 
altogether per firm, and the mean holding per owner is 63%.48 According to table 7.S2, 
concentration is very stable over the 2000-2005 period, and table 7.S3 documents that there is 
variation across industry sectors. For instance, the mean holding of the largest owner is 72% 
in trade and 63% in agriculture, fishing, forestry, and mining. Finally, table 7.S4 shows that 
when firms are grouped according to size, some of the concentration proxies suggest that 
ownership concentration decreases as firm size grows, at least over certain size intervals. For 
instance, the mean direct holding of the largest owner is 73% in the first (lowest) size decile, 
decreases monotonically to 65% in the ninth decile, and then rises again in the tenth decile.  
Thus, the average firm has very high ownership concentration and very few owners. In 
fact, table 7.S1 also shows that this is the case in most firms. One fourth of all firms are 
owned by one person, and three quarters of the firms have an owner who holds a simple 
majority (i.e., at least 50%). More surprisingly, but consistent with the concentration pattern 
reflected in the size deciles above, panel C documents that when we move from all firms to 
the subsample of large nonlisted firms (i.e., the 5% largest nonlisted by sales), concentration 
does not drop. The largest owner in large nonlisted firms holds 71% vs. 70% for all firms, the 
mean holding is the same (63%), whereas there are slightly more owners per firm (13 vs. 10). 
There is similar heterogeneity across industries as for all firms, and concentration tends to 
increase with firm size at the very highest size decile (not shown in the tables). Finally, it 
does not matter whether we use ultimate (all-layers) or direct (first-layer) holdings. For 
instance, the largest ultimate owner in the sample of all firms holds on average 71%, as 
opposed to 70% based on direct (72% vs. 71% in large nonlisted). Thus, the largest 
stockholder in a Norwegian firm which is not a subsidiary will normally not exercise control 
through a pyramid of other firms.49 
Overall, these descriptive statistics show that most nonlisted firms have a very 
concentrated ownership structure regardless of firm size and industry membership.50 Moving 
on to listed firms in panel D of table 7.S1, ownership concentration falls dramatically. The 
largest direct owner holds on average 25%, the second largest has 11%, there are about 3,900 
                                                 
48 The median number of owners per firm is 2, and the median holding per owner is 50%. 
49 Not surprisingly, this conclusion changes when we allow subsidiaries into the sample. If we include them, we find that 
concentration is higher both for direct and ultimate holdings, and that ultimate concentration is lower than direct. For 
instance, the largest ultimate owner in large nonlisted firms holds on average 67%, as opposed to 83% based on direct. This 
16 percentage points difference is due to the fact that some of the direct cash flow rights are held by firms that in turn are 
held by several other owners. We find that this difference is three times larger for large firms than for all firms. This reflects 
that equity ownership by corporations is much more common in large firms, and particularly in subsidiaries. 
50 Since we do not yet know the data quality for ultimate ownership in listed firms, we will focus on nonlisted firms when 
analyzing ultimate ownership in the following. 
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owners per firm, and it takes the five largest for a simple majority. About 5% of the firms 
have a majority owner. At the opposite extreme of low concentration, one tenth have a largest 
owner with less than 10%. These figures are quite stable over time, but there is considerable 
variation across industries (not shown in the table). For instance, the largest owner holds on 
average 35% in a transport firm and 20% in a construction firm. 
Figure 7.1.1.1 shows the histogram for ownership concentration in the sample of all 
firms for 2005, where we measure ownership concentration as the direct fraction held by the 
largest stockholder. The histogram reflects the point already noticed that ownership 
concentration is in general very high. The new point is the overrepresentation of holdings that 
are critical for control. In particular, the largest owner more often holds 1/3, 1/2, or 2/3 of the 
equity than other fractions. Thus, the regulatory thresholds for stockholder control are 
reflected in the observed ownership structure. This is an illustrating example of the general 
point that regulation matters for corporate governance. 
[Figure 7.1.1.1] 
Table 7.1.1.1 regresses ownership concentration on firm and owner characteristics. We 
measure ownership concentration by the Herfindahl index of direct holdings.51 The 
independent variables are listing status, the type of the largest owner (to be discussed in detail 
in section 7.1.2), firm size, firm age, industry sector (see section 4.3), and calendar year. To 
save space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the fixed effects (year and industry). 
[Table 7.1.1.1] 
For the sample of all firms with no ownership restrictions, the model shows that 
concentration is higher if the firm is nonlisted, small, old, and when the largest owner is a 
person, the state, or a foreigner. Unreported coefficients show that concentration is unusually 
high in trade, and unusually low in agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining, and that it varies 
over time. The model explains 7% of the variation in ownership concentration, and the results 
are practically unchanged when we restrict the sample to multiple owner firms (i.e., firms 
with Herfindahl index < 1). When we estimate the model on large firms in the section to the 
right in the table, the model explains two to five times more of the variation in ownership 
concentration. Once more, concentration is higher in nonlisted firms. It also falls with firm 
size, but less convincingly so in multiple owner firms, where also age no longer relates 
systematically to concentration.  
Overall, we find that regardless of sample restrictions, ownership concentration is 
highest in nonlisted firms, decreases with firm size, and is mostly higher when the largest 
owner is a person or a foreigner. Still, ownership concentration is very high in large nonlisted 
firms. Regulation matters for ownership concentration, as equity fractions that are legally 
critical for control are more common than other fractions. 
7.1.2 Owner types 
As already seen from table 7.1.1.1, we separate owners into institutions (financial owners), 
industrial (non-institutional; non-financial), persons (individuals), state, and foreign 
(international). Since we miss family data based on kinship and marriage, we cannot tell 
whether a firm’s owners, directors, and officers belong to the same family. We use personal 
ownership to proxy for family ownership, treating each person as one family. Thus, we will 
underestimate the true volume of family ownership. 
                                                 
51 The results are identical when we instead measure concentration by the direct holding of the largest owner or by the 
Herfindahl index of ultimate holdings. 
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According to direct holdings as reported in table 7.S1, persons as a group own on 
average 76% of the equity. Domestic non-financial firms, who hold 5% in the aggregate, is 
the second largest type.52 Half the firms have personal owners, only. This distribution is 
rather stable over time (table 7.S2), whereas persons hold much less in the energy sector 
(28%) than elsewhere, and much more in construction (91%) (table 7.S3). Thus, by any 
criterion, individuals are the dominating owner type in limited liability firms as a whole. 
Table 7.S1 shows that personal owners are much less common in large nonlisted firms, 
but still hold the largest aggregate stake of 29% on average, compared to 25% for foreigners 
and 13% for industrials.  In listed firms, however, industrials are the largest owner type 
(38%), followed by foreigners (25%), and persons (18%). Thus, the person is the dominating 
owner type in nonlisted firms except in the largest, and the industrial owner is the most 
common type in listed firms. Regardless of listing status, the firm is more often owned 
through intermediaries the larger it is.53 
Overall, this analysis shows that for firms as a whole, persons are by far the dominating 
owner type. In large firms, however, and particularly the listed ones, most of the equity is 
held indirectly through intermediaries.54 
7.1.3 Inside ownership 
Since we have insufficient inside ownership data for listed firms, and since we miss ultimate 
insider holdings for nonlisted firms, we focus on direct inside ownership in nonlisted firms. 
The summary tables report equity holdings by insider types, such as all insiders as a group, 
by ranked insider holdings, such as the largest insider, and by the ranked holding per insider 
type, such as the frequency by which the largest insider is the chairman. 
According to panel B of table 7.S1, officers and directors (i.e., all insiders as a group) 
own on average 87% of a nonlisted firm’s equity. The CEO has simple majority through 
54%, which means directors excluding the CEO own 33%. The largest insider holds on 
average 67% (i.e., just the supermajority). This pattern is stable over time, energy firms have 
lower insider holdings than other firms, and insider holdings decrease with firm size. 
In order to analyze insider holdings more formally and also to allow for multivariate 
relationships, the regression model in table 7.1.3.1 relates insider ownership in private firms 
to the largest owner’s type, firm size, and firm age. Panel A presents the relationship between 
insider concentration, size, and age, whereas panel B adds the type of the largest owner as an 
independent variable. Both panels include unreported industry and year fixed effects as 
control variables.  To ensure that the data is not cut into very small subcategories, which is a 
problem when we want to control for industry and time effects, we merge institutional 
owners with the unspecified type, since institutions are very seldom the largest owner in 
nonlisted firms anyway. The four alternative samples of nonlisted firms are all firms and 
                                                 
52 Since this is a corporate governance setting, we consider each ownership structure equally important by equally-weighting 
across all sample firms to get the mean values. Thus, these average fractions do not reflect the owner types’ share of the 
overall equity wealth in the economy, which would be represented by a value-weighted average. 
53 As expected, first-layer aggregate ownership decreases for persons and increases for corporations if we include 
subsidiaries. In such a sample, persons in large nonlisted (listed) firms hold on average just 13% (16%) of the stock, 
compared to 48% (40%) for industrial owners. 
54 Notice that the concept of ultimate owners is rather useless in an owner type setting, as the ultimate owner approach 
reallocates ownership from intermediary owners to underlying owners, who in principle are persons, only. Thus, in a perfect 
reallocation from direct (first-layer) to ultimate owners, all firms would be owned 100% by persons. In practice, holdings by 
the state are never reallocated to the citizens, and we cannot reallocate direct ownership by foreigners in our sample, since 
we mostly do not know their identity due to the nominee account system. 
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large firms, which we both analyze with no owner restrictions (i.e., both single and multiple 
owner firms allowed) and with a multiple owner restriction. The estimates show that insider 
holdings are consistently higher the smaller the firm, the younger the firm, and when the 
largest insider is a person.55 The R2 rises from about 2-5% in panel A to 30-45% in panel B, 
reflecting that whereas the firm’s size and age are weak predictors of insider holdings, the 
type of the largest shareholder has considerable explanatory power. 
 [Table 7.1.3.1] 
Overall, this analysis documents that most of the large owners in nonlisted firms are also 
on the board or the management team (i.e., insiders), and more so when the largest owner is a 
person, when the firm is small, and when it is young. The largest inside owner mostly 
controls the stockholder meeting, and the CEO is often the largest stockholder. Thus, the 
separation between ownership and control is normally non-existent in nonlisted firms, 
regardless of firm size. Therefore, the first agency problem (conflicts between owners and 
managers) is negligible, whereas the second (conflicts between large and small owners) is 
potentially large. This is the opposite situation of what Bøhren and Ødegaard (2006) found 
for the population of Norwegian listed firms, where insiders hold on average 8% of the equity 
in their sample, and the largest average insider holds 6%. Thus, listing status makes a big 
difference for whether or not powerful owners are on the board or on the management team. 
7.2 Board composition 
We analyze the structure of the board in terms of board size, board turnover (which reflects 
owner activity), CEO turnover (board activity), CEO-chairman duality (monitoring quality), 
and director characteristics based on age, gender, and employment (heterogeneity). 
Panel A of table 7.S1 shows that the average board in nonlisted firms has 2.3 directors. 
About one third of the boards have just one director, 5% have at least five, and the largest 
board has 16 members. In terms of dynamics, 2% of the directors are replaced in a given year 
on average, and 1% of the firms replace at least half their directors.56 Around 5% of the firms 
get a new chairman or a new CEO or both., and the chairman and the CEO are the same 
person in 54% of the firms. 
The average director age is 50 years old, and females are a couple of years younger than 
males. Two thirds of the boards have only male directors, and the average fraction of female 
directors is 17%. Board size tends to increase with firm size, the mean rising from 1.92 to 
3.43 directors as we move from the lowest to the highest firm size decile. These 
characteristics are stable, both across industries and over time.  
Large nonlisted firms have larger boards than nonlisted firms as a whole (3.9 vs. 2.3 
directors), they change their CEO slightly more often (turnover is 0.06 vs. 0.05), and the age 
difference between men and women is larger (4 years vs. 2 years). Finally, the boards of 
listed firms differ considerably from those of comparable nonlisted firms. The average board 
is almost twice as large ( 6.5 vs. 3.9 directors), CEO turnover is considerably higher (0.17 vs. 
                                                 
55  Measuring insider holdings by CEO ownership or by non-CEO director ownership produces the same results. 
56 We define board turnover is 1 minus the ratio of the number of unchanged board members from the last period to the 
average number of directors during the current period.   
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0.06), the female directors are two years younger (45.4 vs. 47.6), and the age difference 
between men and women is three years larger (7 vs. 4 years).57 
Research has repeatedly shown that board size correlates inversely with performance. In 
order to better understand the determinants of board size, table 7.2.1 reports the results of 
estimating a model that regresses board size on listing status, firm size, firm age, ownership 
concentration, board turnover, director age, the fraction of employee directors, the fraction of 
female directors, and industry sector. The results are practically identical in all four samples, 
and the models explain 30-40% of board size variation. The table shows that the board has 
more directors the larger and older the firm, the lower the ownership concentration, the 
higher the board turnover, the younger the directors, and the higher the fraction of female 
directors and employee directors. Being listed per se increases board size. 
[Table 7.2.1] 
Summarizing, most boards are very small, stable over time, homogenous in terms of 
gender and stakeholder mix (few women and few employee directors), and heterogeneous in 
terms of age (men are older than women). Larger boards are mostly found in large, old, and 
listed firms with low ownership concentration. These larger boards tend to have more 
stockholder-elected directors who are young and female and more employee directors. 
7.3 Governance and performance 
Section 6.6 shows that nonlisted firms have higher median book return on assets (ROA) than 
listed firms. This section explores whether this can be explained by the governance 
mechanisms analyzed in this chapter and by differences in non-governance characteristics 
like size and age. Table 7.3.1 starts out by documenting distributional properties of the ROA 
in 2005 for nonlisted firms, listed firms, and large nonlisted firms, respectively. Panel A 
shows parameters of the unconditional distributions, whereas panels B-E show the median 
ROA per decile of the largest owner’s equity holding, the Herfindahl index of all holdings, 
the insider ownership, and board size, respectively. Finally, panel F shows median ROA per 
type of the largest owner.58 
According to panel A, the median (mean) ROA is 7% (8%) in nonlisted firms as a 
whole, 8% (11%) in large nonlisted firms, and 5% (5%) in listed firms. Thus, as already 
documented in section 6.4, nonlisted firms tend to be more profitable than listed firms, 
particularly when we compare firms of similar size. 
[Table 7.3.1] 
Panels B and C show the median ROA within each of ten ownership concentration 
deciles (0-9). The column called “.” represents observations with missing data for that 
variable, the “-1” columns contains the observations with 100% ownership concentration 
(single-owner firm), and columns 0-9 are the deciles (from lowest to highest concentration) 
for multiple-owner firms. Empty cells represent deciles that cannot be meaningfully separated 
from the decile to the right because the ownership characteristic in question has the same 
                                                 
57 Norwegian listed firms have very small boards compared to almost any other country. Wymeersch (1998) reports an 
average board size of 10 in the UK, 12 in France, 10 in Belgium, 12 in Italy, and 7 in the Netherlands. The average size of 
the German supervisory board is 13 (Hopt, 1998). Carter and Lorsch (2004) find that the average US board has about 12 
directors, which is down from 16 in the 1980s.  
58 To reduce the effect of extreme outliers reflected in panel A, panels B-F use ROA observations which are winsorized at 
the 5%/95% tails. 
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value in both deciles (such as deciles 4 and 5 for the largest owner of nonlisted firms in panel 
B). Both panels show that the ROA tends to be convex in ownership concentration for 
nonlisted firms as a whole, as the ROA peaks around the 9th decile. It is difficult to spot 
similar patterns in large nonlisted firms and in listed firms.   
 In panel F, the column headings 0-5 represent unidentified, institutional, personal, 
state, foreign, and industrial owners, respectively. The figures reflect that the median ROA in 
nonlisted firms as a whole is highest when the largest owner is a person (7.3%). This is also 
true for the subsample of  large nonlisted firms (8.4%).  State owners play this role in listed 
firms (11.1%), driven by a very small number of recently semi-privatized firms in petroleum 
and telecom. Insider ownership in panel D, where we must drop listed firms because of weak 
data, supports the impression from panels B and C that high concentration correlates 
positively with ROA up to rather high concentration levels (around decile 7), and also that the 
relationship is diffuse in large nonlisted firms. Finally, panel E documents that for nonlisted 
firms, the median ROA is highest in the lowest board size decile. The pattern is less clear for 
listed firms.  
Overall, table 7.3.1 suggests that the typical nonlisted firm is more profitable than the 
typical listed firm, that nonlisted firms with high ownership concentration and high inside 
ownership are particularly profitable unless concentration becomes excessive and the firm is 
particularly large, and also that the identity of the largest owner matters for all firm types. 
Small boards are associated with the highest performance in nonlisted firms.59 
Table 7.3.2 provides a formal, multivariate test by regressing the firm’s ROA on its 
corporate governance mechanisms, listing status, and controls. The mechanisms we consider 
are ownership structure (ownership concentration, owner type, and insider ownership), board 
composition (board size, CEO directorship, female directors, and employee directors), 
financial policy (leverage and dividends), and listing status. Our governance-independent 
control variables are firm size, firm age, and industry. Ownership concentration is measured 
by the holding of the largest owner.60 To reduce the possibility of reverse causation, we lag 
the governance variables by one year. We estimate the models separately for all firms, large 
firms, and small firms. In all three cases, we investigate the potential effect of extreme 
ownership structures by also estimating the models in the subsample of firms that have at 
least two owners (multiple-owner firms). The base case model in panel A includes the type of 
the largest owner, but must ignore insider holdings and listing status, since we have too few 
listed firms to validly account for all three dimensions in one model. For the same reason, the 
model in panel B includes insider holdings and listing status, but not the type of the largest 
owner.  
[Table 7.3.2]  
Seven relationships stand out. First, and most importantly, after having controlled for 
differences in ownership structure, board composition, financial policy, firm size, firm age, 
and industry, nonlisted firms are more profitable than listed firms. The coefficients for the 
listing status dummies in panel B reflects that the expected ROA is 0.7-0.8 percentage points 
higher for a nonlisted firm than a comparable listed firm. This is true for the sample of all 
                                                 
59 As the sample size per decile for listed firms is very small, the patterns in tables B, C, E, and F should be interpreted with 
considerable caution for this subsample. 
60 No results change when we alternatively measure ownership concentration by the Herfindahl index or if we use ultimate 
owners rather than first-layer owners. 
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nonlisted firms and for large nonlisted firms, and regardless of whether we include or exclude 
single-owner firms.61 Thus, listing status per se matters for performance.  
 The second finding worth noticing is that ROA relates positively to ownership 
concentration and insider holdings, suggesting that everything else equal, large owners are 
beneficial. However, there is also a negative coefficient for the quadratic term in both cases, 
meaning that ROA first increases and then decreases as concentration or insider holdings 
grows. This result is in line with most of the existing research for listed firms (Gugler, 2001; 
Becht et al, 2003). However, consistent with the univariate pattern from table 7.3.1, these 
relationships are mostly not statistically significant for large firms. Thus, the positive, 
quadratic link between performance and ownership concentration or insider holdings 
primarily occurs in nonlisted firms that are smaller than most listed firms. The subsample of 
small nonlisted firms confirms this impression. 
 Third, panel A shows that having a person (an industrial firm) as the largest owner 
correlates positively (negatively) with performance in all samples and significantly in all but 
the sample of large firms with multiple owners (large firms as a whole). This is consistent 
with the notion that direct monitoring produces lower agency costs than delegated 
monitoring. It also fits well with recent findings on the excess operating performance of 
family control in listed firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 2006).   
 Fourth, ROA drops as board size grows, although the relationship is less convincing 
in large firms when we also account for insider ownership (panel B). This suggests that 
although more directors may increase the board’s information pool, the board becomes a less 
efficient decision-maker. Earlier studies of listed companies in several countries report the 
same result when measuring performance by market value, which only captures the security 
benefits (Bøhren and Strøm, 2008). It is still noticeable that the inverse relationship between 
ROA and board size turns up in our nonlisted firms as well, where the boards are so small. 
Fifth, ROA is negatively related to our proxies for board diversity (female directors and 
employee directors), but the relationship is not consistently significant across all samples. 
Sixth, the ROA is higher when the CEO is on the board in a large firm. This suggests 
that the positive skills effect of CEO participation is not offset by weaker monitoring quality 
from the other directors. The finding is in line with the existing evidence from listed firms of 
zero or inverse correlation between board independence and market value (Bhagat and Black, 
2002). Finally, ROA increases with dividend payout, which is consistent with the agency 
rationale for distributing a high fraction of the earnings. Findings based on the market value 
of listed firms are similar (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006). The evidence on leverage is diffuse. 
Overall, table 7.3.2 documents that key governance mechanisms (ownership structure, 
board composition, and financial strategy) correlate systematically with performance. There 
is a quadratic relationship between performance and both ownership concentration and 
insider holdings except in large firms, where the relationship disappears. Having a person 
rather than a corporation as the largest owner is associated with higher performance except in 
large firms. As for board composition, board size relates inversely to performance, board 
diversity has no clear-cut relationship to performance, and large firms do better when their 
CEO is also a director. Dividends associate positively with performance in every sample.  
The bulk of these findings are in line with earlier studies that mostly measure 
performance by market value and that only analyze listed firms. Thus, although listing status 
makes a big difference for the governance structure of nonlisted vs. listed firms (as we 
showed in sections 7.1 and 7.2), it seems less important for defining what good governance 
                                                 
61 Since the sample of small listed firm is so small, we cannot estimate the listing status dummies for small firms in panel B. 
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amounts to in terms of value-enhancing ownership structures, boards, and financial policies 
(this section). This is the first new result on the relationship between listing status, 
governance, and performance. 
The second novel result is that after having accounted for how firms differ both in terms 
of governance mechanisms, industry, size, and age, we find that nonlisted firms have higher 
performance than listed firms. The excess return is about 0.8 percentage points of ROA. This 
suggests that listing status per se matters for performance. Is this just due to measurement 
errors or is there an economic explanation in terms of higher efficiency in nonlisted firms? 
We do not know yet, but we doubt that measurement error is a major part of the explanation. 
There are good reasons to believe that the quality of the data set is unusually high. Moreover, 
the sample size is undoubtedly large, and the models we have used control for a series of 
potential performance determinants that are firm-specific (governance, age, and size) and 
industry-specific (industry dummy). Still, we may have ignored performance determinants 
that correlate with listing status, but not with the explanatory variables in the model.  
An alternative explanation is that nonlisted firms have higher ROA simply because they 
are more capital constrained. That is, the limited access to outside financing prevents the firm 
from investing in projects that would be profitable under the lower cost of capital faced by a 
similar listed firm, which is less constrained. This makes the ROA of the marginal investment 
project higher in nonlisted firms than in listed. Therefore, the nonlisted firm’s overall ROA 
(i.e., the aggregate ROA across all its investment projects) will also be higher.  
The other possibility is that nonlisted firms are more efficient. We can think of two 
reasons why. First, if the first agency problem is generally more costly than the second, net 
agency costs are higher in listed firms, since this is the firm type where the first agency 
problem dominates. As the ROA reflects returns after agency costs are paid, listed firms will 
underperform. Second, it has been argued that unless management is given sufficient time to 
innovate, develop, and commercialize new ideas, firm value may be destroyed (Stein (1988, 
1989), Jacobs (1991), Porter (1992), Bebchuk and Stole (1993)).  Fuller and Jensen (2002) 
argue that capital market participants are partly responsible for this problem, as financial 
analysts push managers towards meeting unreasonable earnings forecasts by overinvesting in 
projects with short payback. Since nonlisted firms do not report quarterly earnings, are not 
priced in the market every day, and have very illiquid ownership rights, they may be less 
exposed than listed firms to the pressure towards value-destroying short-termism.  
Nevertheless, our result is puzzling, since the decision to stay private or go public is 
endogenous, at least for firms above a certain size, such as the large firm sample in our study. 
Why do the owners voluntarily take their nonlisted firm public, and why do not the owners of 
listed firms take it private? Or maybe the fact that very few firms that can go public never do 
so is evidence that the public form is often inefficient? We think these are interesting 
questions for future research. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has analyzed the characteristics of the firm’s ownership structure and board 
composition and how these governance mechanisms interact with economic performance. 
Regardless of what sample we use and what other determinants we control for, ownership 
concentration is significantly higher when the firm is nonlisted. It is also higher when the 
largest owner is a person or a foreigner, but decreases with firm size, although even large 
nonlisted firms which are not subsidiaries have very high ownership concentration. We find 
that regulation matters for concentration, as the largest owner tends to often hold equity 
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fractions that are just above rather than just below the legally critical lower bound for control 
(1/3, 1/2, 2/3). Persons are the dominating owner type by far, although most of the equity in 
listed firms and large nonlisted firms is held indirectly through other firms. Controlling firms 
through pyramids of other firms is still rare, at least when we ignore subsidiaries. 
Large owners in nonlisted firms are very often on the board or the management team 
(i.e., insiders), and more so when a small and young firm has a person as the largest owner. 
Because the largest insider tends to be both the CEO and the majority owner, separation 
between ownership and control is a non-existent phenomenon. This makes the first agency 
problem negligible in nonlisted firms, whereas the second is potentially large. The situation is 
the opposite in listed firms, where the first agency problem dominates because most large 
owners are relatively small and neither the firm’s directors nor officers. 
The overwhelming majority of boards are very small, stable over time, and homogenous 
in terms of gender and stakeholder mix. Larger boards are overrepresented in large, old, and 
listed firms with low ownership concentration. Such boards tend to have more owner-elected 
directors who are young and female and more directors chosen by the employees. 
We find that except in large firms, operating performance as measured by ROA is higher 
when some owner has a large stake, and that having a person rather than a corporation as the 
largest owner is associated with higher performance. Firms with small boards are more 
profitable except in large firms, board diversity has no clear-cut relationship to performance, 
and large firms tend to have higher performance when their CEO is also a director. Dividend 
payout is positively associated with performance in every sample.  
These relationships between performance and governance mechanisms grossly 
correspond to those found earlier for how these governance mechanisms correlate with 
market value or operating performance in listed firms. Thus, the first remarkable result is that 
although listing status makes a big difference for how the governance structure looks, it 
matters much less for how the governance structure interacts with performance. The second 
finding to notice is that after having controlled for differences in governance, size, age, and 
industry, we do find that listing status matters for performance. In particular, nonlisted firms 
outperform otherwise comparable public firms in terms of ROA. We can only speculate what 
the underlying reasons may be. One possibility is that this happens because nonlisted firms 
are more capital constrained. A second is that if the first agency problem is more costly than 
the second, conflicts of interest are more costly in public firms. Another is that since 
nonlisted firms do not report quarterly earnings, are not continuously priced, and have very 
illiquid stock, their managers feel less pressure towards value-destroying short-termism. 
Regardless of explanation, however, the excess performance of nonlisted firms is puzzling, 
since thousands of firms can voluntarily choose whether to be public or private.  
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8. Summary and conclusions 
Motivation. Existing research on corporate finance and governance has almost exclusively 
studied firms that are listed on a stock exchange (public firms). This is probably due to the 
difficulty of collecting data for nonlisted (private) firms about their market value, accounting 
figures, ownership structure, and board composition. The resulting lack of insight into the 
economics of nonlisted firms is problematic for two reasons. First, we show that nonlisted 
firms constitute a much larger share of the overall economy than listed firms, and that this is 
probably true in most countries. Second, existing evidence from listed firms may not apply to 
the nonlisted, which are less transparent, cannot use public equity markets, offer less minority 
stockholder protection, and have very illiquid stock. Also, the lack of a benchmark from 
nonlisted firms makes it difficult to determine the uniqueness of being listed, and particularly 
why certain firms choose to go public whereas the vast majority prefer to stay private.  
Focus. Our study tries to improve on this situation by building a comprehensive, 
detailed, and reliable database on the corporate finance and governance characteristics for the 
population of listed and nonlisted firms with limited liability. This is the CCGR database, 
which we use to analyze a wide range of corporate finance and governance characteristics  
and to explore how they relate to operating performance. We cover a wide range of topics in 
a relatively rough way, using the insight obtained from this first look at the data as a point of 
departure for studying much more focused questions in the future. 
Database. The CCGR database includes every firm with limited liability registered in 
Norway. It has twelve consecutive years of accounting data and six consecutive years of 
governance data, involving about 240 items per firm per year. The governance data specifies 
every equity holding above 5%, the composition of the board, and the identity of the owners, 
the CEO, and the directors. The firm’s credit rating, founding year, and industry are available 
as well. The regulatory environment is characterized by high investor protection, stronger 
minority protection in listed firms than nonlisted, and by accounting regulations that mandate 
comprehensive, audited accounting statements regardless of the firm’s listing status and size.  
Sample. We study about 77,000 firms per year. The sample only includes active firms 
and ignores financials and subsidiaries. Service and trade firms jointly account for almost 
70% of all firms in the sample. Energy firms represent less than 0.5%, but is still the largest 
industry by assets and sales. Nonlisted firms comprise 99.8% of the sample.  
Relative importance.. Nonlisted firms as a whole are much more significant in the 
economy than listed firms. They earn in the aggregate four times higher revenues, employ 
four times more people, and hold twice as much assets. Indirect evidence suggests that this is 
also the typical case internationally. This makes it even more remarkable that so little is 
known about the economics of nonlisted firms. 
Firm size. Regardless of whether we measure size by sales, assets, or employees, the 
distribution of firm size in the economy is close to lognormal. This is consistent with Gibrat’s 
law, which shows that independence between growth and size at the firm level implies a 
lognormal distribution of size in a large set of firms. Although more than two thirds of the 
listed firms have at least 100 employees and the vast majority of nonlisted firms have much 
less, there are still about ten times more nonlisted firms with at least 100 employees. For 
every listed firm, there are typically 30 nonlisted firms of similar size.  
Asset structure. Nonlisted firms have more liquid assets. The average nonlisted firm 
invests to just offset depreciation, whereas listed firms invest considerably more. 
Nevertheless, sales growth and earnings growth are quite independent of listing status, 
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suggesting that the marginal value of real investments is higher in nonlisted firms. Possibly, 
nonlisted firms may be underinvesting because they cannot access public equity markets and 
may also have to pay more for their debt.  
Financial strategy. Both financial leverage and the debt structure vary with listing status. 
Nonlisted firms finance their assets with considerably more debt, which may be partially due 
to the unavailability of public equity. They also use debt with shorter duration, which may be 
driven by asset-liability matching or larger information asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders. Regardless of listing status, firms use more debt when they are small, grow quickly, 
and have low profitability. A nonlisted firm distributes a much higher fraction of its earnings 
than a listed firm. This may reflect that nonlisted firms have owners with stronger dividend 
preferences or that nonlisted firms pay higher dividends to reduce the conflict of interest 
between majority and minority owners (i.e., the second agency problem). Regardless of 
listing status, less earnings is retained by small, old, unprofitable, and slow-growing firms.  
Ownership structure. Ownership concentration is much higher in nonlisted firms, and 
highest when the largest owner is a person or a foreigner. Concentration decreases with firm 
size, but even large nonlisted firms have very concentrated ownership. Persons hold by far 
most of the equity except in listed firms, where corporate owners dominate. Ownership 
control through pyramids is uncommon, but equity fractions that are legally critical for 
control (i.e., 1/3, 1/2, and 2/3) are more often observed than other holdings. 
Board composition. Large owners of nonlisted firms are very often their officers or 
directors or both (i. e., insiders), particularly when small, young firms have a person as the 
largest owner. Because the largest insider is often both the CEO and the majority owner, 
ownership seldom separates from control in nonlisted firms. This makes the first agency 
problem negligible (i.e., the conflict of interest between owners and managers), but the 
second potentially large (conflicts between large and small owners). The situation is just the 
opposite in listed firm, where the first agency problem dominates because most large owners 
are neither officers nor directors. The overwhelming majority of boards are very small, stable 
over time, and homogenous in terms of gender mix and stakeholder types. Larger boards are 
typically found in large, old, listed firms with low ownership concentration. Such boards have 
more directors who are young and female and also more employee-elected directors. 
Economic performance. After having accounted for a series of governance mechanisms 
and control variables, we find that nonlisted firms tend to have higher operating performance 
as measured by accounting return on assets (ROA) than listed firms. The ROA is also higher 
when personal ownership is high, the board is small, the CEO is a voting member, and when 
firms pay high dividends relative to earnings. This evidence suggests that personal ownership 
reduces agency costs more than ownership through intermediaries, that good boards are 
small, and that paying the free cash flow out of the firm reduces agency costs and improves 
the liquidity of the owners’ wealth. More importantly, these findings also suggest that listing 
status matters not only for behavior in terms of corporate governance and finance, but also for 
the ability to create economic value. At this stage, we can only speculate why this happens. 
One possibility is that nonlisted firms have higher ROA because they are more capital 
constrained. Another is that the agency conflict between owners and managers is more costly 
than the conflict between large and small owners. Also, since nonlisted firms do not report 
quarterly earnings, are not continuously priced, and have very illiquid stock, they may feel 
less pressure towards value-destroying short-termism. Still, the excess performance of 
nonlisted firms is puzzling, since thousands of our sample firms can voluntarily choose 
whether to be public or private. We think this is an exciting challenge for future research on 
the corporate finance and governance of nonlisted firms. 
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Table 4.1. Sample construction from the population of all firms with limited liability
A. Filters for all firms
Nr. Filtering 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Mean
No filter 99,379 105,659 111,380 119,100 127,082 131,041 145,656 149,468 153,912 155,996 158,259 182,689 136,635
1 Orgtype 99,224 105,363 111,077 118,810 126,831 130,817 136,140 138,745 141,146 141,991 144,426 157,710 129,357
2 1+S>0 91,989 97,888 103,424 109,866 118,519 122,452 127,626 130,385 132,443 132,254 133,365 141,133 120,112
3 2+A>0 91,468 97,358 102,864 109,296 117,956 121,805 127,011 129,856 131,903 131,752 132,943 140,719 119,578
4 3+BAL≥0 89,514 95,465 100,889 107,220 115,875 119,727 124,869 127,608 129,630 129,468 130,731 138,101 117,425
5 4+CE≤CA 89,490 95,425 100,834 107,114 115,703 119,612 124,736 127,389 129,412 129,217 130,494 137,853 117,273
6 5+WC≤A 89,490 95,425 100,834 107,114 115,703 119,612 124,736 127,389 129,412 129,217 130,494 137,853 117,273
7 6+EmplAvg 67,006 72,513 77,683 83,931 90,835 94,618 98,278 99,954 101,307 101,795 102,775 103,760 91,205
8 7+EmplYr 67,006 72,513 75,373 83,906 90,831 84,707 87,284 88,042 89,348 89,571 90,731 103,760 85,256
Sample candidates 67,006 74,055 79,449 86,346 93,240 94,478 96,976 98,035 99,192 100,045 101,677 103,760 91,188
Ex financial firms 66,469 73,332 78,633 85,431 92,226 93,419 95,855 96,877 98,020 98,860 100,507 102,607 90,186
Sample 59,170 65,050 69,362 74,875 80,191 80,682 81,998 81,699 83,319 83,297 84,911 82,569 77,260
B. Filters for public firms
Nr. Filtering 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Mean
No filter 116 142 148 187 207 190 188 181 176 157 165 186 170
1 Orgtype 116 130 135 173 188 170 166 159 155 137 145 165 153
2 1+S>0 106 130 135 173 188 168 165 157 154 136 145 165 152
3 2+A>0 106 130 135 173 188 168 165 157 154 136 145 165 152
4 3+BAL≥0 105 130 134 173 186 165 165 157 152 132 143 163 150
5 4+CE≤CA 105 130 134 173 186 165 165 157 152 132 143 163 150
6 5+WC≤A 105 130 134 173 186 165 165 157 152 132 143 163 150
7 6+EmplAvg 103 128 133 168 182 164 164 156 152 132 143 158 149
8 7+EmplYr 103 128 133 168 182 164 164 156 152 132 143 158 149
Sample candidates 103 128 134 168 184 168 165 157 153 136 143 158 150
Ex financial firms 100 112 120 154 169 154 152 146 142 126 133 147 138
Sample 100 112 120 154 169 154 147 140 132 117 127 134 134
This table reports the filters used to construct the sample of Norwegian firms with limited liability over the period 1994-2005. The "Orgtype" line reports the number of all limited
liability firms (AS and ASA firms) in the Norwegian economy. The "S" filter requires sales (operating income) >0, "A" requires total assets >0, "EMAvg" requires that employees in
any year (even two years before or after the firm is in the sample) is positive, and "EMYr" requires that the employee figure is missing or positive for a nonlisted firm. "BAL" denotes
a set of main balance sheet items, for which non-negativity is enforced. "CE" denotes cash equivalents, "CA" is current assets, and "WC" denotes working capital. We keep a
company in the sample between the first and the last year it passes all filters (sample candidates). We exclude financial sector firms and also subsidiaries (the last line). A subsidiary
is a firm where another firm holds more than 50% of its equity. 
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Table 4.2. Aggregate size per industry sector
Sector Sector label Firms Sales Assets Employees
0 Missing 922 13 18 15
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining 1,671 29 46 16
2 Manufacturing, chemical products 6,822 605 648 264
3 Energy 337 681 808 50
4 Construction 8,740 128 65 98
5 Service 37,874 551 741 437
7 Trade 17,970 418 198 159
8 Transport 3,746 136 193 117
9 Multisector 4,487 63 54 47
82,569 2,624 2,770 1,203
This table shows measures of aggregate size across industry sectors for the sample of Norwegian limited
liability firms in 2005 as specified in table 4.1. All firms are classified into industry sectors according to their
NAIC industry codes as defined in Appendix 4.A2. Employees are in thousands, whereas sales and assets are in
billions of NOK as of year-end 2005. 
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Year Sales/GNP Assets/GNP Employees GNP
1994 48% 43% 1,060 2,881
1995 51% 45% 1,119 3,003
1996 51% 45% 1,152 3,306
1997 54% 51% 1,212 3,460
1998 57% 61% 1,272 3,364
1999 51% 63% 1,308 3,816
2000 52% 61% 1,339 4,267
2001 51% 60% 1,269 4,100
2002 53% 64% 1,255 4,114
2003 51% 58% 1,280 4,229
2004 53% 56% 1,296 4,665
2005 50% 52% 1,203 5,295
Mean, all 52% 55% 1,230 3,875
Mean, nonlisted 40% 38% 960
Mean, listed 11% 17% 270
Table 5.1. The relative significance of firms with limited liability in the Norwegian economy
This table presents aggregate size measures for Norwegian firms with limited liability over the sample
period 1994-2005. "GNP" (Gross national product) is in billions of 2005 NOK, and "Employees" are in
thousands. The "Employees" figures for firms with subsidiaries are from their consolidated accounting
statements, provided their consolidated assets are never less than 85% of their nonconsolidated assets.
Missing or zero values are filled in with the next available value, or with the previous available value if no
later value is available.  The sample selection procedure is explained in table 4.1.
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Table 5.2. The relative significance of nonlisted firms in the Norwegian economy
Year Sales Assets Employees Firms
1994 84% 72% 75% 99.8%
1995 84% 72% 75% 99.8%
1996 85% 73% 74% 99.8%
1997 85% 74% 73% 99.8%
1998 85% 74% 74% 99.8%
1999 85% 76% 78% 99.8%
2000 82% 72% 80% 99.8%
2001 70% 63% 81% 99.8%
2002 71% 59% 83% 99.8%
2003 71% 67% 82% 99.9%
2004 68% 66% 80% 99.9%
2005 66% 64% 81% 99.8%
Mean 78% 69% 78% 99.8%
This table presents the aggregate size of nonlisted firm as a percentage of all firms with limited liability
in Norway from 1994 to 2005. The "Employees" figures for firms with subsidiaries are from their
consolidated accounting statements, provided their consolidated assets are never less than 85% of their
nonconsolidated assets. Missing or zero values are filled in with the next available value, or with the
previous available value if no later value is available. The sample selection procedure is explained in
table 4.1.
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Table 5.3. Stock market capitalization of listed firms relative to GDP
A. European Union
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Mean
Slovak Republic 7 6 10 9 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 9 8
Bulgaria 0 0 0 8 5 5 4 5 9 12 19 6
Latvia 0 3 6 6 5 7 8 8 10 12 16 7
Romania 0 0 0 2 2 2 3 5 10 9 16 21 6
Lithuania 2 11 17 10 11 14 10 10 19 29 32 15
Poland 3 3 5 8 12 18 18 14 15 17 28 31 14
Slovenia 4 2 3 8 12 10 13 14 21 25 30 23 14
Czech Republic 14 28 30 23 20 20 20 15 22 19 29 31 23
Hungary 4 5 12 33 30 34 26 20 20 20 29 30 22
Estonia 22 9 32 34 25 35 41 55 27 31
Portugal 18 17 22 37 56 58 57 42 35 40 44 39 39
Norway 29 30 36 42 31 40 39 41 35 43 57 67 41
Malta 2 5 14 14 22 53 53 36 33 38 53 74 33
Germany 22 23 28 38 50 67 67 57 34 44 44 44 43
Italy 18 19 21 30 48 62 71 48 41 42 47 46 41
Denmark 36 31 39 55 57 61 68 56 45 58 63 70 53
Ireland 39 48 62 77 72 86 73 50 56 63 58 62
Greece 15 15 19 28 66 170 99 74 52 62 61 68 61
Spain 30 33 39 50 66 69 87 77 68 82 90 85 65
France 33 33 38 47 67 101 109 88 66 76 91 81 69
Belgium 36 38 44 56 98 74 80 73 52 57 218 90 76
Sweden 61 72 91 110 112 149 137 108 74 96 109 114 103
Netherlands 81 86 92 124 153 174 173 119 96 95 107 122 119
Finland 38 34 49 60 119 273 245 157 105 105 99 108 116
Luxembourg 186 168 180 194 187 180 174 121 115 138 157 152 163
United Kingdom 116 124 146 151 167 201 179 151 119 137 133 139 147
Mean 38 34 40 48 59 76 73 56 46 52 65 61 54
Median 26 26 29 37 50 61 67 48 35 43 55 46 44
B. World
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Mean
High income 63 68 76 90 107 135 118 103 82 99 109 113 97
Middle income 33 31 34 31 25 40 37 34 31 41 43 50 36
Low income 33 28 26 25 20 30 24 19 22 37 44 55 30
Mean 39 36 38 38 42 54 47 41 38 46 55 61 45
Median 25 21 22 23 22 33 26 23 24 28 31 37 26
This table shows market capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of the country's GDP. Market
capitalization is calculated as the product of the share price and the number of shares outstanding in companies that
are domestically incorporated and listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. We exclude
investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles. The data source is the World
Development Indicators database from the World Bank. The world mean and median values per year are calculated
for those countries (out of a maximum of 102) which reported the data in a particular year.
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Table 6.S1. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel A. All firms  
n mean std skew. kurt. med. mode p0 p0_25 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_5 p99_75 p99_99 p100
Total Assets 82569 33.55 1436.51 150 26042 1.80 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.29 0.68 1.80 5.11 15.65 35.89 248.76 611.41 1378.67 28239.00 284828.00
Employees 82569 14.57 293.65 89 9419 3.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 7.00 16.00 27.00 117.00 242.00 510.00 11817.00 38780.00
Sales 82569 31.78 1587.93 204 47697 2.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.28 0.94 2.74 7.77 22.47 44.96 235.01 514.56 1155.55 25797.00 393718.00
Growth of Assets 74281 1.87 36.73 104 13140 1.02 1.00 -123.50 0.05 0.17 0.50 0.67 0.87 1.02 1.25 1.71 2.32 6.72 12.83 27.77 1614.14 6006.00
Growth of Sales 73789 11.68 1001.62 152 25381 1.05 1.00 -82.00 0.00 0.03 0.35 0.63 0.90 1.05 1.25 1.82 2.90 13.14 31.00 78.87 17763.60 187565.50
Growth of NOI 73124 0.38 241.48 -194 52221 0.66 1.00 -59682.00 -104.00 -30.50 -4.96 -1.90 -0.13 0.66 1.50 3.53 7.20 37.00 68.00 117.33 930.00 23243.33
Current Assets (CA) 82569 12.05 398.54 142 23311 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.38 1.03 2.87 8.39 18.57 120.12 257.66 508.20 8484.00 73338.00
Cash and Others 82569 3.05 82.53 98 11556 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.85 2.43 5.05 26.13 57.89 125.42 3837.26 12379.00
Inventory 82569 2.12 86.36 140 21184 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 1.60 3.38 19.55 41.29 84.97 1209.96 14553.00
Investment (I) 57782 4.33 321.43 128 17676 0.02 0.00 -5267.61 -10.72 -2.10 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.94 2.47 18.88 45.16 112.36 6904.00 49712.00
Working Capital (WC) 82569 1.93 135.40 -82 15259 0.18 0.10 -22903.00 -29.53 -6.37 -1.14 -0.48 -0.04 0.18 0.76 2.73 6.54 40.64 87.64 175.40 2140.25 10075.00
Assets to Empl. 76521 2.89 53.55 140 25257 0.48 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.48 1.04 2.81 6.43 34.99 64.75 123.26 1557.66 10808.73
Sales to Empl. 76521 1.90 25.38 179 37429 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.21 0.47 0.88 1.59 3.01 4.75 14.47 25.84 43.22 447.70 5747.67
CA to Assets 82569 0.68 0.31 -1 -1 0.79 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.46 0.79 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
WC to Assets 82569 -0.29 30.41 -222 55793 0.15 1.00 -7900.00 -15.10 -3.27 -0.64 -0.32 -0.03 0.15 0.36 0.57 0.70 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
I. to Dpr. Assets (DA) 57782 1.44 29.86 104 14279 0.02 0.00 -38.50 -0.94 -0.76 -0.16 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.36 1.40 3.18 18.03 35.18 64.85 1375.00 4835.00
Depreciation to DA 57782 0.34 1.20 50 3429 0.24 0.00 -2.26 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.24 0.39 0.61 0.81 1.87 2.90 4.83 63.00 110.29






























Total Debt 82569 21.36 922.63 153 28086 1.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.49 1.35 3.79 10.84 23.62 150.73 357.51 758.73 19195.98 192396.00
Current Debt (CD) 82569 10.12 443.28 160 30539 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.30 0.79 2.13 5.94 12.35 75.28 171.10 385.40 10674.00 96241.00
CD to Total Debt 82201 0.73 0.32 -1 -1 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.49 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.40
Debt to Assets 82569 1.42 34.41 169 35322 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.36 0.58 0.77 0.90 1.16 1.64 5.71 11.78 26.94 894.00 7901.00
Dividends 82569 1.00 80.89 160 30714 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 2.81 6.71 19.50 1943.00 17756.00
Dividend Payout 82161 0.08 14.71 261 73662 0.00 0.00 -867.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 1.02 1.21 1.64 21.13 4099.50
Net oper. Inc. (NOI) 82569 2.76 143.12 169 35339 0.10 0.00 -848.00 -10.81 -2.70 -0.48 -0.21 -0.02 0.10 0.44 1.37 2.96 18.28 46.36 101.14 3647.00 32774.00
Equity 82569 12.19 530.50 141 22586 0.36 0.10 -1273.53 -6.75 -2.24 -0.44 -0.13 0.10 0.36 1.16 4.26 11.39 97.23 232.81 595.20 8412.89 92432.00
Return on Assets 82569 0.08 14.93 247 68024 0.07 0.00 -847.44 -6.50 -1.74 -0.40 -0.17 0.00 0.07 0.18 0.32 0.43 0.79 1.23 2.29 133.00 4085.00
Return on Equity 82502 0.41 16.35 189 47327 0.31 0.00 -621.00 -25.25 -6.69 -1.12 -0.39 0.02 0.31 0.67 1.13 2.08 7.27 13.86 28.56 260.00 4085.00
Firm Age 82569 12.87 12.56 3 15 10.00 8.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 10.00 17.00 25.00 34.00 71.00 83.00 90.00 136.00 164.00
This table presents distributions of corporate finance variables in 2005 for the population of all Norwegian firms with limited liability that pass our filters as defined in table 4.1. The corporate finance variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. Except







































Table 6.S1. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel B. Nonlisted firms
n mean std skew. kurt. med. mode p0 p0_25 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_5 p99_75 p99_99 p100
Total Assets 82435 21.38 464.75 116 19492 1.79 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.28 0.68 1.79 5.07 15.37 34.54 221.81 497.11 984.48 17798.00 90854.00
Employees 82435 11.88 193.13 102 12489 3.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 7.00 15.00 27.00 105.00 202.00 411.00 6113.00 27558.00
Sales 82435 20.85 343.55 79 8188 2.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.28 0.94 2.73 7.74 22.19 43.99 215.42 447.67 968.55 16328.64 43656.25
Growth of Assets 74159 1.88 36.76 104 13119 1.02 1.00 -123.50 0.05 0.17 0.50 0.67 0.87 1.02 1.25 1.71 2.32 6.72 12.84 27.77 1614.14 6006.00
Growth of Sales 73667 11.69 1002.44 152 25339 1.05 1.00 -82.00 0.00 0.03 0.35 0.63 0.90 1.05 1.25 1.82 2.90 13.08 30.92 77.83 17763.60 187565.50
Growth of NOI 73002 0.38 241.68 -194 52135 0.66 1.00 -59682.00 -104.00 -30.50 -4.96 -1.90 -0.13 0.66 1.50 3.53 7.20 36.88 68.00 117.33 930.00 23243.33
Current Assets (CA) 82435 8.54 115.98 61 5282 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.38 1.03 2.85 8.25 18.02 105.54 217.11 413.06 5357.00 14656.70
Cash and Others 82435 2.36 48.62 87 9239 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.85 2.40 4.91 23.27 45.80 87.19 2266.20 6758.63
Inventory 82435 1.39 17.41 58 5106 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 1.58 3.33 18.65 36.13 74.98 836.92 2258.35
Investment (I) 57661 1.56 68.17 57 7376 0.02 0.00 -5267.61 -9.92 -2.08 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.92 2.39 16.41 37.32 85.60 2557.75 7561.41
Working Capital (WC) 82435 1.78 85.02 -110 25774 0.18 0.10 -18017.54 -27.41 -6.27 -1.13 -0.47 -0.04 0.18 0.76 2.69 6.33 35.73 75.24 142.38 1500.10 7620.77
Assets to Empl. 76387 2.80 52.64 147 27049 0.47 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.47 1.04 2.80 6.39 34.47 62.99 119.77 1491.85 10808.73
Sales to Empl. 76387 1.88 24.93 187 40136 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.21 0.47 0.88 1.59 3.00 4.74 14.45 25.70 43.15 425.87 5747.67
CA to Assets 82435 0.68 0.31 -1 -1 0.79 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.46 0.79 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
WC to Assets 82435 -0.29 30.43 -221 55702 0.15 1.00 -7900.00 -15.10 -3.28 -0.64 -0.32 -0.03 0.15 0.36 0.57 0.70 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
I. to Dpr. Assets (DA) 57661 1.43 29.86 104 14309 0.02 0.00 -38.50 -0.94 -0.76 -0.16 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.35 1.39 3.17 18.00 35.16 64.65 1375.00 4835.00
Depreciation to DA 57661 0.34 1.19 51 3552 0.24 0.00 -2.26 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.24 0.39 0.61 0.81 1.86 2.88 4.81 63.00 110.29
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) 10350 2.05 34.10 38 1673 0.09 0.00 -13.80 -0.97 -0.82 -0.16 -0.01 0.00 0.09 0.42 1.25 2.77 20.81 50.17 116.75 1646.76 1701.20
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Current Debt (CD) 82435 6.76 140.53 94 11468 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.30 0.79 2.11 5.86 12.00 66.86 143.56 310.21 5528.82 22566.62
CD to Total Debt 82067 0.73 0.32 -1 -1 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.49 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.40
Debt to Assets 82435 1.42 34.44 169 35265 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.37 0.58 0.77 0.90 1.16 1.64 5.72 11.78 26.94 894.00 7901.00
Dividends 82435 0.71 48.58 128 18086 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 2.74 6.12 16.63 616.67 7900.00
Dividend Payout 82027 0.08 14.72 261 73542 0.00 0.00 -867.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 1.02 1.20 1.64 21.13 4099.50
Net oper. Inc. (NOI) 82435 1.78 55.39 96 11438 0.10 0.00 -371.34 -9.57 -2.58 -0.47 -0.21 -0.02 0.10 0.43 1.35 2.90 16.40 39.26 84.93 2486.70 8097.71
Equity 82435 7.41 179.80 146 30183 0.35 0.10 -1273.53 -6.75 -2.24 -0.44 -0.13 0.10 0.35 1.15 4.17 10.91 81.53 184.12 425.09 6101.26 39994.00
Return on Assets 82435 0.08 14.94 246 67914 0.07 0.00 -847.44 -6.50 -1.75 -0.40 -0.17 0.00 0.07 0.18 0.32 0.43 0.79 1.23 2.29 133.00 4085.00
Return on Equity 82368 0.42 16.36 189 47250 0.31 0.00 -621.00 -25.33 -6.72 -1.12 -0.39 0.02 0.31 0.67 1.13 2.08 7.30 13.88 28.64 260.00 4085.00
Firm Age 82435 12.84 12.47 3 15 10.00 8.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 10.00 17.00 25.00 34.00 70.00 82.00 90.00 133.00 164.00
This table presents distributions of corporate finance variables in 2005 for the population of nonlisted Norwegian firms with limited liability that pass our filters as defined in table 4.1. The corporate finance variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1.







































Table 6.S1. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel C. Large nonlisted firms
n mean std skew. kurt. med. mode p0 p0_25 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_5 p99_75 p99_99 p100
Total Assets 4122 307.62 2029.07 27 1055 45.29 31.49 1.32 2.44 3.77 6.91 11.51 22.43 45.29 124.77 408.98 861.35 4486.30 9896.59 14843.93 90854.00 90854.00
Employees 4122 124.61 730.34 24 713 33.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 15.00 33.00 76.00 184.00 370.00 1516.00 2573.00 3816.00 25057.00 25057.00
Sales 4122 313.70 1506.50 18 426 86.99 52.64 43.99 44.15 44.39 46.20 48.70 57.85 86.99 173.26 447.67 968.55 3693.41 7611.84 15251.04 43656.25 43656.25
Growth of Assets 3784 2.72 61.73 49 2529 1.09 . 0.02 0.35 0.53 0.76 0.86 0.98 1.09 1.26 1.55 1.96 4.45 6.72 13.98 3392.61 3392.61
Growth of Sales 3779 141.81 4326.55 36 1417 1.10 . 0.08 0.33 0.57 0.83 0.92 1.00 1.10 1.26 1.64 2.44 16.57 114.65 2107.97 187565.50 187565.50
Growth of NOI 3764 6.99 405.90 49 2886 1.04 0.17 -7161.00 -124.29 -24.31 -3.04 -0.75 0.39 1.04 1.81 3.83 7.25 36.30 93.76 223.39 23243.33 23243.33
Current Assets (CA) 4122 116.06 448.29 12 182 29.68 7.04 0.09 1.81 2.74 5.68 8.38 15.92 29.68 68.73 193.74 381.27 1587.48 2997.10 4329.58 9286.00 9286.00
Cash and Others 4122 30.18 213.55 20 484 5.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.47 1.57 5.02 13.95 39.37 79.76 399.93 699.60 1880.14 6758.63 6758.63
Inventory 4122 19.51 75.31 13 276 3.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 3.48 12.84 35.51 73.94 295.00 427.00 627.20 2258.35 2258.35
Investment (I) 3834 19.29 263.27 15 493 0.71 0.00 -5267.61 -248.89 -26.62 -0.86 -0.01 0.09 0.71 4.15 19.48 52.48 360.63 700.30 1741.00 7561.41 7561.41
Working Capital (WC) 4122 20.44 376.57 -25 1343 6.70 4.40 -18017.54 -1218.71 -180.90 -12.80 -3.07 1.06 6.70 19.23 60.24 122.18 672.89 1123.75 1337.28 7620.77 7620.77
Assets to Empl. 4089 13.71 128.49 39 1925 1.29 0.75 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.27 0.39 0.68 1.29 2.89 9.00 31.21 279.77 423.14 766.31 6793.00 6793.00
Sales to Empl. 4089 11.60 106.96 44 2199 2.91 2.96 0.01 0.19 0.37 0.74 1.02 1.65 2.91 5.60 16.23 38.81 134.16 213.68 360.38 5747.67 5747.67
CA to Assets 4122 0.70 0.26 -1 0 0.78 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.29 0.53 0.78 0.92 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
WC to Assets 4122 0.18 0.23 0 5 0.16 0.47 -2.45 -0.57 -0.40 -0.15 -0.06 0.05 0.16 0.31 0.46 0.56 0.79 0.88 0.97 1.00 1.00
I. to Dpr. Assets (DA) 3834 1.10 10.17 29 1063 0.16 0.00 -13.80 -0.92 -0.69 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.47 1.17 2.17 15.86 32.55 61.35 441.14 441.14
Depreciation to DA 3834 0.41 2.75 30 1020 0.24 0.00 -2.26 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.24 0.39 0.60 0.75 2.00 3.17 4.59 110.29 110.29
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) 3542 1.13 10.55 28 994 0.16 0.00 -13.80 -0.92 -0.69 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.47 1.18 2.14 16.52 32.67 63.61 441.14 441.14































Current Debt (CD) 4122 95.62 580.13 23 691 20.53 5.12 0.00 0.32 1.93 4.27 6.00 10.63 20.53 46.13 131.01 286.05 1308.90 2418.35 3607.12 22566.62 22566.62
CD to Total Debt 4120 0.73 0.27 -1 0 0.82 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.30 0.54 0.82 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt to Assets 4122 0.72 0.26 8 258 0.75 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.31 0.42 0.60 0.75 0.86 0.92 0.97 1.18 1.32 1.53 8.80 8.80
Dividends 4122 12.82 216.78 29 904 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.09 13.00 121.30 260.00 554.00 7900.00 7900.00
Dividend Payout 4111 0.17 0.69 5 315 0.00 0.00 -17.57 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.99 1.71 2.99 4.16 19.21 19.21
Net oper. Inc. (NOI) 4122 27.17 240.61 23 627 2.86 0.00 -371.34 -119.69 -35.48 -3.88 -0.45 0.73 2.86 8.42 30.81 78.34 434.73 685.26 1273.75 8097.71 8097.71
Equity 4122 108.20 785.30 34 1640 11.38 0.10 -1273.53 -29.69 -6.24 0.47 1.20 3.74 11.38 38.66 132.59 308.37 2087.08 2852.75 5884.00 39994.00 39994.00
Return on Assets 4122 0.11 0.32 37 1783 0.08 0.00 -1.99 -0.42 -0.24 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.23 0.31 0.59 0.85 0.98 16.76 16.76
Return on Equity 4122 0.35 2.79 -9 731 0.27 0.00 -93.25 -9.00 -1.95 -0.35 -0.03 0.10 0.27 0.57 0.94 1.44 3.66 5.85 9.49 85.83 85.83
Firm Age 4122 19.26 17.55 2 7 15.00 8.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 8.00 15.00 23.00 40.00 50.00 90.00 102.00 108.00 129.00 129.00
This table presents distributions of corporate finance variables in 2005 for the population of large nonlisted Norwegian firms with limited liability that pass our filters as defined in table 4.1. Large nonlisted firms are the 5% largest nonlisted firms by sales. The






































Table 6.S1. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel D. Listed firms
n mean std skew. kurt. med. mode p0 p0_25 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_5 p99_75 p99_99 p100
Total Assets 134 7522.41 33024.31 7 50 638.12 17.96 17.96 44.37 79.68 119.32 227.18 638.12 2299.94 7239.81 20770.00 217697.00 284828.00 284828.00 284828.00 284828.00
Employees 134 1669.14 5258.55 6 34 248.00 19.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 19.00 59.00 248.00 944.00 3122.00 5455.00 35816.00 38780.00 38780.00 38780.00 38780.00
Sales 134 6754.74 38034.66 9 84 271.06 0.31 0.31 0.43 2.34 8.56 48.19 271.06 1526.87 4196.13 14695.60 176224.00 393718.00 393718.00 393718.00 393718.00
Growth of Assets 122 1.55 1.37 5 38 1.16 . 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.81 0.92 1.06 1.16 1.47 2.31 3.03 7.19 12.58 12.58 12.58 12.58
Growth of Sales 122 6.61 50.02 11 121 1.13 . 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.40 0.60 0.95 1.13 1.42 3.44 8.66 22.92 553.19 553.19 553.19 553.19
Growth of NOI 122 1.31 12.23 1 34 0.93 . -78.20 -78.20 -27.98 -4.36 -1.57 -0.08 0.93 1.78 3.85 5.81 53.78 84.30 84.30 84.30 84.30
Current Assets (CA) 134 2170.66 9250.20 6 43 230.47 1.15 1.15 2.53 15.52 40.77 83.16 230.47 688.07 1768.00 4360.80 64401.00 73338.00 73338.00 73338.00 73338.00
Cash and Others 134 427.53 1606.54 6 37 89.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 3.28 19.76 89.26 214.85 491.40 1081.50 10463.00 12379.00 12379.00 12379.00 12379.00
Inventory 134 456.55 2057.60 6 34 1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.64 67.26 407.82 1072.35 13447.00 14553.00 14553.00 14553.00 14553.00
Investment (I) 121 1324.79 6764.02 6 37 16.29 0.00 -1444.65 -1444.65 -852.74 -2.60 0.00 1.56 16.29 174.22 526.94 2249.00 41001.00 49712.00 49712.00 49712.00 49712.00
Working Capital (WC) 134 92.66 2625.40 -5 49 82.01 -22903.00 -22903.00 -11357.00 -165.86 -29.06 9.44 82.01 228.11 614.56 1239.60 8745.00 10075.00 10075.00 10075.00 10075.00
Assets to Empl. 134 50.28 236.17 7 48 2.30 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.58 0.83 1.23 2.30 5.01 37.23 142.41 1367.70 2049.57 2049.57 2049.57 2049.57
Sales to Empl. 134 13.53 115.60 11 131 1.24 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.42 1.24 3.01 6.42 10.53 144.81 1333.18 1333.18 1333.18 1333.18
CA to Assets 134 0.41 0.26 0 -1 0.36 . 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.36 0.62 0.78 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
WC to Assets 134 0.16 0.23 1 2 0.10 . -0.74 -0.74 -0.24 -0.13 -0.07 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.43 0.62 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
I. to Dpr. Assets (DA) 121 4.21 29.83 10 112 0.31 0.00 -6.25 -6.25 -0.95 -0.07 0.00 0.10 0.31 0.96 3.29 6.77 58.94 323.45 323.45 323.45 323.45
Depreciation to DA 121 0.79 3.74 8 68 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.19 0.38 0.67 0.98 21.84 35.08 35.08 35.08 35.08
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) 121 4.21 29.83 10 112 0.31 0.00 -6.25 -6.25 -0.95 -0.07 0.00 0.10 0.31 0.96 3.29 6.77 58.94 323.45 323.45 323.45 323.45
Total Debt 134 4574.86 21133.42 7 56 230.30 0.80 0.80 4.34 8.09 21.78 63.19 230.30 892.02 5036.80 14354.00 128380.00 192396.00 192396.00 192396.00 192396.00
Current Debt (CD) 134 2078.00 10268.10 7 59 117.56 0.80 0.80 0.94 4.45 13.98 41.03 117.56 437.28 1470.00 5274.00 54326.00 96241.00 96241.00 96241.00 96241.00
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Debt to Assets 134 0.44 0.24 0 -1 0.47 . 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.23 0.47 0.61 0.74 0.77 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Dividends 134 183.01 1601.95 10 112 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.18 75.59 5503.00 17756.00 17756.00 17756.00 17756.00
Dividend Payout 134 0.09 0.29 4 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.73 1.43 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05
Net oper. Inc. (NOI) 134 608.74 3231.78 8 78 27.54 -848.00 -848.00 -250.50 -68.76 -25.64 0.37 27.54 148.91 660.56 2387.94 15292.00 32774.00 32774.00 32774.00 32774.00
Equity 134 2947.55 12082.44 6 44 342.28 12.97 12.97 13.62 41.12 60.67 152.10 342.28 1275.97 3356.80 6416.00 89317.00 92432.00 92432.00 92432.00 92432.00
Return on Assets 134 0.05 0.17 -4 33 0.05 . -1.35 -1.35 -0.50 -0.16 -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.33 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Return on Equity 134 0.07 0.41 -3 25 0.11 . -2.90 -2.90 -1.78 -0.52 -0.17 0.00 0.11 0.21 0.36 0.46 0.78 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91
Firm Age 134 31.04 34.93 2 2 16.00 10.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 9.00 16.00 37.00 97.00 112.00 140.00 145.00 145.00 145.00 145.00
This table presents distributions of corporate finance variables in 2005 for the population of listed Norwegian firms with limited liability that pass our filters as defined in table 4.1. The corporate finance variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. Except for employees and ratios,




























Table 6.S2. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005 by industry sector
Panel A. All firms Industry sector code
Percentile 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
Total Assets P50 1.51 3.91 2.41 57.07 1.85 1.59 1.86 2.16 1.72
P75 7.19 14.98 7.77 428.03 4.43 4.79 4.64 6.19 4.44
Employees P50 2.00 4.00 4.00 9.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 3.00
P75 6.00 7.00 11.00 32.00 9.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 7.00
Sales P50 0.40 3.40 4.12 21.31 4.01 1.79 4.36 3.68 3.07
P75 1.38 10.38 12.37 137.57 9.35 4.81 11.75 10.28 8.04
Growth of Assets P50 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.05 1.06 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.06
P75 1.27 1.28 1.21 1.21 1.32 1.25 1.20 1.27 1.33
Growth of Sales P50 1.03 1.12 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.04 1.03 1.07 1.08
P75 1.74 1.42 1.21 1.37 1.34 1.26 1.17 1.26 1.37
Growth of NOI P50 0.53 0.55 0.68 0.99 0.63 0.67 0.69 0.58 0.60
P75 1.39 1.77 1.53 1.53 1.51 1.50 1.48 1.44 1.56
Current Assets (CA) P50 0.65 1.32 1.51 19.28 1.30 0.74 1.47 1.08 1.00
P75 2.50 5.04 4.73 116.90 3.23 2.06 3.65 3.01 2.63
Cash and Others P50 0.19 0.27 0.31 4.14 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.21
P75 0.71 1.12 1.07 27.29 0.86 0.80 0.84 1.14 0.67
Inventory P50 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.07
P75 0.06 0.35 0.97 0.83 0.26 0.03 1.42 0.00 0.52
Investment (I) P50 0.00 0.08 0.05 2.28 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04
P75 1.52 0.71 0.35 15.18 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.55 0.28
Working Capital (WC) P50 0.13 0.18 0.27 0.93 0.19 0.13 0.32 0.13 0.16
P75 0.78 1.54 1.32 17.75 0.71 0.58 1.05 0.62 0.68
Assets to Empl. P50 0.47 1.02 0.51 5.32 0.43 0.45 0.49 0.57 0.44
P75 1.37 2.86 0.96 14.29 0.69 1.23 0.97 1.09 0.91
Sales to Empl. P50 0.16 1.00 0.92 1.83 0.96 0.70 1.22 0.98 0.86
P75 0.50 1.79 1.50 4.40 1.37 1.33 2.23 1.75 1.49
CA to Assets P50 0.67 0.50 0.76 0.34 0.81 0.72 0.91 0.60 0.76
P75 0.95 0.78 0.92 0.88 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.93















P75 0.45 0.29 0.36 0.28 0.30 0.36 0.41 0.26 0.32
I to Dpr. Assets (DA) P50 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06
P75 0.27 0.34 0.34 0.25 0.55 0.30 0.32 0.44 0.47
Depreciation to DA P50 0.09 0.15 0.23 0.07 0.27 0.21 0.28 0.25 0.23
P75 0.25 0.27 0.37 0.23 0.40 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.37
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.22 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.13
P75 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.27 0.61 0.37 0.53 0.50 0.50
Total Debt P50 0.88 3.00 1.81 19.67 1.48 1.11 1.48 1.67 1.32
P75 3.57 10.29 5.56 207.37 3.53 3.43 3.56 4.61 3.37
Current Debt P50 0.46 1.12 1.12 9.56 1.06 0.59 1.03 0.91 0.79
P75 1.46 3.54 3.32 76.05 2.50 1.55 2.57 2.55 1.91
CD to Debt P50 0.99 0.52 0.81 0.65 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.77 0.83
P75 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt to Assets P50 0.70 0.80 0.76 0.57 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.79 0.79
P75 0.88 0.97 0.90 0.79 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93
Dividends P50 0.67 0.80 0.60 6.97 0.46 0.45 0.56 0.64 0.30
P75 2.00 2.00 2.00 83.70 1.00 1.18 1.75 2.06 0.92
Dividend Payout P50 0.47 0.41 0.63 0.70 0.67 0.79 0.82 0.65 0.66
P75 0.90 0.76 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.94
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 0.04 0.10 0.11 1.40 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07
P75 0.34 0.77 0.55 15.44 0.48 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.35
Equity P50 0.28 0.57 0.48 24.19 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.28
P75 1.93 2.87 1.94 214.16 0.92 1.15 1.04 1.27 0.95
Return on Assets P50 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
P75 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.15
Return on Equity P50 0.15 0.25 0.26 0.10 0.44 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.29
P75 0.49 0.63 0.59 0.35 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.62 0.68
Firm Age P50 1.00 8.00 12.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 11.00 10.00 7.00







This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables in 2005 by industry sector. The
sample is all firms as defined in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables, except for employees and
ratios, are in millions of NOK as of 2005. The dividend figures only include the firms that pay dividends. The industry sector
codes are 0: Missing; 1: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining; 2: Manufacturing, chemical products; 3: Energy; 4: Construction;


















Table 6.S2. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005 by industry sector
Panel B. Nonlisted firms Industry sector code
Percentile 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
Total Assets P50 1.51 3.90 2.38 42.93 1.85 1.58 1.86 2.14 1.72
P75 7.01 14.57 7.51 303.35 4.43 4.77 4.63 6.10 4.44
Employees P50 2.00 4.00 4.00 8.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 3.00
P75 6.00 7.00 11.00 31.00 9.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 7.00
Sales P50 0.40 3.39 4.08 17.26 4.00 1.79 4.35 3.65 3.07
P75 1.38 10.37 12.04 106.49 9.34 4.79 11.74 10.09 8.02
Growth of Assets P50 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.06
P75 1.27 1.28 1.21 1.19 1.32 1.25 1.20 1.27 1.33
Growth of Sales P50 1.03 1.12 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.04 1.03 1.07 1.08
P75 1.74 1.42 1.21 1.36 1.34 1.26 1.17 1.26 1.37
Growth of NOI P50 0.53 0.55 0.68 1.00 0.63 0.67 0.69 0.58 0.60
P75 1.39 1.77 1.53 1.53 1.51 1.50 1.48 1.44 1.56
Current Assets (CA) P50 0.65 1.32 1.49 16.93 1.30 0.74 1.47 1.06 0.99
P75 2.48 5.03 4.60 92.76 3.22 2.05 3.64 2.95 2.63
Cash and Others P50 0.19 0.27 0.30 3.39 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.21
P75 0.70 1.12 1.05 20.13 0.86 0.79 0.84 1.11 0.67
Inventory P50 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.07
P75 0.06 0.35 0.94 0.83 0.26 0.03 1.42 0.00 0.52
Investment (I) P50 0.00 0.08 0.05 1.80 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04
P75 1.52 0.71 0.34 14.53 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.54 0.28
Working Capital (WC) P50 0.13 0.18 0.27 0.91 0.19 0.13 0.32 0.13 0.16
P75 0.76 1.53 1.27 14.42 0.71 0.58 1.05 0.60 0.68
Assets to Empl. P50 0.47 1.02 0.51 5.10 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.56 0.44
P75 1.36 2.86 0.95 13.42 0.69 1.23 0.97 1.08 0.91
Sales to Empl. P50 0.16 1.00 0.92 1.83 0.96 0.70 1.22 0.98 0.86
P75 0.50 1.80 1.50 4.22 1.37 1.33 2.23 1.75 1.49
CA to Assets P50 0.67 0.50 0.76 0.35 0.81 0.72 0.91 0.60 0.76
P75 0.95 0.78 0.92 0.88 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.93
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P75 0.45 0.29 0.36 0.28 0.30 0.36 0.41 0.26 0.32
I to Dpr. Assets (DA) P50 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06
P75 0.27 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.55 0.30 0.31 0.44 0.48
Depreciation to DA P50 0.09 0.15 0.23 0.07 0.27 0.21 0.28 0.25 0.23
P75 0.25 0.27 0.37 0.20 0.40 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.37
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.22 0.04 0.13 0.15 0.13
P75 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.61 0.35 0.53 0.50 0.50
Total Debt P50 0.88 2.98 1.78 16.59 1.47 1.11 1.48 1.66 1.32
P75 3.56 10.28 5.42 162.59 3.53 3.42 3.55 4.52 3.36
Current Debt P50 0.46 1.11 1.11 8.80 1.06 0.58 1.03 0.91 0.79
P75 1.44 3.52 3.23 67.00 2.49 1.54 2.57 2.51 1.91
CD to Debt P50 0.99 0.52 0.81 0.71 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.77 0.83
P75 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt to Assets P50 0.70 0.80 0.76 0.58 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.80 0.79
P75 0.88 0.97 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93
Dividends P50 0.67 0.80 0.57 6.59 0.46 0.44 0.55 0.60 0.30
P75 2.00 2.00 1.84 53.61 1.00 1.18 1.74 2.00 0.92
Dividend Payout P50 0.47 0.41 0.63 0.70 0.67 0.79 0.82 0.66 0.66
P75 0.90 0.76 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.94
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 0.04 0.10 0.10 1.34 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07
P75 0.34 0.76 0.53 12.90 0.48 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.35
Equity P50 0.28 0.57 0.47 17.73 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.28
P75 1.91 2.85 1.87 147.48 0.92 1.14 1.04 1.23 0.95
Return on Assets P50 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
P75 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.15
Return on Equity P50 0.15 0.25 0.26 0.10 0.44 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.29
P75 0.49 0.63 0.59 0.36 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.68
Firm Age P50 1.00 8.00 12.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 11.00 10.00 7.00







This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables in 2005 by industry
sector. The sample is nonlisted firms as defined in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables,
except for employees and ratios, are in millions of NOK as of 2005. The dividend figures only include the firms that pay
dividends. The industry sector codes are 0: Missing; 1: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining; 2: Manufacturing, chemical


















Table 6.S2. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005 by industry sector
Panel C. Large nonlisted firms Industry sector
Percentile 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
Total Assets P50 80.31 145.67 59.74 436.84 31.12 60.25 29.31 51.53 38.60
P75 170.80 278.09 148.24 2,148.59 53.03 173.68 54.09 161.94 76.00
Employees P50 42.00 20.00 55.00 37.50 42.50 39.00 20.00 40.00 34.00
P75 91.00 63.00 116.00 106.50 65.00 92.00 37.00 103.00 107.00
Sales P50 123.77 75.36 101.32 222.82 68.49 93.08 76.35 94.55 67.80
P75 206.09 161.64 216.60 759.87 102.71 181.82 143.89 210.23 115.73
Growth of Assets P50 1.07 1.12 1.07 1.05 1.14 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.08
P75 1.25 1.23 1.18 1.20 1.35 1.27 1.27 1.29 1.21
Growth of Sales P50 1.04 1.17 1.09 1.09 1.16 1.10 1.08 1.11 1.10
P75 1.22 1.40 1.19 1.23 1.37 1.30 1.22 1.30 1.21
Growth of NOI P50 0.83 1.47 0.96 1.11 1.06 1.07 1.05 0.99 1.06
P75 1.35 2.97 1.76 1.46 2.01 1.99 1.71 1.82 1.72
Current Assets (CA) P50 44.11 41.65 36.54 120.24 24.16 33.79 23.89 25.92 23.41
P75 88.10 107.63 84.62 536.10 39.58 84.11 43.64 68.93 44.48
Cash and Others P50 7.96 5.15 5.02 24.49 4.74 6.81 3.44 7.49 3.33
P75 22.79 18.57 12.70 108.42 9.29 19.30 8.81 24.14 9.84
Inventory P50 11.43 13.00 10.74 1.34 0.84 1.72 4.44 0.00 5.37
P75 23.94 44.12 25.18 5.00 4.48 11.86 11.97 0.22 11.91
Investment (I) P50 2.24 3.59 1.76 13.15 0.54 1.03 0.22 1.07 0.82
P75 20.58 19.48 6.91 61.11 1.95 6.30 0.99 9.19 4.23
Working Capital (WC) P50 19.54 16.42 11.32 12.05 5.45 6.76 5.58 2.36 6.39
P75 38.44 41.69 28.31 46.77 10.11 22.35 13.46 11.80 17.61
Assets to Empl. P50 1.55 5.54 1.22 7.54 0.76 1.28 1.40 1.17 0.99
P75 4.20 10.47 2.08 45.14 1.21 3.94 2.66 2.71 1.90
Sales to Empl. P50 2.51 3.75 2.01 3.60 1.76 2.83 3.94 2.96 2.18
P75 4.29 7.34 3.18 17.95 2.62 6.07 7.14 7.28 3.96
CA to Assets P50 0.61 0.48 0.64 0.26 0.83 0.73 0.89 0.62 0.75















WC to Assets P50 0.26 0.13 0.19 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.06 0.20
P75 0.35 0.30 0.32 0.16 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.18 0.34
I to Dpr. Assets (DA) P50 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.15
P75 0.36 0.37 0.32 0.24 0.63 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.44
Depreciation to DA P50 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.28 0.22 0.32 0.25 0.19
P75 0.20 0.17 0.28 0.16 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.33
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17
P75 0.36 0.37 0.32 0.25 0.63 0.52 0.57 0.49 0.48
Total Debt P50 54.88 92.44 39.53 207.48 23.01 39.96 19.98 34.90 22.94
P75 107.69 174.39 89.34 1,229.46 40.85 110.14 38.71 115.90 45.47
Current Debt P50 30.23 26.11 24.80 88.57 18.27 23.93 15.53 21.42 13.38
P75 51.16 52.95 60.60 482.95 31.01 55.80 31.54 53.67 31.23
CD to Debt P50 0.51 0.40 0.68 0.45 0.87 0.77 0.95 0.82 0.71
P75 0.67 0.63 0.87 0.88 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.92
Debt to Assets P50 0.67 0.72 0.70 0.55 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.74
P75 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.73 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.84
Dividends P50 1.11 1.80 5.00 12.00 1.57 2.60 2.45 3.13 1.80
P75 1.80 3.73 15.00 115.00 4.18 9.00 7.45 19.61 8.21
Dividend Payout P50 0.31 0.15 0.57 0.68 0.46 0.50 0.84 0.47 0.36
P75 0.60 0.33 0.98 0.94 0.81 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.65
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 3.93 8.96 3.27 21.86 2.82 3.52 2.09 2.45 1.69
P75 13.15 18.87 8.08 144.48 5.12 11.67 5.79 10.09 5.07
Equity P50 27.58 37.53 18.61 193.40 6.94 13.93 6.86 9.92 9.43
P75 60.28 79.33 50.06 910.18 13.04 49.94 17.78 38.89 25.85
Return on Assets P50 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07
P75 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.13
Return on Equity P50 0.18 0.28 0.18 0.10 0.41 0.27 0.34 0.25 0.24
P75 0.48 0.49 0.39 0.21 0.69 0.61 0.63 0.50 0.52
Firm Age P50 12.00 15.00 18.00 10.00 16.00 14.00 15.00 16.00 14.00







This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables in 2005 by industry sector. The sample
is large nonlisted firms (i.e., 5% largest nonlisted by sales) as specified in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All
variables, except for employees and ratios, are in millions of NOK as of 2005. The dividend figures only include the firms that pay
dividends. The industry sector codes are 0: Missing; 1: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining; 2: Manufacturing, chemical products; 3:


















Table 6.S2. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005 by industry sector
Panel D. Listed firms Industry sector
VarName Percentile 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
Total Assets P50 95.23 4,022.82 1,149.77 3,510.47 4,113.96 237.53 375.15 1,321.46 6,635.58
P75 95.23 4,022.82 2,866.90 11,494.01 6,369.70 535.94 1,597.10 4,093.47 6,635.58
Employees P50 19.00 1,135.00 537.00 176.50 3,501.50 147.00 276.50 429.50 2,961.00
P75 19.00 1,135.00 1,613.00 2,926.50 5,455.00 246.00 608.00 2,014.50 2,961.00
Sales P50 34.99 1,948.56 529.51 486.45 9,445.87 142.11 221.79 181.92 5,381.91
P75 34.99 1,948.56 2,430.80 3,648.60 14,695.60 293.59 1,929.78 917.72 5,381.91
Growth of Assets P50 0.00 1.34 1.12 1.38 1.09 1.21 1.16 1.12 1.33
P75 0.00 1.34 1.27 2.60 1.10 1.81 2.52 1.30 1.33
Growth of Sales P50 0.00 0.82 1.13 1.27 1.13 1.15 1.10 1.13 1.07
P75 0.00 0.82 1.28 3.97 1.14 1.47 1.60 1.63 1.07
Growth of NOI P50 0.00 -1.57 1.12 0.70 1.72 0.77 1.00 0.54 3.57
P75 0.00 -1.57 2.51 1.63 2.21 1.45 1.58 1.52 3.57
Current Assets (CA) P50 63.14 1,640.54 275.16 1,128.36 2,913.60 102.22 184.22 247.37 2,902.09
P75 63.14 1,640.54 852.85 1,738.79 4,360.80 242.42 626.65 546.56 2,902.09
Cash and Others P50 9.68 152.70 93.68 257.01 272.65 48.27 37.84 146.60 389.72
P75 9.68 152.70 241.25 709.56 344.80 126.64 149.20 237.20 389.72
Inventory P50 5.48 1,072.35 30.10 0.00 628.81 0.00 14.34 0.00 1,687.92
P75 5.48 1,072.35 293.70 36.04 849.80 6.68 156.24 12.40 1,687.92
Investment (I) P50 0.00 526.94 25.01 122.99 221.06 15.48 5.11 2.97 968.73
P75 0.00 526.94 133.39 2,101.00 267.90 73.62 215.44 38.45 968.73
Working Capital (WC) P50 27.45 966.92 125.77 286.02 215.85 21.97 31.67 118.38 1,419.52
P75 27.45 966.92 314.45 426.00 256.30 81.66 184.27 172.90 1,419.52
Assets to Empl. P50 5.01 3.54 1.68 13.93 1.18 2.27 1.88 2.75 2.24
P75 5.01 3.54 3.41 43.29 1.20 4.81 2.89 24.71 2.24
Sales to Empl. P50 1.84 1.72 1.44 3.78 2.70 1.15 0.49 0.78 1.82
P75 1.84 1.72 3.07 11.66 2.71 2.42 4.77 1.67 1.82
CA to Assets P50 0.66 0.41 0.55 0.27 0.74 0.33 0.39 0.23 0.44
P75 0.66 0.41 0.64 0.36 0.79 0.62 0.81 0.35 0.44
WC to Assets P50 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.21
P75 0.29 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.14 0.23 0.28 0.20 0.21
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P75 0.00 0.31 0.39 1.79 0.68 2.92 0.96 0.62 0.36
Depreciation to DA P50 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.15 0.09
P75 0.00 0.09 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.67 0.37 0.29 0.09
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.00 0.31 0.26 0.33 0.43 0.82 0.28 0.18 0.36
P75 0.00 0.31 0.39 1.79 0.68 2.92 0.96 0.62 0.36
Total Debt P50 35.81 2,304.49 350.14 1,505.24 3,162.41 85.43 168.70 430.72 3,113.05
P75 35.81 2,304.49 1,040.49 6,907.61 4,899.30 186.47 932.20 885.51 3,113.05
Current Debt P50 35.69 673.61 188.63 148.61 2,697.75 69.24 89.53 148.23 1,482.57
P75 35.69 673.61 649.00 1,391.13 4,185.40 142.64 450.75 398.94 1,482.57
CD to Debt P50 1.00 0.29 0.66 0.21 0.85 0.81 0.85 0.35 0.48
P75 1.00 0.29 0.88 0.34 0.85 0.95 0.97 0.73 0.48
Debt to Assets P50 0.38 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.77 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.47
P75 0.38 0.57 0.61 0.68 0.77 0.57 0.61 0.75 0.47
Dividends P50 0.00 0.00 30.81 17,756.00 0.00 20.98 6.96 51.90 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 276.20 17,756.00 0.00 212.37 70.88 204.96 0.00
Dividend Payout P50 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.54 0.00 0.94 0.73 0.26 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.54 0.00 1.34 1.43 0.34 0.00
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 -12.40 369.95 35.61 215.36 329.63 4.48 7.48 60.58 660.56
P75 -12.40 369.95 177.81 850.76 571.50 41.96 49.38 158.56 660.56
Equity P50 59.41 1,718.33 432.09 2,012.18 951.55 171.70 195.16 557.04 3,522.54
P75 59.41 1,718.33 1,614.30 4,586.40 1,470.40 343.90 684.80 1,710.72 3,522.54
Return on Assets P50 -0.13 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.11
P75 -0.13 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.11
Return on Equity P50 -0.21 0.22 0.13 0.11 0.30 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.19
P75 -0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.39 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.19
Firm Age P50 1.00 14.00 21.00 18.00 45.50 10.00 11.50 70.50 12.00







This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables in 2005 by industry sector. The sample is the listed firms
as specified in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables, except for employees and ratios, are in millions of NOK as of 2005.
The dividend figures only include the firms that pay dividends. The industry sector codes are 0: Missing; 1: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining; 2:


















Table 6.S2. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005 by firm size
Panel A. All firms Sales decile
Percentile 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Total Assets P50 20.87 5.94 3.32 2.15 1.51 1.09 0.84 0.63 0.51 0.34
P75 57.18 9.46 5.16 3.45 2.51 1.97 1.66 1.57 1.68 1.32
Employees P50 20.00 9.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 42.00 14.00 9.00 7.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Sales P50 44.97 14.39 7.77 4.89 3.30 2.27 1.52 0.94 0.49 0.10
P75 90.86 17.65 8.86 5.44 3.64 2.50 1.69 1.07 0.60 0.19
Growth of Assets P50 1.08 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.92
P75 1.27 1.28 1.27 1.27 1.26 1.25 1.25 1.26 1.18 1.07
Growth of Sales P50 1.10 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.01 0.98 0.67
P75 1.26 1.28 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.24 1.25 1.24 1.06
Growth of NOI P50 0.99 0.86 0.81 0.75 0.67 0.62 0.55 0.48 0.33 0.22
P75 1.77 1.67 1.61 1.59 1.51 1.51 1.41 1.38 1.19 1.03
Current Assets (CA) P50 14.43 4.25 2.39 1.51 1.04 0.73 0.54 0.38 0.25 0.15
P75 34.06 6.35 3.40 2.21 1.56 1.14 0.88 0.68 0.51 0.41
Cash and Others P50 2.63 0.90 0.58 0.42 0.31 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.06
P75 7.65 2.03 1.24 0.89 0.66 0.50 0.41 0.33 0.24 0.17
Inventory P50 1.76 0.57 0.21 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 6.44 1.62 0.86 0.50 0.30 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00
Investment (I) P50 0.34 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 1.87 0.38 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00
Working Capital (WC) P50 2.93 0.86 0.50 0.31 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.05
P75 10.08 2.15 1.21 0.78 0.55 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.16
Assets to Empl. P50 0.99 0.63 0.54 0.48 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.31 0.21
P75 2.18 1.24 1.02 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.93 0.85 0.74 0.60
Sales to Empl. P50 2.44 1.54 1.23 1.05 0.94 0.84 0.74 0.71 0.36 0.08
P75 4.42 2.63 2.05 1.66 1.52 1.28 1.34 0.93 0.52 0.16















P75 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.00
WC to Assets P50 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.15
P75 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.61
I to Dpr. Assets (DA) P50 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.41 0.36 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.03 0.00
Depreciation to DA P50 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.11
P75 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.28
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.51 0.44 0.28 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.79
Total Debt P50 14.37 4.43 2.53 1.61 1.13 0.83 0.60 0.46 0.36 0.22
P75 37.79 7.03 3.96 2.67 1.96 1.56 1.26 1.21 1.20 0.87
Current Debt P50 9.82 3.11 1.72 1.11 0.76 0.55 0.40 0.29 0.19 0.10
P75 23.63 4.60 2.52 1.62 1.15 0.86 0.65 0.53 0.41 0.35
CD to Debt P50 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt to Assets P50 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.65
P75 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.99
Dividends P50 1.82 0.73 0.46 0.30 0.29 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.17
P75 5.28 1.50 0.91 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.36 0.30 0.24 1.00
Dividend Payout P50 0.66 0.73 0.80 0.75 0.86 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.89
P75 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 1.45 0.48 0.28 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.01
P75 4.50 1.16 0.68 0.45 0.34 0.26 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.03
Equity P50 4.63 1.17 0.68 0.45 0.32 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11
P75 17.08 2.51 1.39 0.93 0.69 0.55 0.49 0.42 0.38 0.34
Return on Assets P50 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.00
P75 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.07
Return on Equity P50 0.32 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.26 0.16 0.02
P75 0.63 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.62 0.51 0.30
Firm Age P50 14.00 12.00 10.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 10.00
P75 21.00 19.00 17.00 17.00 16.00 15.00 15.00 16.00 17.00 17.00
This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables in 2005 by firm size as measured by
sales. The sample is all firms as defined in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables, except for























Table 6.S2. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005 by firm size
Panel B. Nonlisted firms Sales decile
Percentile 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Total Assets P50 20.20 5.91 3.30 2.14 1.51 1.08 0.84 0.63 0.51 0.34
P75 53.57 9.35 5.13 3.44 2.50 1.97 1.66 1.57 1.68 1.32
Employees P50 20.00 9.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 41.00 14.00 9.00 7.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Sales P50 43.99 14.27 7.74 4.88 3.29 2.26 1.52 0.94 0.49 0.10
P75 86.99 17.47 8.80 5.41 3.63 2.49 1.68 1.07 0.60 0.19
Growth of Assets P50 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.92
P75 1.26 1.28 1.27 1.27 1.26 1.25 1.25 1.26 1.18 1.07
Growth of Sales P50 1.09 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.01 0.98 0.67
P75 1.26 1.28 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.24 1.25 1.24 1.06
Growth of NOI P50 0.99 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.67 0.62 0.55 0.48 0.33 0.22
P75 1.76 1.68 1.61 1.59 1.51 1.51 1.41 1.38 1.19 1.03
Current Assets (CA) P50 13.98 4.22 2.37 1.51 1.04 0.73 0.54 0.38 0.25 0.15
P75 32.28 6.29 3.39 2.20 1.55 1.14 0.88 0.68 0.51 0.41
Cash and Others P50 2.55 0.89 0.58 0.42 0.31 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.06
P75 7.34 2.02 1.23 0.88 0.66 0.50 0.41 0.33 0.24 0.17
Inventory P50 1.73 0.57 0.21 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 6.24 1.61 0.86 0.50 0.30 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00
Investment (I) P50 0.32 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 1.75 0.37 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00
Working Capital (WC) P50 2.82 0.86 0.49 0.31 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.05
P75 9.55 2.14 1.21 0.77 0.55 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.16
Assets to Empl. P50 0.97 0.63 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.31 0.21
P75 2.13 1.24 1.02 0.92 0.87 0.86 0.93 0.85 0.74 0.60
Sales to Empl. P50 2.44 1.52 1.23 1.05 0.94 0.84 0.74 0.71 0.36 0.08
P75 4.43 2.62 2.04 1.66 1.51 1.28 1.34 0.93 0.52 0.16
CA to Assets P50 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.69 0.78
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WC to Assets P50 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.15
P75 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.61
I to Dpr. Assets (DA) P50 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.51 0.54 0.50 0.41 0.36 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.03 0.00
Depreciation to DA P50 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.11
P75 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.28
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.50 0.43 0.27 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.79
Total Debt P50 13.93 4.40 2.52 1.61 1.13 0.82 0.60 0.46 0.36 0.22
P75 35.30 6.96 3.93 2.67 1.95 1.55 1.26 1.21 1.20 0.87
Current Debt P50 9.55 3.09 1.71 1.10 0.76 0.55 0.40 0.29 0.19 0.10
P75 22.43 4.56 2.50 1.61 1.15 0.86 0.65 0.53 0.41 0.35
CD to Debt P50 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt to Assets P50 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.65
P75 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.99
Dividends P50 1.80 0.72 0.45 0.30 0.29 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.17
P75 5.00 1.50 0.89 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.36 0.30 0.24 1.00
Dividend Payout P50 0.66 0.73 0.81 0.75 0.87 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.89
P75 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 1.41 0.47 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.01
P75 4.31 1.15 0.68 0.45 0.34 0.26 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.03
Equity P50 4.41 1.16 0.68 0.45 0.32 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11
P75 15.80 2.49 1.38 0.92 0.69 0.55 0.49 0.41 0.38 0.34
Return on Assets P50 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.00
P75 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.07
Return on Equity P50 0.32 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.26 0.16 0.02
P75 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.62 0.51 0.30
Firm Age P50 14.00 12.00 10.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 10.00
P75 21.00 19.00 17.00 17.00 16.00 15.00 15.00 16.00 17.00 17.00
This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables in 2005 by firm size as measured by
sales. The sample is all nonlisted firms as defined in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables, except























Table 6.S2. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005 by firm size
Panel C. Large nonlisted firms Sales decile
Percentile 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Total Assets P50 693.91 156.84 83.63 53.99 43.59 36.98 27.85 23.63 21.08 17.45
P75 1,749.77 282.47 135.51 91.64 75.16 56.16 44.04 39.43 32.22 29.23
Employees P50 278.00 89.50 55.00 39.00 32.00 29.00 23.00 23.00 19.00 18.00
P75 619.50 167.00 96.00 71.00 56.50 52.00 43.00 39.00 35.00 29.00
Sales P50 970.82 288.34 173.27 123.41 95.80 78.81 66.44 57.85 51.73 46.19
P75 1,823.74 344.52 191.53 133.58 100.98 83.05 69.31 59.63 52.94 47.38
Growth of Assets P50 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.11 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.10 1.10 1.09
P75 1.23 1.27 1.23 1.28 1.23 1.26 1.27 1.25 1.27 1.29
Growth of Sales P50 1.10 1.10 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.10
P75 1.22 1.26 1.28 1.29 1.25 1.22 1.26 1.25 1.26 1.29
Growth of NOI P50 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.08 0.91 1.07 1.04 0.95 1.01 1.06
P75 1.76 1.75 1.92 2.02 1.68 1.87 1.80 1.71 1.78 1.80
Current Assets (CA) P50 336.84 96.61 55.02 38.29 29.44 25.33 19.64 16.23 15.42 12.57
P75 635.79 146.78 81.32 54.95 42.41 35.47 28.44 25.11 22.09 19.40
Cash and Others P50 36.20 13.11 8.95 6.80 4.54 3.95 3.18 3.08 2.53 2.25
P75 119.57 34.85 20.21 15.38 10.04 9.24 7.36 7.05 6.12 5.19
Inventory P50 51.63 14.11 5.01 5.62 3.78 3.46 2.64 2.36 1.93 1.78
P75 126.36 35.00 20.47 14.44 10.91 10.51 8.48 6.66 5.17 4.23
Investment (I) P50 21.70 3.93 1.72 0.97 0.64 0.45 0.29 0.33 0.28 0.20
P75 77.79 14.47 5.94 3.38 3.14 1.91 1.36 1.47 1.19 0.80
Working Capital (WC) P50 52.94 21.94 12.94 10.56 7.11 5.57 4.42 3.51 3.61 2.51
P75 154.95 55.85 28.42 20.33 14.77 14.13 10.90 9.30 8.14 7.04
Assets to Empl. P50 2.29 1.65 1.57 1.38 1.38 1.19 1.08 0.94 0.94 0.95
P75 6.97 3.78 3.85 2.53 2.95 2.31 2.32 2.02 2.42 2.02
Sales to Empl. P50 3.46 3.26 3.14 3.16 2.95 2.66 2.89 2.42 2.72 2.62
P75 8.35 6.62 8.14 5.57 5.80 4.95 4.97 4.28 5.05 4.25
CA to Assets P50 0.60 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.85















WC to Assets P50 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.16
P75 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.32
I to Dpr. Assets (DA) P50 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.13
P75 0.35 0.56 0.51 0.47 0.39 0.53 0.43 0.49 0.55 0.46
Depreciation to DA P50 0.15 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.27
P75 0.28 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.41 0.39
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.12
P75 0.35 0.56 0.51 0.47 0.39 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.57 0.42
Total Debt P50 425.63 104.99 56.36 36.74 30.29 25.42 19.16 16.09 14.48 12.95
P75 1,063.71 177.77 91.76 57.85 48.41 38.57 27.82 25.25 20.19 20.58
Current Debt P50 258.96 67.95 38.89 26.05 21.23 17.17 12.52 11.32 9.86 8.40
P75 506.20 99.44 57.18 36.49 30.86 25.40 18.57 17.22 14.39 12.76
CD to Debt P50 0.74 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.86
P75 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt to Assets P50 0.73 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.79
P75 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.88
Dividends P50 40.00 10.00 4.00 3.08 2.80 2.00 1.14 1.20 1.09 1.26
P75 121.30 20.00 11.85 7.00 5.05 4.73 3.19 3.96 3.03 3.00
Dividend Payout P50 0.72 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.76 0.76
P75 1.00 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.86 0.95 0.92 1.00 0.98 0.93
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 41.07 8.85 5.51 3.89 2.57 2.25 1.64 1.56 1.39 1.22
P75 120.21 19.78 12.84 8.03 6.08 5.01 3.64 3.74 3.80 2.89
Equity P50 179.35 44.02 22.28 13.89 10.19 8.57 5.85 5.28 4.86 3.32
P75 598.14 92.00 46.07 33.17 24.96 18.83 13.93 13.02 11.33 8.51
Return on Assets P50 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09
P75 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17
Return on Equity P50 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.38
P75 0.39 0.42 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.58 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.66
Firm Age P50 17.00 16.50 16.00 16.00 16.00 15.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 13.00
P75 35.00 28.00 24.00 28.00 22.00 23.50 22.00 21.00 21.00 20.00
This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables in 2005 by firm size as measured by sales.
The sample is large nonlisted firms (5% largest by sales among the nonlisted) as defined in table 4.1. The variables are defined in Appendix

























Table 6.S2. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics for 2005 by firm size
Panel D. Listed firms Sales decile
Percentile 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Total Assets P50 20,770.00 2,204.80 1,278.93 592.75 573.37 325.98 178.69 273.16 258.47 225.02
P75 57,279.00 3,226.18 1,767.00 799.31 1,890.77 1,461.00 1,425.14 535.94 421.91 423.80
Employees P50 5,455.00 1,135.00 1,098.00 443.00 192.00 165.00 122.50 28.00 133.50 40.00
P75 19,929.00 1,670.00 2,069.00 574.00 369.00 504.00 200.00 59.00 398.00 106.00
Sales P50 14,695.60 2,542.93 1,545.97 533.71 337.91 195.23 100.88 48.19 15.71 2.34
P75 63,883.00 3,001.19 1,669.42 682.52 400.05 232.49 142.11 53.91 21.34 6.21
Growth of Assets P50 1.16 1.11 1.17 1.12 1.27 1.09 1.19 1.20 1.25 1.97
P75 1.31 1.23 1.38 1.20 1.53 1.33 1.33 2.02 1.61 3.03
Growth of Sales P50 1.13 1.12 1.17 1.08 1.24 1.11 1.00 0.90 1.60 1.18
P75 1.28 1.26 1.33 1.30 2.03 1.17 1.23 2.37 2.85 1.40
Growth of NOI P50 1.38 0.86 2.88 0.34 0.95 1.25 0.38 0.70 1.01 0.89
P75 3.10 1.20 4.73 1.50 1.46 2.39 0.90 1.47 1.39 2.31
Current Assets (CA) P50 4,360.80 1,152.27 639.28 248.12 242.49 181.87 65.94 89.55 79.91 70.48
P75 25,749.00 1,497.10 751.74 290.08 382.40 307.64 143.99 174.13 150.06 122.78
Cash and Others P50 702.00 200.49 120.42 39.66 113.13 83.52 31.01 18.77 25.22 13.43
P75 6,806.00 361.16 236.32 95.20 157.06 168.16 71.38 34.60 84.25 119.00
Inventory P50 1,042.28 187.48 56.88 7.90 13.68 0.39 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 7,033.00 407.82 266.64 67.26 30.29 1.68 12.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment (I) P50 2,101.00 174.22 136.60 25.01 10.19 7.11 2.36 2.97 1.53 0.23
P75 9,580.00 387.59 498.00 71.65 82.65 31.55 21.81 25.77 4.11 3.22
Working Capital (WC) P50 614.56 247.10 107.28 64.28 125.64 92.69 30.42 48.52 24.71 35.05
P75 1,419.52 430.87 232.63 112.54 171.91 268.00 81.66 138.53 121.18 82.36
Assets to Empl. P50 3.09 1.80 1.88 1.23 2.27 2.00 2.55 8.42 1.71 4.43
P75 5.61 3.54 3.41 2.27 3.93 2.76 5.51 33.22 5.01 26.81
Sales to Empl. P50 3.01 2.71 1.33 1.20 2.03 1.15 1.21 1.66 0.09 0.05
P75 4.54 6.90 3.33 2.09 3.59 1.51 2.06 4.10 0.62 0.24
CA to Assets P50 0.30 0.50 0.41 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.20
P75 0.64 0.79 0.59 0.56 0.76 0.68 0.41 0.38 0.66 0.37
WC to Assets P50 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.21 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.09
P75 0.20 0.28 0.18 0.27 0.33 0.22 0.30 0.28 0.42 0.30















P75 0.34 0.62 0.49 0.67 1.32 1.50 2.02 1.63 2.90 1.78
Depreciation to DA P50 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.34 0.16 0.54 0.19 0.32 0.22
P75 0.15 0.34 0.22 0.26 0.47 0.58 0.68 0.37 0.67 0.33
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.29 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.69 0.61 0.80 0.82 0.38 0.16
P75 0.34 0.62 0.49 0.67 1.32 1.50 2.02 1.63 2.90 1.78
Total Debt P50 14,354.00 1,095.20 837.26 327.99 158.45 133.73 63.73 70.99 27.97 50.60
P75 42,333.00 1,640.70 1,259.00 627.21 584.52 203.40 451.12 111.87 116.44 108.90
Current Debt P50 5,274.00 649.00 442.25 177.54 119.81 105.56 53.79 35.60 25.07 16.59
P75 28,215.00 928.59 577.23 216.80 197.99 156.74 85.50 52.29 43.32 56.93
CD to Debt P50 0.50 0.65 0.52 0.63 0.76 0.92 0.77 0.54 0.90 0.74
P75 0.59 0.86 0.67 0.73 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.69 1.00 1.00
Debt to Assets P50 0.60 0.59 0.68 0.56 0.43 0.37 0.48 0.25 0.16 0.19
P75 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.63 0.56 0.67 0.55 0.29 0.38 0.32
Dividends P50 11,629.50 0.00 204.96 34.15 161.79 20.98 119.92 11.70 10.48 37.36
P75 17,756.00 0.00 204.96 34.15 248.00 276.20 212.37 18.15 20.69 70.88
Dividend Payout P50 0.45 0.00 0.27 0.41 1.15 0.67 0.57 0.35 0.66 1.08
P75 0.54 0.00 0.27 0.41 2.05 0.89 0.94 0.37 1.05 1.43
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 947.00 87.75 62.35 25.91 37.86 31.55 4.03 6.54 2.99 -9.77
P75 3,210.00 157.77 170.79 84.23 121.00 310.52 135.86 53.49 13.75 5.23
Equity P50 6,416.00 1,109.60 473.57 234.41 254.43 292.58 122.44 216.97 203.89 194.29
P75 22,679.00 1,718.33 861.60 317.71 1,174.50 761.77 974.02 412.72 406.04 423.00
Return on Assets P50 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.02 -0.01
P75 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.05 0.00
Return on Equity P50 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03
P75 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.40 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.00
Firm Age P50 19.00 19.00 33.50 44.00 19.50 14.00 13.00 18.00 13.00 8.00
P75 70.00 21.00 68.00 79.00 40.00 26.00 15.00 70.00 21.00 12.00
This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables in 2005 by firm size as measured by sales. The sample is
listed firms as defined in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables, except for employees and ratios, are in millions of NOK as
























Table 6.S3. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics time series
Panel A. All firms
Percentile 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total Assets P50 1.58 1.59 1.63 1.68 1.69 1.74 1.78 1.80 1.77 1.75 1.82 1.80
P75 4.56 4.57 4.74 4.88 4.92 5.09 5.17 5.12 5.02 4.92 5.19 5.11
Employees P50 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
P75 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
Sales P50 2.90 2.83 2.84 2.80 2.71 2.73 2.71 2.67 2.69 2.64 2.82 2.74
P75 8.46 8.37 8.44 8.44 8.14 8.05 7.97 7.76 7.81 7.55 8.08 7.77
Growth of Assets P50 0.00 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.02
P75 0.00 1.27 1.27 1.32 1.30 1.27 1.26 1.23 1.19 1.19 1.24 1.25
Growth of Sales P50 0.00 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.01 1.05 1.05
P75 0.00 1.26 1.26 1.30 1.28 1.24 1.25 1.23 1.21 1.19 1.26 1.25
Growth of NOI P50 0.00 0.66 0.71 0.77 0.70 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.62 0.73 0.66
P75 0.00 1.53 1.59 1.71 1.56 1.50 1.44 1.46 1.50 1.40 1.61 1.50
Current Assets (CA) P50 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.96 1.04 1.03
P75 2.62 2.60 2.68 2.74 2.69 2.77 2.80 2.79 2.72 2.69 2.94 2.87
Cash and Others P50 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.27
P75 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.85
Inventory P50 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.50 0.47 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.37
Investment (I) P50 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
P75 0.00 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.20
Working Capital (WC) P50 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.18
P75 0.57 0.59 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.60 0.48 0.48 0.44 0.76
Assets to Empl. P50 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.48
P75 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.80 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.96 1.00 1.04
Sales to Empl. P50 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.92 0.88
P75 1.24 1.26 1.30 1.36 1.40 1.37 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.50 1.60 1.59















   
P75 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95
WC to Assets P50 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.15
P75 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.36
I to Dpr. Assets (DA) P50 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
P75 0.00 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.36
Depreciation to DA P50 0.00 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24
P75 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09
P75 0.00 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.76 0.52 0.43 0.40 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.43
Total Debt P50 1.21 1.22 1.23 1.25 1.26 1.32 1.32 1.37 1.43 1.43 1.55 1.35
P75 3.32 3.34 3.40 3.49 3.53 3.69 3.69 3.80 3.91 3.90 4.26 3.79
Current Debt P50 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.79 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.98 0.79
P75 2.08 2.05 2.05 2.10 2.09 2.20 2.18 2.27 2.37 2.34 2.63 2.13
CD to Debt P50 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt to Assets P50 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.77
P75 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Dividends P50 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.22 0.32 0.42 0.38 0.41 0.50
P75 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.46 0.58 0.71 0.55 0.85 1.05 0.95 1.07 1.50
Dividend Payout P50 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.80 0.85 0.70 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.75
P75 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.70 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.25 1.55 1.30 1.38 0.98
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10
P75 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.43 0.44
Equity P50 0.03 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.36
P75 0.34 1.03 1.10 1.18 1.20 1.18 1.25 1.13 0.96 0.88 0.79 1.16
Return on Assets P50 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07
P75 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18
Return on Equity P50 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.38 0.31
P75 0.79 0.58 0.60 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.64 0.70 0.87 0.91 1.17 0.67
Firm Age P50 10.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 10.00
P75 12.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 15.00 15.00 16.00 17.00 17.00
This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables per year for the sample period 1994-2005.
The sample is all firms as defined in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables, except for employees and ratios,
























Table 6.S3. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics time series
Panel B. Nonlisted firms
Percentile 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total Assets P50 1.57 1.58 1.63 1.67 1.68 1.74 1.78 1.79 1.77 1.75 1.82 1.79
P75 4.53 4.54 4.71 4.85 4.88 5.04 5.13 5.08 5.00 4.90 5.16 5.07
Employees P50 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
P75 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
Sales P50 2.89 2.82 2.83 2.79 2.70 2.72 2.70 2.67 2.68 2.64 2.82 2.73
P75 8.41 8.33 8.38 8.38 8.08 8.00 7.93 7.72 7.77 7.52 8.04 7.74
Growth of Assets P50 0.00 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.02
P75 0.00 1.27 1.27 1.31 1.30 1.27 1.26 1.23 1.19 1.19 1.24 1.25
Growth of Sales P50 0.00 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.01 1.05 1.05
P75 0.00 1.26 1.26 1.30 1.28 1.24 1.25 1.23 1.21 1.19 1.26 1.25
Growth of NOI P50 0.00 0.66 0.71 0.77 0.70 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.62 0.73 0.66
P75 0.00 1.53 1.59 1.71 1.56 1.50 1.44 1.46 1.50 1.40 1.61 1.50
Current Assets (CA) P50 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.04 1.03
P75 2.61 2.59 2.66 2.72 2.66 2.75 2.78 2.77 2.71 2.68 2.92 2.85
Cash and Others P50 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.27
P75 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.80 0.79 0.86 0.85
Inventory P50 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.37
Investment (I) P50 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
P75 0.00 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19
Working Capital (WC) P50 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.18
P75 0.57 0.59 0.64 0.67 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.59 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.76
Assets to Empl. P50 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.47
P75 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.80 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.95 1.00 1.04
Sales to Empl. P50 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.92 0.88
P75 1.24 1.26 1.30 1.36 1.40 1.37 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.50 1.60 1.59















P75 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95
WC to Assets P50 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.15
P75 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.36
I to Dpr. Assets (DA) P50 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
P75 0.00 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.58 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.35
Depreciation to DA P50 0.00 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24
P75 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09
P75 0.00 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.76 0.51 0.43 0.39 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.42
Total Debt P50 1.21 1.21 1.23 1.25 1.26 1.32 1.31 1.37 1.42 1.43 1.54 1.34
P75 3.30 3.31 3.38 3.46 3.51 3.67 3.67 3.77 3.89 3.88 4.24 3.77
Current Debt P50 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.79 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.97 0.79
P75 2.06 2.04 2.04 2.09 2.08 2.18 2.16 2.26 2.36 2.33 2.62 2.11
CD to Debt P50 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt to Assets P50 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.77
P75 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Dividends P50 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.22 0.32 0.42 0.37 0.41 0.50
P75 0.31 0.37 0.39 0.45 0.58 0.70 0.55 0.85 1.05 0.94 1.06 1.48
Dividend Payout P50 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.80 0.85 0.70 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.75
P75 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.70 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.25 1.55 1.30 1.38 0.98
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10
P75 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.43 0.43
Equity P50 0.03 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.35
P75 0.34 1.02 1.09 1.17 1.19 1.16 1.24 1.12 0.95 0.87 0.79 1.15
Return on Assets P50 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07
P75 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18
Return on Equity P50 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.38 0.31
P75 0.79 0.58 0.60 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.64 0.71 0.87 0.91 1.17 0.67
Firm Age P50 10.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 10.00
P75 12.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 15.00 15.00 16.00 17.00 17.00
This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables per year for the sample period 1994-2005.
The sample is all nonlisted firms as defined in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables, except for employees
























Table 6.S3. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics time series
Panel C. Large nonlisted firms
Percentile 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total Assets P50 44.67 44.87 44.27 45.46 45.19 47.08 48.07 44.47 43.55 41.62 44.92 45.29
P75 111.07 111.31 112.81 117.31 113.50 123.97 127.36 119.51 121.41 113.28 119.32 124.77
Employees P50 45.00 43.00 42.00 41.00 39.00 40.00 38.00 35.00 35.00 34.00 35.00 33.00
P75 101.00 97.00 95.00 90.00 86.00 87.00 86.00 81.00 80.00 76.00 76.00 76.00
Sales P50 94.24 91.56 93.10 94.72 92.30 89.67 88.30 84.31 83.60 80.57 86.62 86.99
P75 185.32 182.61 187.90 188.55 184.42 179.06 175.81 169.96 163.58 154.39 167.51 173.26
Growth of Assets P50 0.00 1.09 1.08 1.12 1.11 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.02 1.03 1.08 1.09
P75 0.00 1.26 1.25 1.30 1.30 1.24 1.27 1.20 1.15 1.16 1.23 1.26
Growth of Sales P50 0.00 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.05 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.11 1.10
P75 0.00 1.24 1.25 1.27 1.27 1.19 1.24 1.23 1.17 1.16 1.26 1.26
Growth of NOI P50 0.00 0.93 0.99 1.05 0.95 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.95 0.89 1.03 1.04
P75 0.00 1.58 1.68 1.72 1.68 1.52 1.54 1.60 1.62 1.50 1.83 1.81
Current Assets (CA) P50 28.47 29.04 29.01 29.66 28.99 29.63 30.29 28.45 27.22 26.53 29.25 29.68
P75 63.56 62.29 65.09 66.81 64.69 66.47 68.96 63.43 59.86 59.36 63.98 68.73
Cash and Others P50 5.04 4.47 4.65 4.61 4.49 4.61 4.32 4.43 4.75 4.65 4.82 5.02
P75 15.14 13.80 13.43 13.65 13.00 13.07 12.98 12.55 13.09 12.87 13.56 13.95
Inventory P50 6.54 6.55 6.28 6.04 5.95 5.32 5.04 4.53 3.93 3.79 3.80 3.48
P75 16.32 16.49 15.95 16.12 16.10 15.06 14.71 13.86 13.05 12.42 13.29 12.84
Investment (I) P50 0.00 1.40 1.37 1.39 1.50 1.32 1.13 0.98 0.74 0.64 0.72 0.71
P75 0.00 5.71 6.07 6.16 7.36 6.56 5.53 4.89 3.91 3.58 3.62 4.15
Working Capital (WC) P50 5.79 5.81 6.18 6.53 6.09 6.20 6.58 5.56 4.66 4.56 4.39 6.70
P75 17.81 17.69 18.67 19.41 18.55 19.58 20.18 18.01 16.07 15.67 15.49 19.23
Assets to Empl. P50 0.76 0.80 0.85 0.97 0.99 1.04 1.13 1.15 1.14 1.11 1.22 1.29
P75 1.51 1.59 1.69 1.92 2.01 2.13 2.42 2.43 2.36 2.35 2.60 2.89
Sales to Empl. P50 1.87 1.96 2.12 2.29 2.35 2.25 2.39 2.51 2.51 2.53 2.78 2.91
P75 3.38 3.53 3.80 4.10 4.28 4.03 4.34 4.29 4.35 4.36 5.00 5.60
CA to Assets P50 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.78
P75 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.92
WC to Assets P50 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.16
P75 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.31















P75 0.00 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.75 0.61 0.51 0.45 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.47
Depreciation to DA P50 0.00 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.24
P75 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.39
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.00 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16
P75 0.00 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.75 0.59 0.50 0.45 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.47
Total Debt P50 30.57 30.09 29.86 30.22 30.04 31.45 31.87 30.88 30.34 29.21 32.37 30.26
P75 72.62 71.62 71.59 74.83 73.70 79.35 82.97 81.68 78.86 77.67 81.58 79.81
Current Debt P50 20.22 20.24 20.63 21.39 20.72 20.93 21.03 20.33 20.76 19.14 22.58 20.53
P75 45.93 46.47 45.23 46.44 47.11 46.82 49.24 45.56 46.25 44.79 49.44 46.13
CD to Debt P50 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.82
P75 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Debt to Assets P50 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.75
P75 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.86
Dividends P50 1.06 1.20 1.21 1.41 1.61 1.90 1.53 2.12 3.14 2.79 4.06 3.00
P75 2.82 3.30 3.45 3.79 4.39 5.06 4.36 5.29 7.84 8.02 10.22 10.00
Dividend Payout P50 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.58 0.50 0.67 0.92 0.92 1.00 0.65
P75 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.88 0.97 0.89 1.00 1.35 1.25 1.41 0.95
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 1.87 1.83 1.94 2.23 1.93 1.81 1.57 1.51 1.68 1.73 2.58 2.86
P75 5.47 5.72 5.51 6.23 5.74 5.64 5.57 4.99 5.40 5.69 7.19 8.42
Equity P50 0.00 10.68 11.28 11.76 11.55 11.89 12.32 11.02 10.29 9.40 9.17 11.38
P75 9.96 32.47 33.26 35.49 35.44 38.89 40.01 37.03 35.68 33.06 32.55 38.66
Return on Assets P50 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
P75 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
Return on Equity P50 0.27 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.27
P75 0.74 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.55 0.59 0.78 0.57
Firm Age P50 12.00 13.00 14.00 14.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 14.00 14.00 15.00 15.00
P75 21.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 24.00 23.00 23.50 23.00 23.00 23.00
This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables per year for the sample period 1994-2005. The sample is
large nonlisted firms (the 5% largest by sales among the nonlisted) as defined in table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables,
























Table 6.S3. Corporate finance: Descriptive statistics time series
Panel D. Listed firms
Percentile 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total Assets P50 720.57 717.42 716.56 692.83 743.15 805.73 836.17 774.14 596.09 598.31 637.73 638.12
P75 2,644.88 2,348.46 2,220.36 1,810.51 2,255.62 2,381.84 2,558.60 2,512.80 2,225.26 2,608.56 2,622.41 2,299.94
Employees P50 533.00 535.00 424.50 371.50 448.00 392.50 347.00 370.50 340.50 331.00 326.00 248.00
P75 1,759.00 1,533.00 1,622.00 1,179.00 1,347.00 1,134.00 989.00 1,351.00 1,242.50 1,336.00 1,420.00 944.00
Sales P50 424.73 447.79 385.28 304.81 281.08 276.60 303.72 306.12 267.60 305.10 245.14 271.06
P75 1,431.29 1,436.41 1,134.99 939.22 875.68 963.10 984.99 1,097.07 1,243.00 1,391.35 1,518.31 1,526.87
Growth of Assets P50 0.00 1.08 1.17 1.22 1.14 1.05 1.11 0.97 0.92 1.02 1.06 1.16
P75 0.00 1.28 1.51 1.73 1.35 1.32 1.65 1.11 1.04 1.14 1.25 1.47
Growth of Sales P50 0.00 1.11 1.13 1.20 1.12 1.03 1.13 1.07 1.00 0.95 1.08 1.13
P75 0.00 1.38 1.36 1.63 1.45 1.23 1.47 1.31 1.24 1.15 1.34 1.42
Growth of NOI P50 0.00 1.12 0.87 1.12 0.63 0.74 0.61 0.43 0.49 0.58 0.99 0.93
P75 0.00 2.12 1.71 2.37 1.61 1.54 1.86 1.51 1.62 1.13 1.70 1.78
Current Assets (CA) P50 237.85 223.14 212.41 191.93 189.88 188.49 210.54 244.24 208.24 212.97 207.65 230.47
P75 693.36 740.42 775.08 578.16 580.46 621.24 798.00 759.97 550.44 608.73 702.92 688.07
Cash and Others P50 78.74 82.26 71.34 55.54 43.03 54.91 45.78 44.96 48.11 47.07 57.69 89.26
P75 240.47 213.04 185.45 165.92 138.12 126.98 175.23 141.63 163.07 184.17 183.29 214.85
Inventory P50 4.54 3.76 2.00 4.48 1.52 0.89 1.38 4.40 2.32 2.47 4.20 1.64
P75 76.40 81.74 76.33 54.53 58.24 60.33 59.24 69.25 43.71 65.33 63.97 67.26
Investment (I) P50 0.00 24.76 24.31 16.52 20.88 31.75 13.09 15.37 6.00 5.32 8.90 16.29
P75 0.00 75.05 160.95 62.23 114.17 191.17 94.87 140.60 44.29 63.67 64.23 174.22
Working Capital (WC) P50 55.92 76.33 77.09 75.24 68.60 66.75 73.17 60.59 39.67 36.20 35.14 82.01
P75 171.15 213.43 262.83 217.06 202.22 214.55 239.43 222.69 192.81 180.88 218.50 228.11
Assets to Empl. P50 0.89 1.02 1.16 1.22 1.20 1.30 1.72 1.53 1.53 1.50 1.69 2.30
P75 3.60 3.36 3.11 3.66 3.93 3.65 5.88 5.60 5.14 3.80 4.13 5.01
Sales to Empl. P50 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.81 0.86 1.09 1.09 0.97 0.90 1.06 1.24
P75 1.98 1.98 1.62 1.77 1.63 1.92 2.26 2.11 2.42 2.09 2.69 3.01
CA to Assets P50 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.45 0.36
P75 0.53 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.61 0.55 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.62
WC to Assets P50 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.10
P75 0.23 0.25 0.34 0.37 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.30 0.27
I to Dpr. Assets (DA) P50 0.00 0.24 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.21 0.20 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.31
P75 0.00 0.88 1.48 1.10 0.98 1.52 0.86 0.86 0.40 0.29 0.47 0.96
Depreciation to DA P50 0.00 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.19
P75 0.00 0.44 0.60 0.53 0.44 0.45 0.36 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.36 0.38
IDA (A>10mill. NOK) P50 0.00 0.24 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.21 0.20 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.31
P75 0.00 0.88 1.48 1.10 0.98 1.52 0.86 0.86 0.40 0.29 0.47 0.96



















  . . . . . . . . . . . .
P75 1,775.96 1,330.45 1,359.34 942.87 980.91 1,011.48 1,182.19 1,334.53 1,128.64 1,223.04 1,273.47 892.02
Current Debt P50 149.72 139.62 115.36 114.37 103.47 117.06 123.63 141.02 118.26 137.95 121.44 117.56
P75 573.56 509.98 407.55 287.63 321.13 360.48 407.34 490.23 395.71 442.26 427.28 437.28
CD to Debt P50 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.55 0.50 0.48 0.55 0.50 0.58 0.59 0.66 0.64
P75 0.57 0.69 0.73 0.94 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91
Debt to Assets P50 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.47
P75 0.69 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.65 0.61
Dividends P50 24.04 16.74 24.26 27.20 26.09 30.51 48.66 52.82 44.36 39.18 63.11 28.21
P75 91.43 40.16 73.04 57.74 64.19 71.90 91.64 75.80 99.16 91.42 167.80 212.37
Dividend Payout P50 0.28 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.53 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.52 0.54
P75 0.61 0.51 0.40 0.52 0.56 0.63 0.90 1.11 0.99 0.65 0.80 0.89
Net Oper. Inc. (NOE) P50 17.46 25.17 18.78 16.43 12.73 5.59 4.95 -1.66 -4.25 9.89 12.98 27.54
P75 57.97 66.60 98.30 95.63 43.74 41.77 66.34 29.48 35.22 59.29 75.92 148.91
Equity P50 0.00 289.27 334.41 340.86 341.86 336.62 323.25 307.80 259.98 275.27 277.39 342.28
P75 93.39 799.35 900.47 902.68 888.46 1,118.37 1,173.73 1,018.92 928.09 1,213.51 1,085.98 1,275.97
Return on Assets P50 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05
P75 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.12
Return on Equity P50 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.11
P75 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.21
Firm Age P50 29.00 24.50 22.00 15.00 15.00 16.00 16.00 17.00 17.00 19.00 17.00 16.00
P75 77.50 70.00 61.50 45.00 39.00 47.00 40.00 41.50 40.00 44.00 39.00 37.00
This table presents the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for corporate finance variables per year for the sample period 1994-2005. The sample is listed firms as defined in
table 4.1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A1. All variables, except for employees and ratios, are in millions of NOK as of 2005. The dividend figures only include the firms




















Table 6.1.1. Aggregate activity levels by employment-based firm size groups
Panel A. All firms
Firm size group
Small 76,340 92% 313.8 26% 654 24% 594 23%
Medium 5,258 6% 196.8 16% 287 10% 326 12%
Large 971 1% 692.4 58% 1,829 66% 1,704 65%
All 82,569 1,203.1 2,770 2,624
Panel B. Nonlisted firms
Firm size group
Small 76,324 93% 313.7 32% 633 36% 591 34%
Medium 5,233 6% 195.5 20% 273 15% 323 19%
Large 878 1% 470.2 48% 857 49% 806 47%
All 82,435 979.4 1,762 1,719
Panel C. Listed firms
Firm size group
Small 16 12% 0.1 0% 21 2% 3 0%
Medium 25 19% 1.3 1% 15 1% 3 0%
Large 93 69% 222.2 99% 972 96% 899 99%




This table presents aggregate activity levels for firms in three size groups (small, medium, and large) according
to their number of employees. The sample, which is based on the population of Norwegian firms with limited










, . . ,
medium-sized firms have between 20 and 99, and large firms have at least 100. "Employees" are in thousands,
"Sales" and "Assets" are in billions of NOK as of 2005, and "Firms" is the actual count.
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Table 6.1.2. Aggregate activity levels by employment-based firm size groups: All firms by industry sector
Industry sector All Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large
0 Missing 922 88% 10% 2% 15 18% 25% 57% 18 43% 28% 29% 13 21% 39% 40%
1 Agriculture 1,671 93% 6% 1% 16 42% 20% 37% 46 49% 18% 32% 29 41% 21% 38%
2 Manufacturing 6,822 85% 12% 3% 264 11% 12% 77% 648 8% 5% 87% 605 7% 8% 85%
3 Energy 337 63% 25% 12% 50 2% 7% 91% 808 11% 8% 81% 681 14% 2% 83%
4 Construction 8,740 92% 7% 0% 98 42% 23% 35% 65 40% 21% 39% 128 37% 23% 40%
5 Service 37,874 94% 5% 1% 437 28% 18% 54% 741 43% 14% 44% 551 30% 18% 52%
7 Trade 17,970 94% 5% 1% 159 49% 19% 32% 198 40% 20% 39% 418 41% 20% 38%
8 Transport 3,746 90% 7% 2% 117 13% 9% 78% 193 18% 8% 73% 136 25% 14% 61%
9 Multisector 4,487 92% 7% 1% 47 38% 26% 36% 54 50% 13% 38% 63 36% 22% 41%
This table presents aggregate activity levels across industry sectors for firms in three size groups (small, medium, and large) according to their number of employees.
The sample, which is based on the population of all Norwegian firms with limited liability in 2005, is selected according to the criteria stated in table 4.1. Small firms
h l th 20 l di i d fi h b t 20 d 99 d l fi h t l t 100 "E l " i th d "S l " d "A t " i
SalesFirms Employees Assets
ave ess an emp oyees, me um-s ze rms ave e ween an , an arge rms ave a eas . mp oyees are n ousan s, a es an sse s are n
billions of NOK as of 2005, and "Firms" is the actual count. The industry sectors are defined in Appendix 4.A2.
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This figure shows the histogram of firm size as measured by sales. The sample, which is based on the population of all Norwegian firms with 
limited liability in 2005, is selected according to the criteria in table 4.1. The histogram is produced from a truncated distribution at 5% and 95%.  
The right inset presents moments of the complete (nontruncated) distribution, the left shows moments of the truncated distribution, whereas the 
middle inset shows percentiles of the cumulative density function of the complete  distribution. The lower right inset performs tests for log-
normality of the nontruncated distribution, using the Anderson-Darling (A-D), Cramér-von Mises (C-vonM), and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
respectively.  The null hypothesis is that the distribution is log-normal. We report goodness-of-fit statistics and p-values. 
75
Table 6.2.1. Investment in depreciable assets by industry sector
Industry sector Percentile 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Mean
Missing P50 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
P75 0.47 0.54 0.34 0.58 0.41 0.36 0.36 0.25 0.09 0.12 0.27 0.34
Agriculture P50 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.15
P75 0.88 0.87 0.94 1.25 2.63 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.24 0.25 0.34 0.76
Manufacturing P50 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.08
P75 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.40 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.34 0.40
Energy P50 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
P75 0.20 0.28 0.23 0.54 0.38 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.27
Construction P50 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.11
P75 0.81 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.60 0.58 0.53 0.46 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.60
Service P50 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
P75 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.54 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.35
Trade P50 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
P75 0.54 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.46 0.40 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.41
Transport P50 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.11
P75 0.89 0.78 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.45 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.58
Multisector P50 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08
P75 0.62 0.59 0.67 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.41 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.47 0.49
This table shows the median (P50) and the 75th (P75) percentile for the ratio of investment to depreciable assets for the sample of all
limited liability firms in Norway as defined in table 4.1. The industry sectors are specified in Appendix 4.A2.
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Table 6.3.1. Determinants of leverage
Determinant  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Intercept 7.597 *** 8.374 *** 8.867 *** 1.119 ***
Nonlisted 0.196 *** 0.224 *** 0.105 ***
Listed -0.196 *** -0.224 *** -0.105 ***
Size -0.906 *** -1.008 *** -1.056 *** -0.127 ***
Size2 0.028 *** 0.031 *** 0.033 *** 0.012 ***
Age 0.221 *** 0.207 *** 0.225 *** -0.063 ***
Age2 -0.050 *** -0.046 *** -0.050 *** 0.001
Tangibility 0.161 *** 0.189 *** 0.188 *** 0.021 ***
Growth 0.008 *** 0.011 *** 0.008 *** 0.001
ROA -0.731 *** -0.825 *** -0.688 *** -0.396 ***
NDTS 0.002 ** 0.004 0.000 0.001
NE 0.002 -0.001 0.006 * 0.001
Ind0 -0.048 *** -0.080 *** -0.078 *** -0.002
Ind1 0.043 *** 0.083 *** 0.065 *** 0.005
Ind2 0.030 *** 0.024 *** 0.048 *** -0.009 ***
Ind3 -0.230 *** -0.220 *** -0.308 *** -0.173 ***
Ind4 0.054 *** 0.047 *** 0.064 *** 0.069 ***
Ind5 0.000 -0.012 * -0.004 0.027 ***
Ind7 0.085 *** 0.088 *** 0.097 *** 0.046 ***
Ind8 0.039 *** 0.034 *** 0.053 *** 0.062 ***
Ind9 0 026 *** 0 034 *** 0 063 *** -0 024 ***
Model
. . . .
Adj. R2 0.250 0.260 0.261 0.142
n 763,186 73,593 64,494 41,768
The models in this table regress the ratio of debt to total assets on potential determinants.
"Size" is the log of assets in million NOK, "Age" is the log of firm age, "Tangibility" is the
ratio of tangible assets to total assets, "Growth" is the relative change in sales, "ROA" is return
on assets, "NDTS" is non-debt tax shields, and "NE" is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm
has negative earnings and zero otherwise. "Indi"; i = 0, 1,.... , 9 is a dummy variable which
equals 1 if the firm belongs to industry sector i as defined in Appendix 4.A2 and zero
otherwise. The sum of the two listing status coefficients and the sum of the ten industry sector
coefficients are both restricted to be zero. The "***", "**", and "*" indicate that the coefficient
estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Model
(1) uses the sample of all firms pooled over the sample years 1994-2005, (2) uses all firms from
2005, (3) uses all nonlisted firms from 1997, and (4) pools large nonlisted firms (i.e., the top
5% by sales) and the 90% largest listed firms by sales over the years.
The firms in model (4) are ranked every year. Additional filters applied to all four samples are
defined in table 4.1. 
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Table 6.6.1. Descriptive statistics for firms that pay dividends
Panel A. All
VarName
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Mean 1994-2004
DIVTE 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.80 0.85 0.70 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.75 0.76
0.82 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.92 1.04 0.70 1.03 1.64 1.54 1.67 1.24 1.03
% payers 20% 34% 35% 38% 36% 36% 29% 35% 39% 39% 47% 7% 35%
Panel B. Nonlisted
DIVTE 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.80 0.85 0.70 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.75 0.76
0.82 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.92 1.04 0.70 1.03 1.64 1.54 1.67 1.24 1.03
% payers 20% 34% 35% 38% 36% 36% 29% 35% 39% 39% 47% 7% 35%
Panel C. Large nonlisted
DIVTE 0 44 0 40 0 42 0 46 0 50 0 58 0 50 0 67 0 92 0 92 1 00 0 65 0 62. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.36 0.67 0.41 0.76 0.56 0.76 0.48 0.79 1.86 1.19 -0.13 0.71 0.79
% payers 22% 45% 46% 49% 47% 48% 40% 48% 49% 51% 56% 24% 46%
Panel D. Listed
DIVTE 0.28 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.53 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.52 0.54 0.39
0.75 0.47 0.91 0.82 0.38 0.39 0.70 1.83 1.41 0.39 -3.08 0.65 0.45
% payers 14% 53% 45% 44% 41% 34% 29% 29% 32% 39% 45% 14% 37%
This table shows the percentage of firms paying dividends (% payers) and the fraction of earnings paid out as dividends by these payers (DIVTE) over the period 
1994-2005. The payout ratio is reported as the median and the mean (underneath)  across the sample firms, which are specified in table 4.1. Appendix 6.A1 defines 
the variables.
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Table 6.6.2. Determinants of dividend policy
Determinant
Intercept -2.808 *** 0.0996 2.116 *** 1.262 ***
Nonlisted 0.084 ** 0.034
Listed -1.381 *** 0.2302 *** -0.084 ** -0.034
Size 0.272 *** -0.1068 *** -0.115 *** -0.029 ***
Age 0.106 *** 0.3468 *** 0.260 *** 0.061 ***
Growth -0.081 *** -0.0774 *** -0.029 *** -0.012
ROA 2.138 *** 4.6408 *** -3.691 *** -2.169 ***
IndDm0 -0.065 * 0.6413 *** 0.558 *** 0.131 **
IndDm1 -0.385 *** -0.1976 ** 0.029 -0.133 **
IndDm2 0.119 *** -0.1888 *** -0.172 *** -0.111 ***
IndDm3 -0.241 *** 0.8428 *** -0.054 -0.013
IndDm4 0.523 *** 0.2406 *** -0.195 *** -0.084 **
IndDm5 0.170 *** -0.0585 ** 0.091 *** 0.086 ***
IndDm7 0.249 *** -0.1044 *** -0.152 *** 0.097 ***
IndDm8 -0.055 *** -0.4024 *** -0.091 *** -0.033
IndDm9 -0.015 0.060
Adj. R2 0.068 0.027
n 532,301  33,972        267,809 18,963        
The two models in this table estimate the determinants of the propensity to pay dividends (payout
i ) d h f i f i id b h ( i ) i l "Si " i
Large firmsAll firms
Payout propensity Payout ratio
Large firmsAll firms
propens ty an t e ract on o earn ngs pa out y t e payers payout rat o , respect ve y. ze s
the natural logarithm of assets, "Age" is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm
was founded, "Growth" is the relative change in sales, and "ROA" is returns on assets. Dividends,
sales, and assets are measured in thousands of NOK. The ROA and the payout ratio are winsorized at
1%. The sum of the two listing status coefficients and the sum of the ten industry sector coefficients
are both restricted to be zero in OLS regressions. The "***", "**", and "*" indicates that the
coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The sample of all firms is defined in table 4.A, from which we exclude firms that do not report
positive earnings. Large listed (nonlisted) firms are the 90% (5%) largest firms by sales among the
listed (nonlisted) firms in a given year. 
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Table 7.S1. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel A. All firms
n mean std skewness kurtosis p0 p0_25 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_75 p99_99 p100
Ownership: Direct (D)  
HOLDLARGE1_D 77864 70.14 27.89 -0.20 -1.41 0.01 8.33 14.90 25.00 33.33 50.00 66.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGE2_D 77864 19.36 19.08 0.35 -1.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.33 34.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
HOLDLARGE3_D 77864 5.59 9.79 1.57 1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 22.22 30.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33
HOLDLARGE4_D 77864 2.02 5.30 2.76 6.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 15.79 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
HOLDLARGE5_D 77864 0.74 2.87 4.32 19.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.12 15.97 20.00 20.00 20.00
HOLDLARGESUM2_D 77864 89.50 18.41 -1.77 2.43 0.01 14.60 27.90 50.00 61.00 82.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM3_D 77864 95.09 12.89 -3.28 11.83 0.01 18.93 37.50 66.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.01 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM4_D 77864 97.11 10.26 -4.71 25.29 0.01 22.20 44.52 80.00 93.75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.01 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM5_D 77864 97.85 9.02 -5.71 37.25 0.01 25.00 50.00 86.27 98.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.01 100.50
HOLDLARGEOUTS_D 32181 49.21 32.57 0.55 -1.14 0.01 2.50 5.00 9.80 12.00 22.68 39.04 84.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDSMALLOUTS_D 32181 42.55 35.34 0.72 -1.03 0.01 1.00 4.00 5.20 6.52 12.00 33.20 70.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HERFINDAHL_D 77764 0.66 0.30 -0.07 -1.49 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.27 0.42 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
NROWNERS_D 77864 9.79 381.96 109.67 14675.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 9.00 201.00 14987.00 63986.00
NROWNERSINS 64369 1.71 0.90 1.60 4.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 13.00
HOLDMEAN_D 78434 62.72 32.16 0.08 -1.58 0.00 0.50 8.33 17.39 25.00 33.33 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDMEDIAN_D 78434 61.85 33.36 0.00 -1.52 0.00 0.03 5.02 11.71 18.00 33.33 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDUNSP_D 77863 12.57 28.87 2.29 3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 57.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINST_D 77864 0.48 5.08 14.26 235.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00 50.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDPERS_D 77791 76.46 38.31 -1.27 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 64.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDSTAT_D 77863 1.01 9.16 9.82 98.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.55 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINTL_D 77863 3.32 17.26 5.23 25.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINDU_D 77854 4.84 17.45 4.14 17.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 40.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SUMHOLD_D 77764 98.73 6.98 -8.18 78.11 0.01 29.09 62.00 95.20 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
BLOCK5NR_D 77864 2.14 1.44 2.22 9.35 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 10.00 18.00 19.00
BLOCK10NR_D 77864 1.90 1.08 1.38 2.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 9.00 9.00
BLOCK5SH_D 77864 98.15 8.83 -7.20 60.11 0.00 9.00 50.00 90.90 98.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
BLOCK10SH_D 77864 96.20 12.62 -4.92 27.83 0.00 0.00 28.00 76.00 90.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
TYPELARGE1_D 78434 1.98 1.06 0.64 2.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Ownership: Ultimate (U)
HOLDLARGE1_U 77674 70.65 27.70 -0.22 -1.40 0.01 9.47 16.34 25.00 33.33 50.00 66.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGE2_U 81908 17.93 18.92 0.47 -1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.33 34.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
HOLDLARGE3_U 81908 5.09 9.34 1.72 1.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.71 20.00 26.40 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33
HOLDLARGE4_U 81908 1.85 4.99 2.92 8.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.00 14.51 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
HOLDLARGE5_U 81908 0.69 2.66 4.48 21.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.25 14.28 20.00 20.00 20.00
HOLDLARGESUM2_U 77674 89.56 18.30 -1.77 2.40 0.01 15.37 28.60 50.00 61.43 82.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM3_U 77674 94.92 13.04 -3.20 11.21 0.01 18.74 37.50 65.10 78.80 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM4_U 77674 96.87 10.57 -4.51 23.28 0.01 19.67 43.73 76.92 91.30 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM5_U 77674 97.60 9.44 -5.40 33.75 0.01 20.00 48.00 83.34 96.14 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGEOUTS_U 31817 50.11 33.67 0.45 -1.30 0.10 1.80 4.39 8.50 11.36 20.15 40.00 96.27 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HERFINDAHL_U 77674 0.66 0.31 -0.09 -1.48 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.27 0.42 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
NROWNERS_U 81908 2.31 2.32 6.73 106.17 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 11.00 19.00 50.00 100.00
HOLDMEAN_U 78250 62.68 32.62 0.04 -1.57 0.01 3.39 6.48 15.83 22.49 33.33 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDMEDIAN_U 78250 61.67 34.01 -0.04 -1.50 0.00 0.49 2.30 10.00 16.64 33.33 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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Table 7.S1. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel A. All firms
n mean std skewness kurtosis p0 p0_25 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_75 p99_99 p100
HOLDUNSP_U 77674 12.69 28.56 2.28 3.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.55 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINST_U 81908 0.22 3.93 21.95 516.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDPERS_U 81908 75.25 39.30 -1.19 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 59.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDSTAT_U 81908 1.05 9.18 9.68 95.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.43 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINTL_U 81908 3.15 16.80 5.39 27.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINDU_U 81908 1.53 10.97 8.02 65.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 85.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SUMHOLD_U 77674 98.32 8.12 -6.89 54.82 0.01 21.00 52.50 91.93 99.02 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
BLOCK5NR_U 81908 2.01 1.42 1.63 4.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 9.00 13.00 19.00
BLOCK10NR_U 81908 1.78 1.11 1.10 1.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 9.00
BLOCK5SH_U 81908 92.72 23.42 -3.45 10.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 87.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
BLOCK10SH_U 81908 90.92 24.54 -3.04 8.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 73.06 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
INSHOLD_CEO 64369 53.52 37.78 -0.08 -1.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_BDEXCEO 64369 33.98 34.69 0.60 -0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.00 50.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_BD 64369 86.53 24.44 -1.83 2.44 0.00 0.00 4.00 28.60 50.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_ALL 64369 87.50 22.93 -1.83 2.43 0.01 5.10 10.00 33.33 50.00 81.65 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_LARGE1 64369 67.45 29.06 -0.18 -1.30 0.01 5.00 8.17 20.00 30.00 50.00 65.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_LARGE2 64369 16.10 19.18 0.68 -1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
INSHOLD_LARGE3 64369 3.06 7.97 2.62 5.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.38 25.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33
INSHOLD_LARGE4 64369 0.70 3.51 5.43 29.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.22 25.00 25.00 25.00
INSHOLD_LARGE5 64369 0.14 1.41 11.27 134.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 16.66 20.00 20.00
INSHOLD_TYPE1 64369 11.36 23.08 2.12 3.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 54.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_TYPE2 64369 17.33 24.26 1.26 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.00 50.00 66.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_TYPE3 64369 16.65 29.13 1.70 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.00 52.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_TYPE4 64369 41.19 43.31 0.32 -1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSRANK_TYPE1 64369 0.37 0.73 1.91 2.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
INSRANK_TYPE2 64369 0.68 0.87 0.88 -0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
INSRANK_TYPE3 64369 0.48 0.79 1.52 1.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
INSRANK_TYPE4 64369 0.59 0.61 0.51 -0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Board (BD)
BD_TURN 72595 0.02 0.09 5.07 27.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.67 0.83 0.88
DISCHSAME 74075 0.95 0.22 -4.10 14.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DISCEOSAME 66150 0.96 0.19 -4.79 20.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DISCEOSAME 64072 0.95 0.22 -4.02 14.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_SIZE 82248 2.26 1.42 1.35 2.65 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 8.00 12.00 16.00
BD_AVG_AGE 81284 49.85 9.34 0.13 -0.02 20.00 26.00 29.50 35.00 38.00 43.25 50.00 56.00 62.00 65.00 72.00 79.00 88.00 93.00
BD_AVG_AGE_M 75341 50.38 9.56 0.12 -0.02 19.00 26.00 29.50 35.00 38.00 44.00 50.29 57.00 62.50 66.00 73.50 80.00 92.00 94.00
BD_AVG_AGE_F 25973 48.25 10.88 0.34 0.03 19.00 24.00 26.00 32.00 35.00 40.00 48.00 56.00 62.00 66.00 77.00 83.00 93.00 95.00
BD_SD_AGE 46715 8.23 5.97 0.64 -0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 1.41 3.06 7.05 12.73 16.86 19.08 23.34 26.87 33.23 36.77
DBD_NR_FEM_EMPL 82569 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DCEOCHBD 72134 0.54 0.50 -0.17 -1.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DCEODIRECTOR 72141 0.27 0.44 1.06 -0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_NR_EMPL_PERC 82569 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_EMPL_PERC 82569 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_STOCKH_PERC 82569 0.17 0.30 1.68 1.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_NR_FEM_PERC 82569 0.17 0.30 1.68 1.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
This table presents univariate descriptive statistics of corporate governance characteristics for the sample of all Norwegian firms with limited liability as defined in table 4.1 The sample includes non-financial firms that pass basic accounting
consistency tests, activity level tests, and that are not subsidiaries. The variables are defined in appendix 7.A1. The subscript "D" denotes direct (first level) ownership, while the subscript "U" denotes ultimate (all levels) ownership, i.e. the direct
ownership plus the indirect ownership through pyramids. 
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Table 7.S1. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel B. Nonlisted firms
n mean std skewness kurtosis p0 p0_01 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_99 p100
Ownership: Direct (D)
HOLDLARGE1_D 77730 70.21 27.84 -0.20 -1.41 0.01 2.30 15.32 25.00 33.33 50.00 66.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGE2_D 77730 19.38 19.10 0.35 -1.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.50 34.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
HOLDLARGE3_D 77730 5.59 9.80 1.57 1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 22.24 30.00 33.33 33.33 33.33
HOLDLARGE4_D 77730 2.02 5.31 2.76 6.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 15.81 25.00 25.00 25.00
HOLDLARGE5_D 77730 0.74 2.87 4.33 19.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.14 15.97 20.00 20.00
HOLDLARGESUM2_D 77730 89.59 18.27 -1.77 2.43 0.01 2.78 28.57 50.00 61.84 82.30 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM3_D 77730 95.18 12.70 -3.30 12.05 0.01 3.84 38.37 66.66 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.01 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM4_D 77730 97.20 10.03 -4.79 26.31 0.01 4.00 46.33 80.00 94.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.01 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM5_D 77730 97.93 8.79 -5.84 39.37 0.01 4.00 50.00 87.19 98.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.01 100.50
HOLDLARGEOUTS_D 32054 49.31 32.59 0.55 -1.15 0.01 0.01 5.00 9.90 12.00 22.90 39.52 85.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDSMALLOUTS_D 32054 42.68 35.34 0.72 -1.04 0.01 0.01 4.00 5.20 6.60 12.00 33.30 70.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HERFINDAHL_D 77630 0.66 0.30 -0.06 -1.50 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.27 0.42 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
NROWNERS_D 77730 3.15 46.11 120.97 19366.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 9.00 2290.00 8803.00
NROWNERSINS 64364 1.71 0.90 1.60 4.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 8.00 13.00
HOLDMEAN_D 78300 62.83 32.08 0.08 -1.59 0.01 0.04 9.09 18.08 25.00 33.33 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDMEDIAN_D 78300 61.96 33.29 0.01 -1.52 0.00 0.00 5.84 12.00 18.00 33.33 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDUNSP_D 77729 12.59 28.89 2.28 3.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 57.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINST_D 77730 0.45 5.03 14.59 244.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 100.00 100.00
HOLDPERS_D 77657 76.57 38.26 -1.28 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 64.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDSTAT_D 77729 1.00 9.16 9.84 98.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.30 100.00 100.00
HOLDINTL_D 77729 3.29 17.22 5.26 26.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINDU_D 77720 4.78 17.38 4.18 17.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SUMHOLD_D 77630 98.73 6.99 -8.17 77.97 0.01 5.00 62.00 95.20 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
BLOCK5NR_D 77730 2.14 1.44 2.23 9.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 18.00 19.00
BLOCK10NR_D 77730 1.90 1.08 1.38 2.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 9.00 9.00
BLOCK5SH_D 77730 98.24 8.52 -7.46 65.17 0.00 0.00 52.79 91.30 98.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
BLOCK10SH_D 77730 96.31 12.32 -5.00 29.09 0.00 0.00 31.11 77.20 90.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
TYPELARGE1_D 78300 1.98 1.05 0.63 2.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Ownership: Ultimate (U)
HOLDLARGE1_U 77548 70.72 27.65 -0.22 -1.41 0.01 2.08 16.66 25.10 33.33 50.00 66.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGE2_U 81776 17.95 18.93 0.47 -1.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.46 34.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
HOLDLARGE3_U 81776 5.09 9.34 1.71 1.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.76 20.00 26.47 33.33 33.33 33.33
HOLDLARGE4_U 81776 1.85 4.99 2.92 8.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.00 14.55 25.00 25.00 25.00
HOLDLARGE5_U 81776 0.69 2.67 4.48 21.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.25 14.29 20.00 20.00
HOLDLARGESUM2_U 77548 89.65 18.16 -1.76 2.37 0.01 2.78 29.41 50.00 62.00 82.80 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM3_U 77548 95.02 12.81 -3.20 11.23 0.01 3.20 39.00 66.00 79.34 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM4_U 77548 96.97 10.29 -4.54 23.75 0.01 3.62 45.59 77.76 91.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGESUM5_U 77548 97.69 9.12 -5.47 34.95 0.01 4.38 50.00 84.00 96.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDLARGEOUTS_U 31692 50.21 33.69 0.45 -1.30 0.10 0.20 4.42 8.50 11.42 20.34 40.00 97.32 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HERFINDAHL_U 77548 0.66 0.30 -0.09 -1.48 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.27 0.43 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
NROWNERS_U 81776 2.30 2.30 6.77 107.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 11.00 50.00 100.00
HOLDMEAN_U 78122 62.76 32.58 0.04 -1.57 0.01 1.12 6.63 16.10 23.00 33.33 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDMEDIAN_U 78122 61.75 33.97 -0.04 -1.50 0.00 0.02 2.42 10.00 16.67 33.33 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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Table 7.S1. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel B. Nonlisted firms
n mean std skewness kurtosis p0 p0_01 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_99 p100
HOLDUNSP_U 77548 12.69 28.57 2.28 3.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINST_U 81776 0.22 3.93 22.01 517.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDPERS_U 81776 75.35 39.25 -1.20 -0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 60.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
HOLDSTAT_U 81776 1.05 9.18 9.68 95.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.55 100.00 100.00
HOLDINTL_U 81776 3.15 16.81 5.40 27.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINDU_U 81776 1.53 10.97 8.01 65.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 85.00 100.00 100.00
SUMHOLD_U 77548 98.41 7.75 -7.08 58.45 0.01 5.00 55.50 92.15 99.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
BLOCK5NR_U 81776 2.01 1.42 1.63 4.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 13.00 19.00
BLOCK10NR_U 81776 1.78 1.11 1.10 1.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 8.00 9.00
BLOCK5SH_U 81776 92.81 23.31 -3.48 10.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 88.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
BLOCK10SH_U 81776 91.02 24.41 -3.07 8.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 74.01 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.50
INSHOLD_CEO 64364 53.52 37.78 -0.08 -1.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_BDEXCEO 64364 33.98 34.69 0.60 -0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.00 50.42 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_BD 64364 86.54 24.43 -1.83 2.45 0.00 0.00 4.00 28.60 50.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_ALL 64364 87.51 22.92 -1.83 2.43 0.01 0.70 10.00 33.33 50.00 81.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_LARGE1 64364 67.46 29.05 -0.18 -1.30 0.01 0.70 8.20 20.00 30.00 50.00 65.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_LARGE2 64364 16.10 19.18 0.68 -1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
INSHOLD_LARGE3 64364 3.06 7.98 2.62 5.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.38 25.00 33.33 33.33 33.33
INSHOLD_LARGE4 64364 0.70 3.51 5.43 29.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.22 25.00 25.00
INSHOLD_LARGE5 64364 0.14 1.41 11.27 134.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 20.00 20.00
INSHOLD_TYPE1 64364 11.36 23.08 2.12 3.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 54.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD TYPE2 64364 17 33 24 26 1 26 0 79 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 34 00 50 00 66 00 100 00 100 00 100 00_ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INSHOLD_TYPE3 64364 16.65 29.13 1.70 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.00 52.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_TYPE4 64364 41.20 43.31 0.32 -1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSRANK_TYPE1 64364 0.37 0.73 1.91 2.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
INSRANK_TYPE2 64364 0.68 0.87 0.88 -0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
INSRANK_TYPE3 64364 0.48 0.79 1.52 1.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
INSRANK_TYPE4 64364 0.59 0.61 0.51 -0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Board (BD)
BD_TURN 72475 0.02 0.09 5.10 27.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.50 0.83 0.88
DISCHSAME 73953 0.95 0.22 -4.11 14.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DISCEOSAME 63957 0.95 0.22 -4.04 14.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_SIZE 82114 2.25 1.41 1.34 2.57 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 12.00 16.00
BD_AVG_AGE 81150 49.85 9.35 0.13 -0.02 20.00 22.00 29.50 35.00 38.00 43.25 50.00 56.00 62.00 65.00 72.00 88.00 93.00
BD_AVG_AGE_M 75207 50.38 9.57 0.12 -0.02 19.00 21.00 29.50 35.00 38.00 43.80 50.25 57.00 62.50 66.00 74.00 92.00 94.00
BD_AVG_AGE_F 25872 48.26 10.89 0.33 0.03 19.00 19.00 26.00 32.00 35.00 40.00 48.00 56.00 62.00 66.00 77.00 93.00 95.00
BD_SD_AGE 46582 8.23 5.98 0.64 -0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 1.41 3.06 7.03 12.73 16.86 19.09 23.34 33.23 36.77
DBD_NR_FEM_EMPL 82435 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DCEOCHBD 72000 0.54 0.50 -0.17 -1.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DCEODIRECTOR 72007 0.27 0.44 1.06 -0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_NR_EMPL_PERC 82435 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_EMPL_PERC 82435 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_STOCKH_PERC 82435 0.17 0.30 1.68 1.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_NR_FEM_PERC 82435 0.17 0.30 1.68 1.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
This table presents univariate descriptive statistics of corporate governance characteristics for the sample of nonlisted Norwegian firms with limited liability as defined in table 4.1 The sample includes non-financial firms that pass basic
accounting consistency tests, activity level tests, and that are not subsidiaries. The variables are defined in appendix 7.A1. The subscript "D" denotes direct (first level) ownership, while the subscript "U" denotes ultimate (all levels) ownership,
i.e. the direct ownership plus the indirect ownership through pyramids. 
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Table 7.S1. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel C. Large nonlisted firms
n mean std skewness kurtosis p0 p0_25 p0_5 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_99 p100
Ownership: Direct (D)
HOLDLARGE1_D 3873 71.39 30.36 -0.41 -1.39 0.01 5.88 7.80 20.70 28.50 45.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGE2_D 3873 14.56 16.92 0.76 -0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.40 27.00 40.75 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
HOLDLARGE3_D 3873 5.73 9.12 1.43 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.12 20.00 25.00 33.33 33.33 33.33
HOLDLARGE4_D 3873 2.54 5.40 2.17 3.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.98 15.00 22.95 25.00 25.00
HOLDLARGE5_D 3873 1.17 3.32 3.10 9.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.78 10.00 15.78 20.00 20.00
HOLDLARGESUM2_D 3873 85.96 21.91 -1.47 1.17 0.01 7.70 12.02 39.37 50.10 73.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGESUM3_D 3873 91.69 17.20 -2.41 5.69 0.01 7.70 16.56 52.00 65.62 93.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGESUM4_D 3873 94.23 14.62 -3.22 11.28 0.01 7.70 16.56 61.00 77.50 99.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGESUM5_D 3873 95.40 13.23 -3.83 16.43 0.01 7.70 16.56 66.94 84.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGEOUTS_D 3216 66.93 33.66 -0.31 -1.51 0.37 4.00 5.00 12.00 19.85 35.00 70.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDSMALLOUTS_D 3216 57.37 40.87 -0.05 -1.81 0.05 1.28 2.00 5.30 6.46 13.80 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HERFINDAHL_D 3871 0.67 0.34 -0.29 -1.54 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.20 0.34 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
NROWNERS_D 3873 12.91 190.57 32.61 1303.45 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 110.00 8803.00 8803.00
NROWNERSINS 1428 1.79 1.06 1.70 3.64 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
HOLDMEAN_D 3915 63.22 35.86 -0.13 -1.68 0.01 0.10 0.27 11.68 16.67 31.82 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDMEDIAN_D 3915 62.36 37.04 -0.17 -1.64 0.00 0.00 0.01 8.00 12.07 25.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDUNSP_D 3873 25.63 39.09 1.11 -0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINST_D 3873 1.16 7.84 9.17 96.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDPERS_D 3872 29.18 41.80 0.91 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 71.54 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDSTAT_D 3873 3.39 16.95 5.10 24.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINTL_D 3873 24.94 42.38 1.16 -0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINDU_D 3873 12.73 28.14 2.21 3.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 54.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SUMHOLD_D 3871 97.07 11.05 -5.37 32.70 0.01 7.90 16.56 80.90 95.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
BLOCK5NR_D 3873 2.28 1.76 1.86 5.14 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 18.00 18.00
BLOCK10NR_D 3873 1.88 1.21 1.44 2.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 9.00 9.00
BLOCK5SH_D 3873 96.08 12.48 -4.55 23.52 0.00 5.65 11.80 73.40 89.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
BLOCK10SH_D 3873 92.96 17.34 -3.33 11.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 54.80 75.10 96.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TYPELARGE1_D 3915 2.40 1.80 -0.06 -1.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Ownership: Ultimate (U)
HOLDLARGE1_U 3859 72.11 30.52 -0.48 -1.33 0.01 5.17 7.61 20.43 26.91 45.89 89.30 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGE2_U 4074 12.40 15.84 0.99 -0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.50 37.50 49.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
HOLDLARGE3_U 4074 5.14 8.52 1.58 1.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 19.50 24.50 33.19 33.33 33.33
HOLDLARGE4_U 4074 2.33 5.01 2.30 4.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 14.20 22.20 25.00 25.00
HOLDLARGE5_U 4074 1.12 3.09 3.11 9.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.31 9.00 14.28 20.00 20.00
HOLDLARGESUM2_U 3859 85.20 22.56 -1.42 0.97 0.01 7.00 10.65 36.26 48.56 72.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGESUM3_U 3859 90.63 18.31 -2.22 4.61 0.01 7.00 13.00 48.87 61.28 90.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGESUM4_U 3859 93.09 16.00 -2.88 8.66 0.01 7.00 13.00 56.50 71.87 97.45 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGESUM5_U 3859 94.27 14.73 -3.35 12.15 0.01 7.00 13.00 61.12 78.50 99.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDLARGEOUTS_U 3155 67.61 34.73 -0.40 -1.48 0.37 1.99 4.07 10.32 16.71 33.33 82.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HERFINDAHL_U 3859 0.67 0.35 -0.34 -1.51 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.18 0.34 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
NROWNERS_U 4074 2.73 3.21 4.55 39.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 8.00 16.00 57.00 57.00
HOLDMEAN_U 3901 63.30 36.95 -0.18 -1.70 0.01 2.31 2.92 9.04 13.88 25.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDMEDIAN_U 3901 62.07 38.55 -0.22 -1.66 0.01 0.25 0.35 5.00 9.59 23.50 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
84
Table 7.S1. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel C. Large nonlisted firms
n mean std skewness kurtosis p0 p0_25 p0_5 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_99 p100
HOLDUNSP_U 3859 25.43 38.05 1.14 -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.30 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINST_U 4074 0.47 5.93 15.38 245.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.50 100.00 100.00
HOLDPERS_U 4074 33.82 42.38 0.68 -1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 85.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDSTAT_U 4074 3.52 17.03 5.03 24.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.30 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINTL_U 4074 23.84 41.61 1.23 -0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.94 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
HOLDINDU_U 4074 4.98 20.19 4.16 15.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 44.81 100.00 100.00 100.00
SUMHOLD_U 3859 95.76 13.05 -4.17 19.29 0.01 7.90 14.29 69.06 87.60 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
BLOCK5NR_U 4074 2.12 1.73 1.50 2.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 13.00 13.00
BLOCK10NR_U 4074 1.72 1.21 1.27 1.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 8.00
BLOCK5SH_U 4074 89.65 25.55 -2.76 6.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 63.24 96.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
BLOCK10SH_U 4074 86.61 27.57 -2.28 4.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 47.15 90.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_CEO 1428 39.50 38.87 0.49 -1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.53 73.02 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_BDEXCEO 1428 31.35 32.23 0.77 -0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.62 50.00 85.30 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_BD 1428 69.39 34.74 -0.65 -1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.31 12.50 40.00 86.73 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_ALL 1428 70.84 33.58 -0.69 -1.03 0.01 1.70 3.00 8.70 15.00 44.67 88.80 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_LARGE1 1428 54.29 33.50 0.18 -1.38 0.01 1.28 2.00 7.50 10.02 25.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_LARGE2 1428 12.33 16.15 1.08 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.34 40.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
INSHOLD_LARGE3 1428 3.07 7.24 2.49 5.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.30 20.40 32.50 33.33 33.33
INSHOLD_LARGE4 1428 0.80 3.27 4.68 23.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.60 18.59 25.00 25.00
INSHOLD_LARGE5 1428 0.26 1.72 7.68 65.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 20.00
INSHOLD_TYPE1 1428 13.66 25.88 2.03 3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.04 50.00 78.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD TYPE2 1428 18 31 23 83 1 30 1 07 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 5 60 33 00 50 00 65 30 98 00 100 00 100 00_ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INSHOLD_TYPE3 1428 13.04 26.05 2.13 3.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.95 50.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSHOLD_TYPE4 1428 24.39 39.53 1.17 -0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INSRANK_TYPE1 1428 0.43 0.73 1.58 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
INSRANK_TYPE2 1428 0.74 0.81 0.72 -0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
INSRANK_TYPE3 1428 0.45 0.78 1.67 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
INSRANK_TYPE4 1428 0.36 0.56 1.29 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Board (BD)
BD_TURN 3509 0.06 0.12 2.56 7.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.56 0.83 0.83
DISCHSAME 3786 0.78 0.41 -1.35 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DISCEOSAME 3460 0.90 0.30 -2.74 5.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_SIZE 4122 3.89 2.01 0.73 0.57 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 14.00 14.00
BD_AVG_AGE 3928 50.78 7.13 -0.02 0.41 25.00 30.00 31.00 39.00 41.86 46.06 50.75 55.50 60.00 62.00 67.00 82.00 82.00
BD_AVG_AGE_M 3871 51.38 7.37 -0.02 0.55 25.00 30.00 31.00 39.00 42.00 46.86 51.50 56.20 60.33 63.00 68.50 92.00 92.00
BD_AVG_AGE_F 1369 47.56 9.65 0.39 0.30 22.00 24.00 26.00 33.00 36.00 41.00 47.00 54.00 60.00 64.00 74.00 87.00 87.00
BD_SD_AGE 3109 8.58 4.78 0.49 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.41 2.52 4.95 8.06 11.72 15.20 16.97 21.21 26.16 26.16
DBD_NR_FEM_EMPL 4122 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DCEOCHBD 3953 0.19 0.39 1.61 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DCEODIRECTOR 3954 0.37 0.48 0.53 -1.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_NR_EMPL_PERC 4122 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_EMPL_PERC 4122 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_STOCKH_PERC 4122 0.11 0.19 1.97 4.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.33 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.00
BD_NR_FEM_PERC 4122 0.11 0.19 1.95 4.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.33 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.00
This table presents univariate descriptive statistics of corporate governance characteristics for the sample of large nonlisted Norwegian firms with limited liability as defined in table 4.1 The sample includes non-financial firms that pass basic
accounting consistency tests, activity level tests, and that are not subsidiaries. The variables are defined in appendix 7.A1. The subscript "D" denotes direct (first level) ownership, while the subscript "U" denotes ultimate (all levels) ownership,
i.e. the direct ownership plus the indirect ownership through pyramids. Large nonlisted firms are the nonlisted firms in the top 5% sales decile.
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Table 7.S1. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel D. Listed firms
n mean std skewness kurtosis p0 p0_01 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_99 p100
Ownership: Direct (D)
HOLDLARGE1_D 134 25.24 14.93 0.88 0.34 4.77 4.77 6.01 7.34 9.06 12.87 22.20 35.51 47.27 51.58 70.14 71.54 71.54
HOLDLARGE2_D 134 10.68 7.03 2.34 7.39 2.00 2.00 2.61 3.74 4.45 6.55 9.15 12.15 18.65 20.49 36.94 46.73 46.73
HOLDLARGE3_D 134 6.97 3.64 1.10 1.23 1.72 1.72 1.75 2.36 2.96 4.48 5.85 9.13 11.34 14.53 18.64 19.51 19.51
HOLDLARGE4_D 134 4.88 2.28 0.97 1.45 0.93 0.93 1.08 1.95 2.15 3.15 4.55 5.93 8.11 9.72 10.37 14.26 14.26
HOLDLARGE5_D 134 3.72 1.49 0.09 -0.59 0.72 0.72 0.75 1.30 1.75 2.57 3.68 4.90 5.48 6.18 7.00 7.43 7.43
HOLDLARGESUM2_D 134 35.92 17.73 0.75 0.40 7.93 7.93 8.92 12.45 14.84 20.81 34.72 47.15 59.29 69.17 84.44 95.37 95.37
HOLDLARGESUM3_D 134 42.89 18.48 0.50 -0.08 10.40 10.40 11.22 16.80 19.88 27.25 41.44 55.36 66.92 75.41 91.70 97.09 97.09
HOLDLARGESUM4_D 134 47.77 18.55 0.30 -0.35 12.50 12.50 13.37 20.12 24.07 32.13 48.04 60.89 70.87 80.09 94.61 98.49 98.49
HOLDLARGESUM5_D 134 51.48 18.47 0.18 -0.46 14.27 14.27 15.52 22.65 28.09 36.92 52.74 63.91 74.99 84.07 96.81 99.62 99.62
HOLDLARGEOUTS_D 127 25.03 14.77 0.81 0.18 6.00 6.00 6.11 7.34 8.70 12.50 22.32 35.50 47.30 50.00 70.90 71.54 71.54
HOLDSMALLOUTS_D 127 9.21 9.94 3.89 16.36 3.40 3.40 4.85 5.00 5.03 5.20 5.88 8.21 13.90 36.94 47.30 70.90 70.90
HERFINDAHL_D 134 0.12 0.10 1.74 3.41 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.26 0.31 0.49 0.52 0.52
NROWNERS_D 134 3863.11 8317.62 4.79 26.36 130.00 130.00 180.00 246.00 422.00 772.00 1447.50 3106.00 6878.00 16552.00 41360.00 63986.00 63986.00
NROWNERSINS 5 1.20 0.45 2.24 5.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
HOLDMEAN_D 134 0.11 0.12 2.56 8.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.41 0.56 0.77 0.77
HOLDMEDIAN_D 134 0.00 0.01 2.86 9.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03
HOLDUNSP_D 134 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HOLDINST_D 134 14.39 10.20 0.71 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 1.76 6.89 12.32 21.68 28.85 32.97 43.27 44.79 44.79
HOLDPERS_D 134 17.95 16.28 1.52 2.28 0.26 0.26 0.33 1.21 2.18 5.94 13.65 22.95 42.84 54.24 76.53 80.19 80.19
HOLDSTAT_D 134 4.39 12.18 3.73 14.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.05 10.32 37.88 58.93 72.11 72.11
HOLDINTL_D 134 25.20 22.25 0.93 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.69 1.83 7.51 17.31 38.18 58.78 67.12 80.57 97.73 97.73
HOLDINDU_D 134 38.07 22.41 0.33 -0.61 0.45 0.45 0.48 5.08 10.16 19.83 36.09 55.77 68.81 77.63 89.39 99.65 99.65
SUMHOLD_D 134 100.00 0.00 . . 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
BLOCK5NR_D 134 3.23 1.52 0.21 -0.54 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
BLOCK10NR_D 134 1.41 0.97 0.61 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
BLOCK5SH_D 134 45.68 21.51 -0.03 -0.63 0.00 0.00 6.01 9.82 14.63 28.52 47.35 59.75 72.87 81.49 91.70 95.37 95.37
BLOCK10SH_D 134 32.80 22.87 0.33 -0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.87 31.81 49.88 66.29 70.14 87.81 95.37 95.37
TYPELARGE1_D 134 4.13 1.20 -1.40 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Ownership: Ultimate (U)
HOLDLARGE1_U 126 24.98 16.04 0.94 0.17 0.31 0.31 3.24 7.26 7.97 11.50 20.61 34.19 50.15 57.23 66.60 70.90 70.90
HOLDLARGE2_U 132 7.26 6.49 1.05 1.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 7.10 9.99 15.31 19.10 27.10 34.10 34.10
HOLDLARGE3_U 132 3.60 4.13 1.18 1.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.15 6.06 8.89 11.12 17.40 18.60 18.60
HOLDLARGE4_U 132 2.15 2.83 1.02 -0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 4.74 6.45 7.91 9.20 10.00 10.00
HOLDLARGE5_U 132 1.05 1.89 2.13 4.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.32 3.89 5.31 7.99 8.96 8.96
HOLDLARGESUM2_U 126 32.59 17.36 0.43 -0.56 0.63 0.63 5.45 7.97 10.47 18.60 31.17 43.60 60.80 63.73 70.90 73.23 73.23
HOLDLARGESUM3_U 126 36.36 18.56 0.29 -0.41 0.86 0.86 5.45 8.21 10.47 21.81 37.03 46.90 63.10 67.29 80.49 87.80 87.80
HOLDLARGESUM4_U 126 38.61 19.31 0.14 -0.51 0.86 0.86 5.45 8.21 10.80 24.84 38.30 50.99 66.39 70.87 87.26 87.80 87.80
HOLDLARGESUM5_U 126 39.70 19.77 0.06 -0.61 0.86 0.86 5.45 8.21 10.80 24.84 40.56 52.82 66.39 71.91 87.26 87.80 87.80
HOLDLARGEOUTS_U 125 23.99 15.83 0.94 0.23 0.31 0.31 1.72 6.94 7.50 10.70 20.47 33.10 50.00 56.60 66.60 70.90 70.90
HERFINDAHL_U 126 0.10 0.11 1.64 2.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.27 0.34 0.44 0.50 0.50
NROWNERS_U 132 5.29 5.31 2.15 5.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 7.00 11.00 17.00 26.00 28.00 28.00
HOLDMEAN_U 128 13.53 13.77 2.37 5.90 0.29 0.29 1.18 2.33 3.27 6.01 8.53 15.00 30.32 43.82 66.60 70.90 70.90
HOLDMEDIAN_U 128 11.49 14.49 2.34 5.62 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.23 0.46 2.88 7.07 13.25 30.40 43.82 66.60 70.90 70.90
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Table 7.S1. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for 2005
Panel D. Listed firms
n mean std skewness kurtosis p0 p0_01 p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 p99_99 p100
HOLDUNSP_U 126 16.15 16.60 1.12 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.18 10.41 25.78 42.29 52.61 58.99 70.90 70.90
HOLDINST_U 132 1.92 4.51 2.84 9.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.30 12.95 18.01 27.10 27.10
HOLDPERS_U 132 10.98 14.76 1.67 2.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.05 18.30 30.67 44.52 61.41 66.39 66.39
HOLDSTAT_U 132 2.87 8.88 4.31 19.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 9.80 13.69 43.82 58.89 58.89
HOLDINTL_U 132 6.84 14.12 2.54 6.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.10 25.38 40.38 63.10 66.60 66.60
HOLDINDU_U 132 1.41 6.07 6.31 47.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 10.00 28.51 54.20 54.20
SUMHOLD_U 126 41.31 20.62 -0.04 -0.78 0.86 0.86 5.45 8.21 10.80 24.84 43.42 55.63 68.67 72.75 87.26 87.80 87.80
BLOCK5NR_U 132 2.27 1.43 0.66 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
BLOCK10NR_U 132 1.07 0.83 0.60 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
BLOCK5SH_U 132 35.88 20.87 0.11 -0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.97 18.41 37.03 50.60 63.51 70.87 87.26 87.80 87.80
BLOCK10SH_U 132 27.14 21.59 0.37 -0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.42 26.04 42.42 57.23 65.49 73.23 87.80 87.80
INSHOLD_CEO 5 1.02 2.28 2.24 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.10 5.10 5.10 5.10 5.10
INSHOLD_BDEXCEO 5 19.83 26.08 2.17 4.76 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.56 9.72 12.20 66.20 66.20 66.20 66.20 66.20
INSHOLD_BD 5 20.85 28.35 2.18 4.80 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.56 9.72 12.20 71.30 71.30 71.30 71.30 71.30
INSHOLD_ALL 5 20.85 28.35 2.18 4.80 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.56 9.72 12.20 71.30 71.30 71.30 71.30 71.30
INSHOLD_LARGE1 5 19.83 26.08 2.17 4.76 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.45 5.56 9.72 12.20 66.20 66.20 66.20 66.20 66.20
INSHOLD_LARGE2 5 1.02 2.28 2.24 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.10 5.10 5.10 5.10 5.10
INSHOLD_LARGE3 5 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
INSHOLD_LARGE4 5 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
INSHOLD_LARGE5 5 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
INSHOLD_TYPE1 5 1.02 2.28 2.24 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.10 5.10 5.10 5.10 5.10
INSHOLD_TYPE2 5 18.71 26.95 2.07 4.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.45 9.72 12.20 66.20 66.20 66.20 66.20 66.20
INSHOLD TYPE3 5 1 11 2 49 2 24 5 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 5 56 5 56 5 56 5 56 5 56_ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INSHOLD_TYPE4 5 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
INSRANK_TYPE1 5 0.40 0.89 2.24 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
INSRANK_TYPE2 5 0.80 0.45 -2.24 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
INSRANK_TYPE3 5 0.20 0.45 2.24 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
INSRANK_TYPE4 5 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Board (BD)
BD_TURN 120 0.17 0.18 1.29 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.23 0.39 0.60 0.71 0.75 0.75
DISCHSAME 122 0.84 0.37 -1.84 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DISCEOSAME 115 0.78 0.41 -1.39 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_SIZE 134 6.51 1.74 0.36 -0.23 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 11.00 11.00 11.00
BD_AVG_AGE 134 51.08 5.16 0.34 1.00 38.00 38.00 39.80 42.33 44.33 47.67 50.86 54.20 56.78 59.80 64.60 70.00 70.00
BD_AVG_AGE_M 134 52.65 5.77 0.23 0.11 39.80 39.80 40.75 42.80 45.00 48.75 52.83 56.33 59.60 63.50 67.50 70.00 70.00
BD_AVG_AGE_F 101 45.42 6.14 0.11 -0.45 32.00 32.00 33.50 36.50 38.00 41.50 45.00 49.67 53.50 57.00 58.50 59.00 59.00
BD_SD_AGE 133 8.64 3.05 -0.13 -0.45 1.53 1.53 1.53 3.40 4.73 6.43 8.81 10.91 12.39 13.22 15.37 15.87 15.87
DBD_NR_FEM_EMPL 134 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DCEOCHBD 134 0.01 0.09 11.58 134.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
DCEODIRECTOR 134 0.10 0.30 2.75 5.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BD_NR_EMPL_PERC 134 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_EMPL_PERC 134 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_STOCKH_PERC 134 0.20 0.15 0.22 -0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.29 0.40 0.43 0.50 0.67 0.67
BD_NR_FEM_PERC 134 0.20 0.15 0.22 -0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.29 0.40 0.43 0.50 0.67 0.67
This table presents univariate descriptive statistics of corporate governance characteristics for the sample of listed Norwegian firms with limited liability as defined in table 4.1 The sample includes non-financial firms that pass basic accounting
consistency tests, activity level tests, and that are not subsidiaries. The variables are defined in appendix 7.A1. The subscript "D" denotes direct (first level) ownership, while the subscript "U" denotes ultimate (all levels) ownership, i.e. the
direct ownership plus the indirect ownership through pyramids.  
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Table 7.S2. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics time series for all firms
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
HOLDLARGE1_D P50 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 66.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 68.11 68.07 68.02 68.33 68.63 70.14
HOLDLARGE2_D P50 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 17.33
P75 35.00 35.00 35.00 34.70 34.30 34.00
Mean 20.69 20.57 20.52 20.39 20.26 19.36
HOLDLARGE3_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
Mean 5.97 5.94 6.00 5.95 5.91 5.59
HOLDLARGE4_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.14 2.02
HOLDLARGE5_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.74
HOLDLARGESUM2_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 88.80 88.64 88.54 88.72 88.88 89.50
HOLDLARGESUM3_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 94.77 94.58 94.54 94.68 94.79 95.09
HOLDLARGESUM4_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 96.90 96.72 96.70 96.83 96.93 97.11
HOLDLARGESUM5_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 97.71 97.54 97.50 97.63 97.71 97.85
HOLDLARGEOUTS_D P50 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 39.04
P75 51.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 84.00
Mean 43.55 41.52 41.28 40.38 41.61 49.21
HOLDSMALLOUTS_D P50 30.00 25.80 25.00 25.00 25.00 33.20
P75 50.00 49.00 49.00 46.25 49.90 70.00
Mean 36.93 35.58 35.58 34.93 35.77 42.55
HERFINDAHL_D P50 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66
NROWNERS_D P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 10.31 11.13 10.45 9.81 10.41 9.79
NROWNERSINS P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
P75 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean 1.76 1.75 1.77 1.78 1.74 1.71
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Table 7.S2. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics time series for all firms
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
HOLDMEAN_D P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 59.30 59.49 59.55 59.88 60.34 62.72
HOLDMEDIAN_D P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 58.26 58.51 58.58 58.89 59.37 61.85
HOLDUNSP_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 9.08 6.00 5.38 5.25 5.39 12.57
HOLDINST_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.26 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.48
HOLDPERS_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 81.39 84.14 84.13 84.38 84.35 76.46
HOLDSTAT_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.94 0.98 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01
HOLDINTL_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 2.90 3.35 3.32 3.30 3.20 3.32
HOLDINDU_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 4.20 3.75 4.23 4.21 4.25 4.84
SUMHOLD_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 98.80 98.55 98.45 98.53 98.60 98.73
BLOCK5NR_D P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 2.21 2.21 2.22 2.21 2.21 2.14
BLOCK10NR_D P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.95 1.90
BLOCK5SH_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 97.87 97.77 97.76 97.90 98.01 98.15
BLOCK10SH_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 95.90 95.72 95.70 95.84 95.94 96.20
TYPELARGE1_D P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean 2.04 2.09 2.13 2.13 2.12 1.98
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Table 7.S2. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics time series for all firms
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
HOLDLARGE1_U P50 65.22 65.00 65.00 65.00 66.00 66.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 69.29 68.62 68.52 68.80 69.10 70.65
HOLDLARGE2_U P50 17.00 17.35 16.67 17.00 16.45 13.33
P75 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00
Mean 18.90 19.17 18.76 19.11 18.64 17.93
HOLDLARGE3_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 8.33 9.70 9.03 9.83 9.00 7.71
Mean 5.26 5.44 5.37 5.45 5.33 5.09
HOLDLARGE4_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 1.82 1.94 1.92 1.97 1.92 1.85
HOLDLARGE5_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.67 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.69
HOLDLARGESUM2_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 89.44 88.77 88.66 88.82 88.96 89.56
HOLDLARGESUM3_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 95.05 94.49 94.42 94.52 94.64 94.92
HOLDLARGESUM4_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 96.99 96.53 96.48 96.59 96.68 96.87
HOLDLARGESUM5_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 97.70 97.30 97.25 97.35 97.44 97.60
HOLDLARGEOUTS_U P50 35.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 40.00
P75 66.66 54.00 52.00 51.00 53.40 96.27
Mean 46.26 43.00 42.33 41.28 42.62 50.11
HERFINDAHL_U P50 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.55
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66
NROWNERS_U P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 2.56 2.54 2.43 2.42 2.37 2.31
HOLDMEAN_U P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 59.97 59.52 59.59 59.93 60.36 62.68
HOLDMEDIAN_U P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 58.83 58.41 58.49 58.82 59.26 61.67
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Table 7.S2. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics time series for all firms
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
HOLDUNSP_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 9.53 5.83 5.42 5.48 5.60 12.69
HOLDINST_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.22
HOLDPERS_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 78.06 82.05 80.26 82.52 81.12 75.25
HOLDSTAT_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.96 1.02 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.05
HOLDINTL_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 2.64 3.18 3.09 3.18 3.03 3.15
HOLDINDU_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 1.51 1.32 1.62 1.47 1.50 1.53
SUMHOLD_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 98.42 98.07 97.99 98.08 98.17 98.32
BLOCK5NR_U P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 2.01 2.07 2.03 2.08 2.04 2.01
BLOCK10NR_U P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean 1.81 1.84 1.81 1.84 1.81 1.78
BLOCK5SH_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 91.63 92.62 90.68 93.05 91.58 92.72
BLOCK10SH_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 89.98 90.81 88.87 91.18 89.72 90.92
INSHOLD_CEO P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 98.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 50.30 51.24 51.60 51.22 53.22 53.52
INSHOLD_BDEXCEO P50 33.33 33.00 33.33 34.00 32.00 31.00
P75 55.70 54.66 55.00 60.00 50.17 50.40
Mean 35.33 34.79 35.02 36.35 33.70 33.98
INSHOLD_BD P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 84.59 84.61 85.62 86.67 85.81 86.53
INSHOLD_ALL P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 85.63 86.03 86.62 87.57 86.91 87.50
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Table 7.S2. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics time series for all firms
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
INSHOLD_LARGE1 P50 60.00 60.00 60.00 62.50 64.00 65.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 65.20 65.73 65.80 66.24 66.52 67.45
INSHOLD_LARGE2 P50 5.00 4.76 6.25 8.34 5.00 0.00
P75 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33
Mean 16.30 16.21 16.55 16.91 16.29 16.10
INSHOLD_LARGE3 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 3.23 3.19 3.33 3.43 3.21 3.06
INSHOLD_LARGE4 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.71 0.70 0.75 0.78 0.70 0.70
INSHOLD_LARGE5 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14
INSHOLD_TYPE1 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.74 10.00 0.00
Mean 10.58 10.81 11.19 11.46 11.77 11.36
INSHOLD_TYPE2 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 34.00 34.00
Mean 18.88 18.44 18.57 18.71 17.55 17.33
INSHOLD_TYPE3 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 30.00 28.00 30.00 33.00 28.34 30.00
Mean 16.45 16.35 16.45 17.64 16.14 16.65
INSHOLD_TYPE4 P50 25.00 26.00 30.00 21.40 32.00 32.00
P75 80.00 84.04 90.00 90.00 99.00 100.00
Mean 38.68 39.01 39.42 38.86 40.35 41.19
INSRANK_TYPE1 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Mean 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.37
INSRANK_TYPE2 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.70 0.68
INSRANK_TYPE3 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.48
INSRANK_TYPE4 P50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.59
BD_TURN P50 #DIV/0! 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 #DIV/0! 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.02
DISCHSAME P50 #DIV/0! 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 #DIV/0! 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.00 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.95 1.00
DISCEOSAME P50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.95
BD_SIZE P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 2.29 2.25 2.27 2.27 2.24 2.26
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Table 7.S2. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics time series for all firms
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BD_AVG_AGE P50 48.00 48.00 48.50 49.00 49.00 50.00
P75 54.00 54.33 55.00 55.50 55.20 56.00
Mean 48.07 48.26 48.64 49.31 49.11 49.85
BD_AVG_AGE_M P50 48.00 48.50 49.00 50.00 49.50 50.29
P75 54.50 55.00 55.00 56.00 56.00 57.00
Mean 48.41 48.64 49.05 49.75 49.60 50.38
BD_AVG_AGE_F P50 46.67 46.67 47.00 47.00 47.00 48.00
P75 54.50 55.00 55.00 56.00 55.00 56.00
Mean 47.00 47.02 47.33 47.93 47.45 48.25
BD_SD_AGE P50 6.88 6.95 6.95 6.95 7.07 7.05
P75 12.73 12.74 12.73 12.73 12.79 12.73
Mean 8.20 8.22 8.22 8.19 8.28 8.23
DBD_NR_FEM_EMPL P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
DCEOCHBD P50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
DCEODIRECTOR P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
HOLDTYPERANK1 P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean 2.03 2.09 2.12 2.12 2.11 1.97
DBIGSB1S0 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
BD_NR_EMPL_PERC P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
This table presents univariate descriptive statistics of the time series of corporate governance
characteristics for the sample of all Norwegian firms with limited liability as defined in table
4.1 The sample includes non-financial firms that pass basic accounting consistency tests,
activity level tests, and that are not subsidiaries. We report cross section median (P50), the
75th percentile (P75), and the mean of the variables, which are defined in appendix 7.A1. The
subscript "D" denotes direct (first level) ownership, while the subscript "U" denotes ultimate
(all levels) ownership, i.e. the sum of direct ownership and indirect ownership through
pyramids. 
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Table 7.S3. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for all firms by industry sector
0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
HOLDLARGE1_D P50 66.00 51.00 60.00 60.00 65.00 65.00 66.00 65.80 66.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 69.45 62.94 65.14 64.84 68.67 67.58 72.05 68.58 69.69
HOLDLARGE2_D P50 18.00 25.00 20.00 13.15 23.60 20.00 17.86 17.46 20.00
P75 34.00 40.00 34.00 30.00 36.00 34.00 35.00 34.00 35.00
Mean 19.28 23.12 20.65 16.11 21.72 20.29 19.53 19.38 20.38
HOLDLARGE3_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 10.88 14.28 13.10 12.50 10.00 10.94 5.60 10.00 10.00
Mean 6.19 7.11 6.89 6.42 6.01 6.16 4.94 5.48 5.62
HOLDLARGE4_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 2.17 2.85 2.64 3.06 1.93 2.33 1.59 1.98 1.92
HOLDLARGE5_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.93 1.10 1.05 1.67 0.61 0.91 0.52 0.82 0.65
HOLDLARGESUM2_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 88.73 86.06 85.79 80.95 90.39 87.87 91.58 87.96 90.06
HOLDLARGESUM3_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 94.91 93.17 92.67 87.37 96.40 94.03 96.52 93.44 95.69
HOLDLARGESUM4_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 97.08 96.02 95.31 90.44 98.33 96.37 98.11 95.43 97.61
HOLDLARGESUM5_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Industry sector
Mean 98.01 97.13 96.36 92.10 98.94 97.28 98.63 96.25 98.26
HOLDLARGEOUTS_D P50 34.00 34.00 33.33 50.00 33.33 34.00 35.02 34.00 40.00
P75 50.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 48.00 50.00 90.00 52.40 82.60
Mean 44.19 38.97 40.82 61.24 36.86 41.39 48.06 43.63 49.86
HOLDSMALLOUTS_D P50 30.00 22.00 20.00 33.30 25.00 25.00 34.00 25.00 33.00
P75 50.00 48.84 45.00 100.00 40.00 48.00 80.00 50.00 66.00
Mean 39.26 31.34 33.44 48.45 32.82 34.97 43.52 36.81 41.74
HERFINDAHL_D P50 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.55
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.66 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.64 0.65
NROWNERS_D P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 13.70 8.37 30.23 371.03 2.75 8.14 4.08 16.44 3.32
NROWNERSINS P50 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
P75 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean 1.70 1.90 1.84 2.00 1.79 1.76 1.68 1.73 1.76
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Table 7.S3. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for all firms by industry sector
0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
Industry sector
HOLDMEAN_D P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 62.59 54.74 55.55 55.05 60.88 59.17 64.03 60.17 61.54
HOLDMEDIAN_D P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 61.79 53.92 54.39 54.09 59.98 58.19 63.11 59.19 60.55
HOLDUNSP_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 9.10 6.78 7.77 8.92 5.66 7.77 6.87 7.24 6.88
HOLDINST_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.49 0.47 0.43 1.32 0.03 0.52 0.11 0.30 0.19
HOLDPERS_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 66.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 82.94 80.83 78.83 27.90 91.33 81.87 83.31 78.90 78.26
HOLDSTAT_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.13 0.40 0.38 25.33 0.12 1.03 0.04 1.58 8.82
HOLDINTL_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 2.70 1.13 4.24 15.17 0.81 2.25 5.93 3.97 1.65
HOLDINDU_D P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 3.72 8.56 6.11 17.37 1.46 4.94 2.82 5.52 3.05
SUMHOLD_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 99.09 98.19 97.80 96.05 99.43 98.42 99.13 97.58 98.89
BLOCK5NR_D P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 2.17 2.44 2.40 2.47 2.14 2.26 2.01 2.20 2.13
BLOCK10NR_D P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean 1.96 2.13 2.05 2.01 1.96 1.98 1.84 1.90 1.92
BLOCK5SH_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 98.39 97.55 96.67 92.56 99.12 97.65 98.62 96.65 98.38
BLOCK10SH_D P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 96.72 95.00 93.87 89.01 97.60 95.40 97.18 94.27 96.61
TYPELARGE1_D P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean 2.02 2.14 2.15 2.97 1.98 2.08 2.08 2.14 2.09
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Table 7.S3. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for all firms by industry sector
0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
Industry sector
HOLDLARGE1_U P50 66.66 51.00 60.00 64.00 65.00 65.00 67.00 66.00 66.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 70.56 63.09 65.70 65.51 69.04 68.31 72.58 69.30 70.21
HOLDLARGE2_U P50 0.00 20.00 17.00 5.30 20.00 16.79 12.00 12.06 18.00
P75 31.00 34.00 33.40 23.25 35.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00
Mean 14.66 20.60 18.92 12.56 20.76 18.72 18.11 17.67 19.24
HOLDLARGE3_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 11.75 11.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 1.00 6.90 8.04
Mean 4.49 6.48 6.19 5.37 5.67 5.53 4.48 4.88 5.20
HOLDLARGE4_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.70 0.00 2.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 1.56 2.70 2.38 2.62 1.78 2.08 1.42 1.73 1.75
HOLDLARGE5_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.69 1.13 0.95 1.53 0.57 0.81 0.45 0.73 0.57
HOLDLARGESUM2_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 89.38 84.97 85.72 79.19 90.60 88.14 91.82 88.10 90.30
HOLDLARGESUM3_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 95.15 91.85 92.26 85.03 96.49 94.00 96.58 93.28 95.73
HOLDLARGESUM4_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 97.15 94.72 94.78 87.88 98.34 96.21 98.09 95.13 97.56
HOLDLARGESUM5_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 98.04 95.92 95.78 89.54 98.93 97.06 98.57 95.90 98.16
HOLDLARGEOUTS_U P50 38.48 30.47 33.33 51.02 34.00 34.00 36.41 35.00 40.00
P75 83.05 50.00 54.88 100.00 50.00 55.00 100.00 65.00 93.90
Mean 48.77 37.60 41.60 61.39 38.62 42.85 49.42 45.25 50.98
HERFINDAHL_U P50 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.67 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.64 0.66
NROWNERS_U P50 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 2.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 2.09 3.19 2.84 3.84 2.18 2.53 2.11 2.73 2.29
HOLDMEAN_U P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 63.15 53.17 55.58 55.07 61.10 59.33 64.28 60.15 61.60
HOLDMEDIAN_U P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 62.27 51.88 54.23 53.63 60.19 58.20 63.29 59.00 60.56
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Table 7.S3. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for all firms by industry sector
0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
Industry sector
HOLDUNSP_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 9.13 7.04 8.01 10.18 5.62 7.96 6.93 7.61 6.94
HOLDINST_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.16 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.02 0.32 0.04 0.14 0.12
HOLDPERS_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 65.60 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 66.70 80.28 77.29 27.04 88.95 79.59 79.95 76.47 76.50
HOLDSTAT_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 61.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.13 0.61 0.47 26.88 0.14 1.07 0.06 1.66 8.56
HOLDINTL_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 2.02 1.24 3.98 13.98 0.79 2.09 5.62 3.76 1.58
HOLDINDU_U P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.73 2.68 2.03 6.94 0.38 1.83 0.94 1.94 1.08
SUMHOLD_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 98.68 97.36 96.86 91.82 99.38 97.93 98.93 96.90 98.68
BLOCK5NR_U P50 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 1.63 2.31 2.22 2.21 2.05 2.09 1.87 2.02 2.01
BLOCK10NR_U P50 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean 1.50 1.96 1.90 1.75 1.88 1.84 1.71 1.75 1.82
BLOCK5SH_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 76.44 90.42 90.60 82.42 95.40 91.76 92.73 90.29 94.00
BLOCK10SH_U P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 75.33 87.69 88.07 78.98 93.98 89.80 91.45 88.21 92.43
INSHOLD_CEO P50 50.00 50.00 50.00 33.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75 100.00 83.67 86.00 65.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 46.38 47.90 48.87 39.99 56.06 50.04 54.89 50.83 53.64
INSHOLD_BDEXCEO P50 40.00 37.30 33.00 32.25 33.81 33.50 30.00 33.30 33.33
P75 66.67 55.00 51.00 53.60 50.00 60.00 50.00 60.00 51.32
Mean 40.41 36.81 34.46 34.48 33.96 35.84 33.17 35.54 34.50
INSHOLD_BD P50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 84.21 83.48 82.04 72.52 89.09 84.86 86.94 85.38 87.23
Mean 86.78 84.71 83.34 74.47 90.01 85.88 88.07 86.37 88.13
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INSHOLD_LARGE1 P50 64.00 51.00 53.60 50.00 62.80 62.91 65.00 65.00 60.26
P75 100.00 100.00 100.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean 67.56 60.82 61.87 52.59 67.22 65.59 68.60 66.98 66.58
INSHOLD_LARGE2 P50 0.00 13.00 10.00 9.88 10.00 3.16 0.00 0.00 9.00
P75 32.40 33.33 33.00 30.00 34.00 33.00 33.33 33.10 34.00
Mean 15.06 18.29 16.76 15.25 18.11 15.94 16.19 15.61 17.33
INSHOLD_LARGE3 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 3.19 4.29 3.68 4.59 3.72 3.31 2.68 2.93 3.28
INSHOLD_LARGE4 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.73 1.10 0.80 1.32 0.76 0.81 0.50 0.62 0.76
INSHOLD_LARGE5 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.53 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.13
INSHOLD_TYPE1 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 17.48 21.00 0.00 9.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.61
Mean 11.73 12.42 13.02 8.39 11.49 10.48 11.63 10.22 12.57
INSHOLD_TYPE2 P50 0.00 10.00 1.63 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 34.00 48.00 36.00 35.00 36.00 34.90 34.00 35.00 35.00
Mean 18.39 21.97 19.41 20.45 18.90 18.28 17.06 18.26 18.37
INSHOLD_TYPE3 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 43.02 25.00 25.00 17.00 26.00 32.54 28.57 30.00 30.00
Mean 22.01 14.84 15.05 14.03 15.06 17.56 16.12 17.27 16.13
INSHOLD_TYPE4 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 20.00 39.00 25.00 32.86
P75 66.67 66.00 67.00 65.00 100.00 84.00 100.00 96.00 98.00
Mean 32.07 34.25 34.56 29.65 43.65 38.54 42.14 39.62 40.16
INSRANK_TYPE1 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Mean 0.37 0.42 0.46 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.40
INSRANK_TYPE2 P50 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.64 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.75 0.71 0.69 0.71 0.73
INSRANK_TYPE3 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.47 0.48
INSRANK_TYPE4 P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.48 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.65 0.58 0.61 0.59 0.60
BD_TURN P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
DISCHSAME P50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.83 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93
DISCEOSAME P50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.89 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95
BD_SIZE P50 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75 3.00 3.00 3.00 7.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 2.21 2.55 2.63 4.71 2.04 2.27 2.09 2.38 2.45
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BD_AVG_AGE P50 45.67 48.00 50.33 50.83 47.00 48.75 49.00 50.00 47.67
P75 52.67 54.00 56.00 54.20 53.33 55.00 56.00 56.00 54.00
Mean 46.06 48.04 50.37 50.42 47.43 48.84 49.20 49.92 47.54
BD_AVG_AGE_M P50 46.67 48.00 51.00 51.50 47.00 49.00 49.50 50.00 48.00
P75 53.50 54.00 56.50 55.11 53.50 56.00 56.00 56.00 54.50
Mean 46.94 48.22 50.73 51.04 47.50 49.40 49.67 50.15 48.01
BD_AVG_AGE_F P50 41.50 47.00 48.00 46.42 48.00 46.00 48.00 49.00 47.00
P75 50.00 55.00 56.00 52.00 55.50 54.00 56.00 56.00 54.50
Mean 43.08 47.75 48.52 46.86 47.74 46.90 48.21 48.92 47.36
BD_SD_AGE P50 7.07 8.59 7.94 7.72 6.51 6.43 6.93 8.17 7.18
P75 12.74 14.15 13.20 10.01 12.97 12.02 13.44 13.80 12.37
Mean 8.30 9.36 8.84 8.10 8.13 7.85 8.39 9.09 8.22
DBD_NR_FEM_EMPL P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
DCEOCHBD P50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.17 0.64 0.56 0.58 0.53 0.51
DCEODIRECTOR P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.26
BD_NR_EMPL_PERC P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
BD_NR_FEM_EMPL_PERC P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_STOCKH_PERC P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33
Mean 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.11 0.16
BD_NR_FEM_PERC P50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.13 0.33
Mean 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.16
This table presents the median (P50), the 75th percentile (P75), and the mean for governance variables by industry sector for
the sample of all Norwegian firms with limited liability as defined in table 4.1. The sample period is 2000-2005, and the
sample includes non-financial firms that pass basic accounting consistency tests, activity level tests, and that are not
subsidiaries. The variables are defined in appendix 7.A1. The subscript "D" denotes direct (first level) ownership, while the
subscript "U" denotes ultimate (all levels) ownership, i.e. the sum of direct ownership and indirect ownership through
pyramids. The industry sector codes are 0: Missing; 1: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining; 2: Manufacturing, chemical
products; 3: Energy; 4: Construction; 5: Service; 6 Financial (not in the sample); 7: Trade; 8: Transport; 9: Multisector.
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HOLDLARGE1_D P50  75.00 66.00 66.00 66.00 65.00 62.50 60.00 60.00 59.60 66.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  72.96 71.21 71.31 69.91 68.83 67.48 66.38 65.20 64.80 67.93
HOLDLARGE2_D P50  11.00 17.00 18.64 20.00 20.30 23.70 23.98 23.50 20.93 13.93
P75  34.00 34.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 36.00 35.98 35.00 34.00 32.00
Mean  17.49 19.19 19.77 21.08 21.23 21.91 22.02 21.92 21.11 16.92
HOLDLARGE3_D P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  5.26 6.66 4.73 6.66 10.00 10.00 12.00 14.28 14.49 11.74
Mean  4.86 5.09 4.83 5.17 5.68 6.12 6.52 7.01 7.21 6.33
HOLDLARGE4_D P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34
Mean  1.77 1.78 1.67 1.63 1.88 2.08 2.33 2.60 2.74 2.72
HOLDLARGE5_D P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.67 0.65 0.58 0.55 0.61 0.67 0.81 0.98 1.15 1.24
HOLDLARGESUM2_D P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  90.44 90.40 91.08 90.99 90.06 89.38 88.41 87.12 85.92 84.85
HOLDLARGESUM3_D P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  95.31 95.49 95.91 96.16 95.74 95.50 94.93 94.14 93.12 91.18
HOLDLARGESUM4 D P50 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00
Decile
_   . . . . . . . . . .
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  97.07 97.27 97.58 97.79 97.62 97.58 97.25 96.74 95.86 93.90
HOLDLARGESUM5_D P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  97.74 97.92 98.16 98.35 98.23 98.25 98.06 97.72 97.01 95.13
HOLDLARGEOUTS_D P50  34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 47.18
P75  51.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 57.00 100.00
Mean  43.92 38.84 38.69 38.99 39.42 39.62 40.37 40.89 43.60 55.37
HOLDSMALLOUTS_D P50  30.00 25.00 30.00 32.00 29.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 33.30
P75  50.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 42.50 45.00 48.00 47.00 50.00 100.00
Mean  38.16 33.53 33.77 34.12 34.31 34.30 34.67 34.52 36.76 47.27
HERFINDAHL_D P50  0.61 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53
P75  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean  0.69 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.63
NROWNERS_D P50  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75  3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00
Mean  3.21 3.02 2.77 3.04 2.95 2.71 3.25 3.92 5.82 72.46
NROWNERSINS P50  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean  1.59 1.64 1.63 1.67 1.72 1.77 1.84 1.88 1.92 1.91
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HOLDMEAN_D P50  50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  65.55 63.46 63.56 62.21 61.09 59.42 57.81 56.13 55.40 58.06
HOLDMEDIAN_D P50  50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  64.61 62.53 62.64 61.33 60.15 58.52 56.80 55.09 54.33 56.98
HOLDUNSP_D P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  7.04 6.59 6.10 6.03 6.08 6.41 6.54 7.66 9.13 11.14
HOLDINST_D P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.29 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.37 0.94
HOLDPERS_D P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 79.18
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  84.77 87.30 88.20 88.11 87.39 86.71 85.05 82.47 77.34 57.52
HOLDSTAT_D P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.43 0.48 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.88 1.24 1.23 1.16 2.56
HOLDINTL_D P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  1.87 0.96 0.89 0.91 1.23 1.35 1.85 2.67 4.65 15.94
HOLDINDU D P50 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00_   . . . . . . . . . .
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  4.15 3.09 2.81 3.00 3.20 3.19 3.77 4.34 5.62 9.33
SUMHOLD_D P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  98.60 98.70 98.82 98.96 98.84 98.86 98.81 98.71 98.33 97.47
BLOCK5NR_D P50  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75  3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean  2.03 2.07 2.04 2.07 2.13 2.18 2.27 2.37 2.44 2.38
BLOCK10NR_D P50  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean  1.80 1.86 1.85 1.89 1.93 1.98 2.03 2.08 2.09 1.96
BLOCK5SH_D P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  97.99 98.16 98.33 98.51 98.41 98.36 98.27 98.05 97.48 95.55
BLOCK10SH_D P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  96.15 96.44 96.78 97.00 96.79 96.70 96.34 95.72 94.64 92.29
TYPELARGE1_D P50  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00
Mean  2.05 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.03 2.06 2.07 2.12 2.44
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HOLDLARGE1_U P50  78.15 66.00 66.00 66.00 65.00 64.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 66.66
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  73.72 71.97 71.88 70.44 69.32 67.97 66.84 65.77 65.41 68.81
HOLDLARGE2_U P50  0.00 10.00 14.00 18.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 9.50
P75  33.30 34.00 34.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 34.00 34.00 28.00
Mean  15.35 17.37 18.32 19.64 19.97 20.64 20.85 20.61 19.70 14.98
HOLDLARGE3_U P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 7.23 10.00 10.00 12.00 12.50 10.00
Mean  4.10 4.44 4.34 4.68 5.20 5.61 6.09 6.51 6.64 5.61
HOLDLARGE4_U P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  1.48 1.52 1.48 1.45 1.70 1.89 2.15 2.41 2.55 2.41
HOLDLARGE5_U P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.55 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.62 0.75 0.89 1.05 1.08
HOLDLARGESUM2_U P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  90.80 90.80 91.38 91.21 90.27 89.58 88.52 87.26 85.97 84.71
HOLDLARGESUM3_U P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  95.36 95.62 96.00 96.15 95.73 95.46 94.85 94.04 92.90 90.67
HOLDLARGESUM4 U P50 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00 100 00_   . . . . . . . . . .
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  97.00 97.26 97.57 97.69 97.50 97.43 97.09 96.56 95.57 93.23
HOLDLARGESUM5_U P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  97.62 97.86 98.11 98.23 98.09 98.08 97.87 97.49 96.67 94.38
HOLDLARGEOUTS_U P50  35.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 50.00
P75  65.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.01 52.64 66.66 100.00
Mean  45.49 41.31 40.58 40.58 41.00 41.08 41.49 42.05 44.39 56.23
HERFINDAHL_U P50  0.65 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.55
P75  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean  0.70 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.63
NROWNERS_U P50  1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
P75  2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean  2.15 2.21 2.18 2.23 2.30 2.37 2.50 2.65 2.81 2.97
HOLDMEAN_U P50  50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  65.76 63.74 63.73 62.34 61.18 59.51 57.83 56.14 55.33 58.54
HOLDMEDIAN_U P50  50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  64.69 62.71 62.73 61.36 60.16 58.53 56.72 54.99 54.09 57.19
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Table 7.S4. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for all firms by firm size
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Decile
HOLDUNSP_U P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.01
Mean  7.21 6.68 6.18 6.13 6.18 6.49 6.69 7.76 9.23 11.63
HOLDINST_U P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.14 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.42
HOLDPERS_U P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 82.25
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  78.07 82.10 84.31 84.84 84.90 84.53 83.70 81.41 77.08 57.74
HOLDSTAT_U P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.47 0.50 0.61 0.68 0.71 0.92 1.28 1.28 1.24 2.62
HOLDINTL_U P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  1.61 0.85 0.84 0.85 1.17 1.28 1.79 2.59 4.48 15.04
HOLDINDU_U P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  1.56 1.03 1.00 1.03 1.19 1.11 1.31 1.44 1.86 3.41
SUMHOLD_U P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  98.23 98.44 98.63 98.74 98.64 98.64 98.52 98.36 97.81 95.71
BLOCK5NR U P50 1 00 2 00 2 00 2 00 2 00 2 00 2 00 2 00 2 00 2 00_   . . . . . . . . . .
P75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mean  1.78 1.86 1.88 1.93 2.01 2.06 2.15 2.24 2.30 2.17
BLOCK10NR_U P50  1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
P75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00
Mean  1.59 1.69 1.72 1.76 1.82 1.87 1.93 1.97 1.98 1.80
BLOCK5SH_U P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  87.83 90.27 92.25 92.91 93.56 93.73 94.18 93.69 92.87 89.08
BLOCK10SH_U P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  86.34 88.85 90.91 91.54 92.07 92.19 92.43 91.55 90.26 86.21
INSHOLD_CEO P50  50.00 51.00 56.00 51.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 40.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 90.00 80.00 75.21 77.45
Mean  52.35 54.10 55.65 55.22 53.94 52.68 50.92 49.38 47.24 44.48
INSHOLD_BDEXCEO P50  26.00 28.59 28.48 33.00 33.33 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.35 31.25
P75  63.33 54.25 50.00 50.00 50.00 51.00 55.30 57.50 60.00 56.00
Mean  35.24 34.01 32.95 33.48 34.33 35.20 36.26 36.13 36.47 34.80
INSHOLD_BD P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.99
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  86.47 87.05 87.79 87.87 87.31 86.88 86.16 84.32 82.41 77.67
INSHOLD_ALL P50  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  87.59 88.10 88.60 88.70 88.26 87.88 87.18 85.50 83.71 79.28
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Table 7.S4. Corporate governance: Descriptive statistics for all firms by firm size
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Decile
INSHOLD_LARGE1 P50  67.65 66.00 66.00 65.00 64.00 60.00 59.20 53.00 51.00 51.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Mean  71.46 70.22 70.42 68.80 67.35 65.64 63.98 62.17 60.47 58.95
INSHOLD_LARGE2 P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 14.00 13.57 13.20 9.00
P75  27.77 33.00 33.33 34.00 33.50 34.00 34.00 33.33 33.30 29.00
Mean  13.11 14.62 15.08 16.51 17.06 17.92 18.30 18.04 17.65 15.13
INSHOLD_LARGE3 P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  2.32 2.55 2.43 2.74 3.10 3.42 3.82 4.09 4.27 3.89
INSHOLD_LARGE4 P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.55 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.62 0.73 0.85 0.96 1.01 0.98
INSHOLD_LARGE5 P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.11 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24
INSHOLD_TYPE1 P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.85 20.00 22.00 25.00 25.00
Mean  7.96 8.47 9.00 10.17 11.03 11.95 12.45 12.98 14.10 14.86
INSHOLD_TYPE2 P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 8.00 5.65
P75  33.33 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 35.00 38.00 40.00 40.00 36.80
Mean  15.75 16.68 16.54 17.09 17.53 18.60 19.61 20.35 20.74 20.19
INSHOLD TYPE3 P50 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00_   . . . . . . . . . .
P75  33.33 30.00 25.00 30.00 32.50 33.00 33.00 28.57 27.37 20.83
Mean  19.50 17.32 16.41 16.39 16.80 16.61 16.65 15.78 15.73 14.61
INSHOLD_TYPE4 P50  37.50 50.00 50.00 50.00 40.00 33.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 90.00 75.00 66.00 65.07 60.00
Mean  43.27 44.58 45.84 44.22 41.95 39.72 37.45 35.21 31.83 28.01
INSRANK_TYPE1 P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean  0.26 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.51
INSRANK_TYPE2 P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Mean  0.60 0.66 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.80
INSRANK_TYPE3 P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean  0.46 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.51
INSRANK_TYPE4 P50  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean  0.60 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.42
BD_TURN P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07
DISCHSAME P50  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean  0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.86
DISCEOSAME P50  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P75  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean  0.94 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.91
BD_SIZE P50  1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00
P75  3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00
Mean  1.92 1.92 1.91 1.96 2.03 2.14 2.26 2.40 2.64 3.43
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Decile
BD_AVG_AGE P50  50.00 49.67 49.00 48.00 48.00 48.00 48.00 48.50 49.00 49.67
P75  57.00 57.00 56.00 55.00 54.67 54.50 54.33 54.33 54.25 54.50
Mean  49.98 49.78 49.02 48.41 48.17 48.17 48.34 48.63 48.91 49.47
BD_AVG_AGE_M P50  50.00 50.00 49.75 49.00 48.50 48.50 48.50 49.00 49.00 50.00
P75  57.00 57.50 57.00 56.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00
Mean  50.39 50.28 49.61 48.95 48.63 48.57 48.72 48.87 49.24 49.93
BD_AVG_AGE_F P50  48.00 48.00 47.00 46.00 46.00 46.50 47.00 48.00 48.00 47.00
P75  56.50 56.00 55.00 54.00 54.00 54.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 54.00
Mean  48.25 48.26 47.43 46.93 46.80 47.00 47.35 48.05 47.97 47.35
BD_SD_AGE P50  6.36 6.36 6.18 6.18 6.36 6.43 6.86 7.07 7.37 8.04
P75  13.00 13.18 13.00 12.66 12.81 12.73 13.00 12.79 12.73 12.19
Mean  8.07 8.14 7.99 7.86 8.05 8.02 8.29 8.36 8.43 8.67
DBD_NR_FEM_EMPL P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
DCEOCHBD P50  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
P75  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean  0.65 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.44 0.29
DCEODIRECTOR P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean  0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.37
BD NR EMPL PERC P50 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00_ _ _   . . . . . . . . . .
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
BD_NR_FEM_EMPL_PERC P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BD_NR_FEM_STOCKH_PERC P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.25 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.17
Mean  0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10
BD_NR_FEM_PERC P50  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P75  0.25 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.17
Mean  0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10
This table presents the pooled median (P50), 75th percentile (P75), and the mean for governance variables by firm size as measured by
sales. The sample is all Norwegian firms with limited liability over the period 2000-2005 as defined in table 4.1, and includes non-
financial firms that pass basic accounting consistency tests, activity level tests, and that are not subsidiaries. The variables are defined in
appendix 7.A1. The subscript "D" denotes direct (first level) ownership, while the subscript "U" denotes ultimate (all levels) ownership,
i.e. the sum of direct ownership and indirect ownership through pyramids. 
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This figure shows the histogram for the largest ownership fraction in 2005. The sample consists of all listed and nonlisted limited liability nonfinancial firms that are not 
subsidiaries and that pass basic accounting consistency and activity filters. Table 4.1 specifies these filters one by one.  The two insets present moments and percentiles of the 
frequency distribution, and the bin size is 0.5%. 
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Table 7.1.1.1. Determinants of ownership concentration
Variable
Intercept 0.518 (0.000) 0.308 (0.000) 0.487 (0.000) 0.300 (0.000)
Listed -0.197 (0.000) -0.108 (0.000) -0.222 (0.000) -0.117 (0.000)
Nonlisted 0.197 (0.000) 0.108 (0.000) 0.222 (0.000) 0.117 (0.000)
Size -0.017 (0.000) -0.007 (0.000)
Size in millions -0.016 (0.000) -0.009 (0.003)
Age 0.011 (0.000) 0.010 (0.000) -0.022 (0.000) -0.003 (0.148)
Largest owner is unspecified -0.027 (0.000) 0.010 (0.000) 0.005 (0.377) 0.028 (0.000)
Largest owner is institutional -0.162 (0.000) -0.107 (0.000) -0.164 (0.000) -0.139 (0.000)
Largest owner is a person 0.037 (0.000) 0.073 (0.000) -0.034 (0.000) 0.040 (0.000)
Largest owner is state 0.012 (0.001) -0.011 (0.000) -0.009 (0.354) -0.017 (0.037)
Largest owner is foreign 0.296 (0.000) 0.106 (0.000) 0.312 (0.000) 0.149 (0.000)
Largest owner is industrial -0.155 (0.000) -0.071 (0.000) -0.111 (0.000) -0.060 (0.000)
R2 0.068 0.078 0.291 0.149
n 464,250 296,982 23,629 13,741
This table examines how firm and owner characteristics relate to ownership concentration. The sample in the "All firms" panel includes all non-
financial firms that pass basic accounting consistency tests, activity level tests, and that are not subsidiaries of another firm. Table 4.1 provides
details of the data filtering process. The sample in the "Large firms" panel are chosen according to the same filters. Large nonlisted firms rank
in the top 5% of sales among the nonlisted firms for that year, while large listed firms rank in the top 90% of sales for that year among all listed
firms. The "Multiple owner" sample excludes all single owner firms, which are firms with one owner or where the largest owner holds at least
99% of the shares. The "No ownership restriction" sample includes both multiple owner and single owner firms.
The dependent variable is the Herfindahl index of all owners, including the owners reported by VPS, which is the alternative data source for the 
owners of shares in ASA firms. "Size" is the natural logarithm of inflation adjusted sales in thousands. For large firms the logarithm is taken
from the sales in millions of NOK. "Age" is the natural logarithm of the age to date for the firm (zero for very young firms). If age is missing,
the founding year is the year the firm entered the sample. If a firm starts at the beginning of our database (1994) but has not indicated the
founding year, we use 1983 as the founding year, which is the average founding year for firms in 2000 (the first year of our ownership
All firms Large firms
No owner restriction Multiple owner No owner restriction Multiple owner
structure data).
The largest owner type is either unspecified, institutional, a person, state, foreign, or industrial. We control for industry membership as
specified in Appendix 4.A2. All variables are contemporaneous, and the sales variable is winsorized at the 1% tails. We run OLS regressions
and control for fixed industry effects (unreported) and fixed time effects (unreported). The sum of the two listing status coefficients, the five
owner type coefficients, the ten industry coefficients, and the six year coefficients are all restricted to be zero. The sample period is 2000-2005.
P-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 7.1.3.1. Determinants of insider ownership in nonlisted firms
Panel A. Size and age 
Variable
Intercept 95.47 (0.000) 87.60 (0.000) 105.85 (0.000) 93.23 (0.000)
Size -1.12 (0.000) -0.75 (0.000)
Size in millions -7.31 (0.000) -6.44 (0.000)
Age -0.70 (0.000) -1.44 (0.000) -0.34 (0.251) 0.68 (0.050)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04
n 406,287 266,538 12,377 9,207
Panel B. Size, age, and the identity of the largest owner
Variable
Intercept 48.65 (0.000) 46.14 (0.000) 55.12 (0.000) 51.05 (0.000)
Size -0.62 (0.000) -0.22 (0.000)
Size in millions -3.73 (0.000) -3.19 (0.000)
Age -1.05 (0.000) -1.86 (0.000) -1.38 (0.000) -0.92 (0.001)
Largest owner is unspecified -5.69 (0.000) -4.65 (0.000) -7.34 (0.000) -5.93 (0.000)
Largest owner is a person 47.43 (0.000) 43.08 (0.000) 47.58 (0.000) 42.76 (0.000)
Largest owner is state -22.24 (0.000) -20.46 (0.000) -19.51 (0.000) -19.22 (0.000)
Largest owner is foreign -12.30 (0.000) -11.49 (0.000) -13.87 (0.000) -11.60 (0.000)
Largest owner is industrial -7.21 (0.000) -6.48 (0.000) -6.86 (0.000) -6.00 (0.000)
R2 0.314 0.303 0.451 0.422
n 406,287 266,538 12,377 9,207
Large firmsAll firms
No owner restriction Multiple owner No owner restriction Multiple owner
All firms Large firms
No owner restriction Multiple owner No owner restriction Multiple owner
This table examines firm and owner characteristics that relate to the insider concentration in nonlisted firms with limited liability.
The sample includes all non-financial nonlisted firms that pass basic accounting consistency tests, activity level tests, and that are
not subsidiaries of another firm. Table 4.1 provides details of the data filtering process. Large nonlisted firms rank in the top 5%
of sales for that year. The "Multiple owner" sample excludes all single owner firms, where there is just one owner or the largest
owner holds at least 99% of the shares. 
All variables are contemporaneous. We run OLS regressions and control for fixed industry effects and fixed time effects
(unreported). Panel B adds dummies for the largest owner type. The sums of the coefficients for the owner type dummies, for the
industry sector dummies, and for the year dummies are all restricted to be zero. The sample is for the years 2000-2005. P-values
are in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is the aggregate equity holdings by the firm's insiders. "Size" is the natural logarithm of inflation adjusted
sales. For large firms the logarithm is taken from the sales in millions of NOK. "Age" is the natural logarithm of the age to date
for the firm (zero for very young firms). If age is missing, the founding year is the year the firm entered the sample. If a firm
starts at the beginning of our database (1994) but has not indicated the founding year, we use 1983 as the founding year (the
average founding year for firms in 2000), which is the first year for our ownership structure data. The sales variable is winsorized
at the 1% tails.
The largest owner type is either unspecified (this includes institutional owners, which is a very small group in nonlisted firms), a
person, state, foreign, or industrial. We group all firms into ten industry sectors based on the firm’s NAIC code for that year as
specified in Appendix 4.A2. 
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Table 7.2.1: Determinants of board size
Variable
Intercept 2.99 (0.000) 3.78 (0.000) 0.54 (0.000) 2.89 (0.000)
Firm size 0.17 (0.000) 0.17 (0.000)
Size in millions 0.90 (0.000) 0.62 (0.000)
Ownership concentration -1.90 (0.000) -3.62 (0.000) -1.35 (0.000) -2.89 (0.000)
Firm age 0.09 (0.000) 0.07 (0.000) 0.10 (0.000) 0.09 (0.000)
Board turnover 1.62 (0.000) 1.12 (0.000) 1.96 (0.000) 1.41 (0.000)
Director average age -0.01 (0.000) -0.01 (0.000) -0.00 (0.536) -0.01 (0.000)
Employee directors 8.56 (0.000) 7.52 (0.000) 5.01 (0.000) 5.29 (0.000)
Female directors 0.35 (0.000) 0.33 (0.000) 1.04 (0.000) 1.03 (0.000)
Nonlisted -0.65 (0.000) -0.53 (0.000) -0.30 (0.000) -0.25 (0.000)
Listed 0.65 (0.000) 0.53 (0.000) 0.30 (0.000) 0.25 (0.000)
R2 0.35 (0.000) 0.33 (0.000) 0.41 (0.000) 0.40 (0.000)
All firms Large firms
All Multiple owner All Multiple owner
n 343,388 (0.000) 218,066 (0.000) 17,188 (0.000) 10,473 (0.000)
Board size (the dependent variable) is the number of directors. "Size in millions" is the natural logarithm of inflation adjusted sales,
winsorized at 1% tails. For large firms the logarithm is taken from the sales in millions of NOK. "Firm age" is the natural logarithm of
the age to date for the firm (zero for very young firms). If the age is missing, the founding year is the year the firm entered our sample.
If a firm starts at the beginning of our database (1994) but has not indicated the founding year, we use 1983, which is the average
founding year for firms in 2000 (first year of governance data).
"Board turnover" accounts for the director turnover in that year excluding employee directors. "Board age" is the mean age for all
directors. "Female directors" is the percentage of non-employee women directors on the board. "Employee directors" is the percentage
of employee directors. "Nonlisted firm" and "Listed firm" are dummy variables indicating firm type. All variables are contemporaneous.
We run OLS regressions and control for unreported fixed industry effects (see Appendix 4.A2 for definitions). The sum of the two
listing status coefficients as well as the sum of the ten industry sector coefficients are restricted to be zero. The sample is pooled across
the sample years 2000-2005. P-values are in parentheses. 
This table examines factors that relate to the board size in firms with limited liability firms that pass our sample selection process
described in table 4.1. The sample consists of all non-financial firms that pass basic accounting consistency tests, activity tests, and that
are not subsidiaries of another firm. Large nonlisted firms are firms that rank in the top 5% of sales for that year, and large listed firms
are those above the 10% decile. The "Multiple owner" sample excludes single owner firms, which are firms with one owner or where
the largest owner holds at least 99% of the shares. The "No owner restriction" sample includes both multiple owner and single owner
firms.
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Table 7.3.1. Return on assets by listing status and governance characteristics 
A. Return on assets (ROA) n mean std skew. kurt. p0 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p100
Nonlisted 82,435 0.08 14.94 246.33 67,914 -847.44 -0.40 0.07 0.18 0.43 4,085
Listed 134 0.05 0.17 -3.99 33 -1.35 -0.16 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.23 0.65
Large nonlisted 4,122 0.11 0.32 36.97 1,783 -1.99 -0.05 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.31 16.76
B. Median ROA by Largest owner n . 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 -1
Nonlisted 82,435 0.028 0.060 0.069 0.069 0.062 0.071 0.083 0.091 0.070 0.071
Listed 134 0.041 0.097 0.026 0.034 0.031 0.060 0.049 0.098 0.066 0.079
Large nonlisted 4,122 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.091 0.082 0.080 0.081 0.093 0.069 0.084 0.078 0.074
C. Median ROA by Herfindahl index
Nonlisted 82,435 0.030 0.054 0.070 0.073 0.067 0.080 0.072 0.096 0.072 0.071
Listed 134 0.032 0.041 0.100 0.013 0.017 0.075 0.097 0.057 0.074 0.071
Large nonlisted 4,122 0.080 0.078 0.090 0.074 0.092 0.093 0.077 0.084 0.091 0.081 0.078 0.074
D. Median  ROA by Inside owners
Nonlisted 82,435 0.060 0.062 0.070 0.062 0.065 0.073 0.087 0.088 0.065 0.068 0.067 0.073
Large nonlisted 4,122 0.076 0.077 0.083 0.084 0.093 0.067 0.087 0.089 0.096 0.070 0.081 0.092
E. Median ROA by Board size
Nonlisted 82,435 0.038 0.065 0.052 0.044 0.073
Listed 134 0.013 0.076 0.040 0.036 0.052 0.078 0.061
Large nonlisted 4,122 0.080 0.075 0.058 0.054 0.052 0.093
F. Median ROA by Type of largest owner . type0 type1 type2 type3 type4 type5
Nonlisted 82,435 0.019 0.087 0.039 0.073 0.040 0.060 0.044
Listed 134 0.041 0.025 0.111 0.041 0.055
Large nonlisted 4,122 0.068 0.095 0.080 0.084 0.046 0.071 0.071
This table shows the return on assets (ROA) by governance characteristics and listing status. Panel A presents the univariate statistics for the ROA. Panels B-E split the sample based on firm
rank according to a specific governance variable into deciles and reports the median ROA in each decile. For ""Largest owner", "Herfindahl index", "Inside owners", and "Board size" the
lowest (highest) values belong to the decile 0 (9). We assign the firms with one owner or firms with all shares held by insiders to the category -1. Companies with missing information for that
variable are in the"." category . "Large nonlisted" firms rank among the top 5% of nonlisted by sales. For the "Largest owner" and the "Herfindahl index", firms with one owner or the largest
owner holding at least 99% of shares belong to the column "-1". For "Board size", all firms with one, two, or three directors are assigned to the column "-1". Empty cells represent deciles
which cannot be meaningfully separated from the decile to the right because the ownership characteristic in question has the same value in both deciles. "Herfindahl index" is the sum of
squared equity fractions in the firm.
Panel F reports median ROA for various largest owner types. The column headings 0 - 5 represent unidentified, institutional, personal, state, foreign, and industrial owners, respectively. Our
sample consists of non-financial firms in 2005 that pass basic accounting consistency tests, activity level tests, and that are not subsidiaries of another firm (see table 4.1). The ROA is
winsorized at the 5%/95% tails except in panel A, which represents the full ROA distribution.
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Table 7.3.2: Performance, governance, and listing status
Panel A. With largest owner type
Small firms
Variable
Intercept -0.057 (0.000) -0.045 (0.000) 0.074 (0.000) 0.090 (0.000) -0.063 (0.000) -0.052 (0.000)
Ownership concentration 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.013) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Ownership concentration squared -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Largest owner is unspecified -0.003 (0.008) -0.003 (0.084) -0.001 (0.811) -0.007 (0.022) -0.003 (0.023) -0.002 (0.226)
Largest owner is a person 0.012 (0.000) 0.011 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.002 (0.369) 0.013 (0.000) 0.012 (0.000)
Largest owner is state 0.007 (0.002) 0.004 (0.234) -0.002 (0.534) 0.005 (0.263) 0.010 (0.000) 0.004 (0.246)
Largest owner is foreign -0.009 (0.000) -0.003 (0.244) -0.003 (0.189) 0.005 (0.158) -0.013 (0.000) -0.005 (0.090)
Largest owner is industrial -0.007 (0.000) -0.009 (0.000) -0.002 (0.504) -0.006 (0.031) -0.007 (0.000) -0.009 (0.000)
Board size -0.005 (0.000) -0.007 (0.000) -0.003 (0.000) -0.004 (0.000) -0.005 (0.000) -0.007 (0.000)
CEO is director 0.002 (0.008) 0.003 (0.000) 0.011 (0.000) 0.013 (0.000) 0.002 (0.061) 0.003 (0.003)
Female stockholder directors -0.006 (0.000) -0.006 (0.000) -0.001 (0.773) -0.001 (0.897) -0.006 (0.000) -0.006 (0.000)
Employee directors -0.019 (0.115) -0.028 (0.092) -0.014 (0.143) -0.029 (0.030) -0.035 (0.127) -0.028 (0.309)
Leverage 0.002 (0.000) 0.003 (0.000) -0.006 (0.006) -0.000 (0.960) 0.003 (0.000) 0.003 (0.000)
Dividend payout 0.053 (0.000) 0.052 (0.000) 0.035 (0.000) 0.031 (0.000) 0.054 (0.000) 0.054 (0.000)
Size 0.008 (0.000) 0.008 (0.000)
Size in millions -0.003 (0.000) -0.005 (0.000)
Age 0.009 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) -0.000 (0.686) -0.001 (0.381) 0.010 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000)
R2 0.054 0.059 0.069 0.077 0.055 0.060
n 355,753 213,988 18,804 10,380 336,949 203,608
Panel B. With insider holdings and listing status  
 Small firms
Variable
Intercept -0.083 (0.000) -0.076 (0.000) 0.089 (0.000) 0.095 (0.000) -0.050 (0.000) -0.044 (0.000)
Ownership concentration 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.019) 0.000 (0.945) 0.000 (0.766) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.010)
Ownership concentration squared -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.007) -0.000 (0.466) -0.000 (0.295) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.003)
Insider ownership 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.646) 0.000 (0.761) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
All firms Large firms
Unrestricted Multiple owner Unrestricted Multiple owner
Multiple owner
Multiple owner
All firms Large firms
Unrestricted Multiple owner Unrestricted Multiple owner
Insider ownership squared -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.926) -0.000 (0.903) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Board size -0.004 (0.000) -0.005 (0.000) -0.001 (0.251) -0.002 (0.041) -0.004 (0.000) -0.006 (0.000)
CEO is director -0.002 (0.075) -0.000 (0.803) 0.005 (0.016) 0.008 (0.001) -0.002 (0.052) -0.001 (0.577)
Female stockholder directors -0.006 (0.000) -0.007 (0.000) -0.006 (0.171) -0.009 (0.115) -0.006 (0.000) -0.007 (0.000)
Employee directors -0.048 (0.034) -0.051 (0.036) -0.065 (0.000) -0.066 (0.001) -0.033 (0.308) -0.038 (0.278)
Leverage 0.004 (0.000) 0.003 (0.000) -0.003 (0.248) -0.001 (0.656) 0.004 (0.000) 0.004 (0.000)
Dividend payout 0.050 (0.000) 0.051 (0.000) 0.026 (0.000) 0.027 (0.000) 0.050 (0.000) 0.052 (0.000)
Nonlisted 0.039 (0.000) 0.039 (0.000) 0.037 (0.000) 0.036 (0.000)
Listed -0.039 (0.000) -0.039 (0.000) -0.037 (0.000) -0.036 (0.000)
Size 0.008 (0.000) 0.008 (0.000) 0.008 (0.000) 0.009 (0.000)
Size in millions -0.007 (0.000) -0.007 (0.000)
Age 0.006 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000) -0.006 (0.000) -0.007 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000)
R2 0.050 0.055 0.056 0.064 0.051 0.056
n 301,917 196,378 9,800 7,251 292,117 189,127
This table examines how the firm's performance depends on its listing status, controlling for a series of governance characteristics (ownership, board, and financial
policy), firm size, firm age, and industry. Performance is measured by the return on assets (ROA). The sample is decomposed according to firm size and the number
of owners.. "Large firms" are the 90% (5%) largest firms by sales that year among the listed (nonlisted) firms. The remaining firms are called small firms. The
"Multiple owner" sample excludes all single owner firms, which are firms with one owner holding at least 99% of the shares. "Ownership concentration" is
measured by the holdings of the largest owner. "Insider ownership" is the aggregate holdings of all directors in the firm. "Largest owner is unspecified" includes
institutional owners, "Board size" is the number of directors, "CEO is director" is a dummy variable which is one if the CEO is on the board and zero otherwise.
"Female directors" is the percentage of non-employee directors on the board, "Employee directors" is the percentage of employee directors. "Leverage" is total debt
to total assets, "Dividends" is the percentage of earnings paid out as cash dividends, and "Size" is the log of sales in thousands of 2005 NOK.
The sample consists of non-financial firms in 2000-2005 that pass basic accounting consistency tests, activity tests, and that are not subsidiaries of another firm.
Table 4.1 shows more details. We run OLS regressions and control for fixed industry effects (unreported) . The sum of the five owner type coefficients (panel A),
the sum of the two listing status coefficients (panel B), and the sum of the ten industry dummies are all restricted to zero. The sample is pooled across the sample
years. While panel A includes all firms, only firms where at least one director also owns shares enter panel B. The governance variables are lagged one year. The
variables are winsorized as follows: ROA at 5%, dividend payout at 5%, leverage at 1%, and sales at 1%. P-values are in parentheses.
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Appendix 4.A1. Items in the CCGR database
Item no. English description Norwegian description File name
Accounting data: Nonconsolidated
2 CEO gender Leder kjønn Account_Data
3 CEO birth date Leder fødselsdato Account_Data
4 CEO birth year Leder fødselsår Account_Data
5 CEO Randomized SSN (Social security number) Leder anonymiserte personnummer Account_Data
6 Organization type Foretaksform Account_Data
7 Fiscal year start Startdato Account_Data
8 Fiscal year end Avslutningsdato Account_Data
9 Revenue Salgsinntekt Account_Data
10 Other operating income Annen driftsinntekt Account_Data
11 Sum operating income Sum Driftsinntekter Account_Data
12 New operating assets produced in-house Endring i beholdning av egentilvirkede anleggsmidler Account_Data
13 Raw materials and consumables used Varekostnad Account_Data
14 Payroll expense Lønnskostnad Account_Data
15 Depreciation of fixed assets and intangible assets Avskrivninger på varige driftsmidler og immaterielle 
eiendeler
Account_Data
16 Write-down of fixed assets and intangible assets Nedskrivning på varige driftsmidler og immaterielle 
eiendeler
Account_Data
17 Other operating expenses (2) Annen driftskostnad (2) Account_Data
18 Other operating expenses (1) Annen driftskostnad (1) Account_Data
19 Operating profits Driftsresultat Account_Data
20 Income from subsidiaries Inntekt på investering i datterselskap Account_Data
21 Income from other group entities Inntekt på investering i annet foretak i samme konsern Account_Data
22 Income from associated company Inntekt på investering i tilknyttet selskap Account_Data
23 Interest received from group companies Renteinntekt fra foretak i samme konsern Account_Data
24 Other interest received Annen renteinntekt Account_Data
25 Other financial income Annen finansinntekt Account_Data
26 Changes in market value of current financial assets Verdiendring av markedsbaserte finansielle omløpsmidler Account_Data
27 Write-down on other current financial assets Nedskrivning av andre finansielle omløpsmidler Account_Data
28 Write-down on fixed financial assets Nedskrivning av finansielle anleggsmidler Account_Data
29 Interests paid to other group companies Rentekostnad til foretak i samme konsern Account_Data
30 Other interest expenses Annen rentekostnad Account_Data
31 Other financial expenses Annen finanskostnad Account_Data
32 Net gain/loss on foreign expense Agio/disagio Account_Data
33 Operating profit before tax Ordinært resultat før skattekostnad Account_Data
34 Tax on ordinary profits Skattekostnad på ordinært resultat Account_Data
35 Operating profits (after tax) Ordinært resultat Account_Data
36 Extraordinary income Ekstraordinær inntekt Account_Data
37 Extraordinary expenses Ekstraordinær kostnad Account_Data
38 Tax on extraordinary profits Skattekostnad på ekstraordinært resultat Account_Data
39 Net profits årsresultat Account_Data
40 Group contribution Konsernbidrag Account_Data
41 Dividends Utbytte Account_Data
42 Reserve for valuation variances Fond for vurderingsforskjeller Account_Data
43 Transferred to retained earnings Annen EK resultatdel Account_Data
44 Research and development Forskning og utvikling;Konsesjoner, patenter, lisenser, 
varemerker og lignende rettigheter;Goodwill
Account_Data
45 Deferred tax asset Utsatt skattefordel Account_Data
46 Intangible assets Immaterielle eiendeler Account_Data
47 Land, buildings and other property Tomter, bygninger og annen fast eiendom Account_Data
48 Machinery and plant Maskiner og anlegg Account_Data
49 Ships, rigs, airplanes, etc. Skip, rigger, fly og lignende Account_Data
50 Fixture and fittings, tools, office machinery, etc. Driftsløsøre, inventar, verktøy, kontormaskiner og lignende Account_Data
51 Tangible fixed assets Varige driftsmidler Account_Data
52 Investments in subsidiaries Investeringer i datterselskap Account_Data
53 Investment in different company in same group Investeringer i annet foretak i samme konsern Account_Data
54 Loans to group companies Lån til foretak i samme konsern Account_Data
55 Investments in associated companies Investeringer i tilknyttet selskap Account_Data
56 Loans to associated companies and jointly controlled companies Lån til tilknyttet selskap og felles kontrollert virksomhet Account_Data
57 Investments in shares Investeringer i aksjer og andeler Account_Data
58 Bonds and other receivables Obligasjoner og andre fordringer Account_Data
59 Pension fund Pensjonsmidler Account_Data
60 Subordinated debt Ansvarlig lånekapital Account_Data
61 Financial fixed assets Finansielle anleggsmidler Account_Data
62 Other fixed assets Andre anleggsmidler Account_Data
63 Fixed assets Anleggsmidler Account_Data
64 Inventories Varer Account_Data
65 Accounts receivable Kundefordringer Account_Data
66 Other receivables (1) Andre fordringer(2) Account_Data
67 Other receivables (2) Andre fordringer(1) Account_Data
68 Subscribed capital called but not paid Krav på innbetalinger av selskapskapital Account_Data
69 Receivables Fordringer Account_Data
70 Shares in group companies Aksjer og andeler i foretak i samme konsern Account_Data
71 Listed stocks Markedsbaserte aksjer Account_Data
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Item no. English description Norwegian description File name
72 Listed bonds Markedsbaserte obligasjoner Account_Data
73 Other listed financial instruments Andre markedsbaserte finansielle instrumenter Account_Data
74 Other financial instruments Andre finansielle instrumenter Account_Data
75 Investments Investeringer Account_Data
76 Bank deposits, cash on hand, etc. Bankinnskudd, kontanter og lignende Account_Data
77 Other current assets Andre omløpsmidler Account_Data
78 Current assets Omløpsmidler Account_Data
79 Share capital Selskapskapital Account_Data
80 Own shares Egen aksjer Account_Data
81 Share premium reserve Overkursfond Account_Data
82 Paid-in capital Innskutt egenkapital Account_Data
83 Reserve for valuation variances Fond for vurderingsforskjeller Account_Data
84 Other equity (Reserves) Annen egenkapital (Reservefond) Account_Data
85 Other equity (2) Annen egenkapital (2) Account_Data
86 Retained earnings Opptjent egenkapital Account_Data
87 Equity Egenkapital Account_Data
88 Pension liabilities Pensjonsforpliktelser Account_Data
89 Deferred tax Utsatt skatt Account_Data
90 Other provisions Andre avsetninger for forpliktelse Account_Data
91 Provisions Avsetning for forpliktelser Account_Data
92 Convertible loans Konvertible lån Account_Data
93 Bonds Obligasjonslån Account_Data
94 Liabilities to credit institutions Gjeld til kredittinstitusjoner Account_Data
95 Other long-term liabilities (2) øvrig langsiktig gjeld (2) Account_Data
96 Other long-term liabilities (3) øvrig langsiktig gjeld (3) Account_Data
97 Other long-term liabilities (1) øvrig langsiktig gjeld (1) Account_Data
98 Other long-term liabilities Annen langsiktig gjeld Account_Data
99 Convertible debt Konvertible lån Account_Data
100 Certificate debt Sertifikatlån Account_Data
101 Liabilities to credit institutions Gjeld til kredittinstitusjoner Account_Data
102 Trade creditors Leverandørgjeld Account_Data
103 Tax payable Betalbar skatt Account_Data
104 Public duties payable Skyldige offentlige avgifter Account_Data
105 Dividends Utbytte Account_Data
106 Other short-term liabilities (2) Annen kortsiktig gjeld (2) Account_Data
107 Other short-term liabilities (3) Annen kortsiktig gjeld (3) Account_Data
108 Other short-term liabilities (1) Annen kortsiktig gjeld (1) Account_Data
109 Current liabilities Kortsiktig gjeld Account_Data
110 Minority interests Minoritetsinteresse Account_Data
111 Comment code 1 Kommentar kode 1 Account_Data
112 Comment code 2 Kommentar kode 2 Account_Data
113 Number of employees Antall ansatte Account_Data
114 CEO Salary Lederlønn Account_Data
115 Auditor's fee Revisors honorar Account_Data
116 Remuneration the board of directors Styrehonorar Account_Data
117 Small/large company Lite/stort firma Account_Data
118 Net profit ratio Resultatgrad Account_Data
119 Liquidity ratio 1 Likviditetsgrad 1 Account_Data
120 Liquidity ratio 2 Likviditetsgrad 2 Account_Data
121 Solvency ratio Soliditet Account_Data
122 Financial leverage ratio Gjeldsgrad Account_Data
123 Interest coverage ratio Rentedektningsgrad Account_Data
124 Cash flow Kontantstrøm Account_Data
125 Inventory turnover Lagerfinansiering Account_Data
126 Return on equity Egenkapitalrentabilitet Account_Data
127 Return on assets Totalkapitalrentabilitet Account_Data
Accounting data: Consolidated
15002 CEO gender Leder kjønn Consolidated_Account_Data
15003 CEO birth date Leder fødselsdato Consolidated_Account_Data
15004 CEO birth year Leder fødselsår Consolidated_Account_Data
15005 CEO Randomized SSN (Social security number) Leder anonymiserte personnummer Consolidated_Account_Data
15006 Organization type Foretaksform Consolidated_Account_Data
15007 Fiscal year start Startdato Consolidated_Account_Data
15008 Fiscal year end Avslutningsdato Consolidated_Account_Data
15009 Revenue Salgsinntekt Consolidated_Account_Data
15010 Other operating income Annen driftsinntekt Consolidated_Account_Data
15011 Sum operating income Sum Driftsinntekter Consolidated_Account_Data
15012 New operating assets produced in-house Endring i beholdning av egentilvirkede anleggsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15013 Raw materials and consumables used Varekostnad Consolidated_Account_Data
15014 Payroll expense Lønnskostnad Consolidated_Account_Data
15015 Depreciation of fixed assets and intangible assets Avskrivninger på varige driftsmidler og immaterielle 
eiendommer
Consolidated_Account_Data
15016 Write-down of fixed assets and intangible assets Nedskrivning på varige driftsmidler og immaterielle 
eiendommer
Consolidated_Account_Data
15017 Other operating expenses (2) Annen driftskostnad (2) Consolidated_Account_Data
15018 Other operating expenses (1) Annen driftskostnad (1) Consolidated_Account_Data
15019 Operating profits Driftsresultat Consolidated_Account_Data
15020 Income from subsidiaries Inntekt på investering i datterselskap Consolidated Account Data
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Item no. English description Norwegian description File name
15023 Interest received from group companies Renteinntekt fra foretak i samme konsern Consolidated_Account_Data
15024 Other interest received Annen renteinntekt Consolidated_Account_Data
15025 Other financial income Annen finansinntekt Consolidated_Account_Data
15026 Changes in market value of current financial assets Verdiendring av markedsbaserte finansielle omløpsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15027 Write-down on other current financial assets Nedskrivning av andre finansielle omløpsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15028 Write-down on fixed financial assets Nedskrivning av finansielle anleggsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15029 Interests paid to other group companies Rentekostnad til foretak i samme konsern Consolidated_Account_Data
15030 Other interest expenses Annen rentekostnad Consolidated_Account_Data
15031 Other financial expenses Annen finanskostnad Consolidated_Account_Data
15032 Net gain/loss on foreign expense Agio/disagio Consolidated_Account_Data
15033 Operating profit before tax Ordinært resultat før skattekostnad Consolidated_Account_Data
15034 Tax on ordinary profits Skattekostnad på ordinært resultat Consolidated_Account_Data
15035 Operating profits (after tax) Ordinært resultat Consolidated_Account_Data
15036 Extraordinary income Ekstraordinær inntekt Consolidated_Account_Data
15037 Extraordinary expenses Ekstraordinær kostnad Consolidated_Account_Data
15038 Tax on extraordinary profits Skattekostnad på ekstraordinært resultat Consolidated_Account_Data
15039 Net profits årsresultat Consolidated_Account_Data
15040 Group contribution Konsernbidrag Consolidated_Account_Data
15041 Dividends Utbytte Consolidated_Account_Data
15042 Reserve for valuation variances Fond for vurderingsforskjeller Consolidated_Account_Data
15043 Transferred to retained earnings Annen EK resultatdel Consolidated_Account_Data
15044 Research and development Forskning og utvikling;Konsesjoner, patenter, lisenser, 
varemerker og lignende rettigheter;Goodwill
Consolidated_Account_Data
15045 Deferred tax asset Utsatt skattefordel Consolidated_Account_Data
15046 Intangible assets Immaterielle eiendeler Consolidated_Account_Data
15047 Land, buildings and other property Tomter, bygninger og annen fast eiendom Consolidated_Account_Data
15048 Machinery and plant Maskiner og anlegg Consolidated_Account_Data
15049 Ships, rigs, airplanes, etc. Skip, rigger, fly og lignende Consolidated_Account_Data
15050 Fixture and fittings, tools, office machinery, etc. Driftsløsøre, inventar, verktøy, kontormaskiner og lignende Consolidated_Account_Data
15051 Tangible fixed assets Varige driftsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15052 Investments in subsidiaries Investeringer i datterselskap Consolidated_Account_Data
15053 Investment in different company in same group Investeringer i annet foretak i samme konsern Consolidated_Account_Data
15054 Loans to group companies Lån til foretak i samme konsern Consolidated_Account_Data
15055 Investments in associated companies Investeringer i tilknyttet selskap Consolidated Account Data      _ _
15056 Loans to associated companies and jointly controlled companies Lån til tilknyttet selskap og felles kontrollert virksomhet Consolidated_Account_Data
15057 Investments in shares Investeringer i aksjer og andeler Consolidated_Account_Data
15058 Bonds and other receivables Obligasjoner og andre fordringer Consolidated_Account_Data
15059 Pension fund Pensjonsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15060 Subordinated debt Ansvarlig lånekapital Consolidated_Account_Data
15061 Financial fixed assets Finansielle anleggsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15062 Other fixed assets Andre anleggsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15063 Fixed assets Anleggsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15064 Inventories Varer Consolidated_Account_Data
15065 Accounts receivable Kundefordringer Consolidated_Account_Data
15066 Other receivables (1) Andre fordringer(2) Consolidated_Account_Data
15067 Other receivables (2) Andre fordringer(1) Consolidated_Account_Data
15068 Subscribed capital called but not paid Krav på innbetalinger av selskapskapital Consolidated_Account_Data
15069 Receivables Fordringer Consolidated_Account_Data
15070 Shares in group companies Aksjer og andeler i foretak i samme konsern Consolidated_Account_Data
15071 Listed stocks Markedsbaserte aksjer Consolidated_Account_Data
15072 Listed bonds Markedsbaserte obligasjoner Consolidated_Account_Data
15073 Other listed financial instruments Andre markedsbaserte finansielle instrumenter Consolidated_Account_Data
15074 Other financial instruments Andre finansielle instrumenter Consolidated_Account_Data
15075 Investments Investeringer Consolidated_Account_Data
15076 Bank deposits, cash on hand, etc. Bankinnskudd, kontanter og lignende Consolidated_Account_Data
15077 Other current assets Andre omløpsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15078 Current assets Omløpsmidler Consolidated_Account_Data
15079 Share capital Selskapskapital Consolidated_Account_Data
15080 Own shares Egen aksjer Consolidated_Account_Data
15081 Share premium reserve Overkursfond Consolidated_Account_Data
15082 Paid-in capital Innskutt egenkapital Consolidated_Account_Data
15083 Reserve for valuation variances Fond for vurderingsforskjeller Consolidated_Account_Data
15084 Other equity (Reserves) Annen egenkapital (Reservefond) Consolidated_Account_Data
15085 Other equity (2) Annen egenkapital (2) Consolidated_Account_Data
15086 Retained earnings Opptjent egenkapital Consolidated_Account_Data
15087 Equity Egenkapital Consolidated_Account_Data
15088 Pension liabilities Pensjonsforpliktelser Consolidated_Account_Data
15089 Deferred tax Utsatt skatt Consolidated_Account_Data
15090 Other provisions Andre avsetninger for forpliktelse Consolidated_Account_Data
15091 Provisions Avsetning for forpliktelser Consolidated_Account_Data
15092 Convertible loans Konvertible lån Consolidated_Account_Data
15093 Bonds Obligasjonslån Consolidated_Account_Data
15094 Liabilities to credit institutions Gjeld til kredittinstitusjoner Consolidated_Account_Data
15095 Other long-term liabilities (2) øvrig langsiktig gjeld (2) Consolidated_Account_Data
15096 Other long-term liabilities (3) øvrig langsiktig gjeld (3) Consolidated_Account_Data
15097 Other long-term liabilities (1) øvrig langsiktig gjeld (1) Consolidated_Account_Data
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Item no. English description Norwegian description File name
15101 Liabilities to credit institutions Gjeld til kredittinstitusjoner Consolidated_Account_Data
15102 Trade creditors Leverandørgjeld Consolidated_Account_Data
15103 Tax payable Betalbar skatt Consolidated_Account_Data
15104 Public duties payable Skyldige offentlige avgifter Consolidated_Account_Data
15105 Dividends Utbytte Consolidated_Account_Data
15106 Other short-term liabilities (2) Annen kortsiktig gjeld (2) Consolidated_Account_Data
15107 Other short-term liabilities (3) Annen kortsiktig gjeld (3) Consolidated_Account_Data
15108 Other short-term liabilities (1) Annen kortsiktig gjeld (1) Consolidated_Account_Data
15109 Current liabilities Kortsiktig gjeld Consolidated_Account_Data
15110 Minority interests Minoritetsinteresse Consolidated_Account_Data
15111 Comment code 1 Kommentar kode 1 Consolidated_Account_Data
15112 Comment code 2 Kommentar kode 2 Consolidated_Account_Data
15113 Number of employees Antall ansatte Consolidated_Account_Data
15114 CEO Salary Lederlønn Consolidated_Account_Data
15115 Auditor's fee Revisors honorar Consolidated_Account_Data
15116 Remuneration the board of directors Styrehonorar Consolidated_Account_Data
15117 Small/large company Lite/stort firma Consolidated_Account_Data
15118 Net profit ratio Resultatgrad Consolidated_Account_Data
15119 Liquidity ratio 1 Likviditetsgrad 1 Consolidated_Account_Data
15120 Liquidity ratio 2 Likviditetsgrad 2 Consolidated_Account_Data
15121 Solvency ratio Soliditet Consolidated_Account_Data
15122 Financial leverage ratio Gjeldsgrad Consolidated_Account_Data
15123 Interest coverage ratio Rentedektningsgrad Consolidated_Account_Data
15124 Cash flow Kontantstrøm Consolidated_Account_Data
15125 Inventory turnover Lagerfinansiering Consolidated_Account_Data
15126 Return on equity Egenkapitalrentabilitet Consolidated_Account_Data
15127 Return on assets Totalkapitalrentabilitet Consolidated_Account_Data
Firm identity data
11102 Industry codes Bransjekoder Industry_Code
11103 Industry codes at level two Bransjekoder nivå 2 Industry_Code
502 Company name Selskapsnavn Misc_2000
503 County number Kommunenummer Misc_2000
504 District number Fylkesnummer Misc_2000
505 Is City - Yes or No Bystatus Misc_2000
Stock listing status data   
402 OSE Listing status OSE noteringsstatus Misc 1994
403 Security type Verdipapirtype Misc_1994
404 OBI company id obi company id Misc_1994
Consumer price index data
13301 CPI KPI Misc 1994
13302 CPI 2005 KPI 2005 Misc_1994
13303 Price adjusted Prisjustert Misc_1994
Auditor and banking relationship data
13410 Auditor's organization ID Revisors organisasjonsnummer Misc 2000
13411 Auditor name Revisors navn Misc_2000
13412 Name of bank relationship Navn på bankforbindelse Misc_2000
Management data
13408 CEO year of birth Daglig leders fødselsår Misc_2000
13409 CEO year of birth Daglig leders fødselsdato Misc_2000
13415 Chairman of board year of birth Styreleder fødselsår Misc_2000
13416 Chairman of board date of birth Styreleder fødselsdato Misc_2000
Misc company characteristics
13405 Number of employees Antall ansatte Misc 2000
506 Status Status Misc_2000
13417 Registered share capital Registeret aksjekapital Misc_2000
13418 Share capital comment Aksjekapital kommentar Misc_2000
13419 Paid-in share capital Aksjekapital innbetalt Misc_2000
Foundation data
13401 Foundation date Etableringsdato Misc 2000
13420 Company age Selskapsalder Misc_2000
13421 Founding year Etableringsår Misc_2000
Credit rating data
13501 First rating date Første rating dato Misc 2000
13502 First rating score Første rating score Misc_2000
13503 Last rating date Siste rating dato Misc_2000
13504 Last rating score Siste rating score Misc_2000
13505 Number of rating scores this year Antall ratinger i dette året Misc_2000
Aggregated ownership data using direct ownership as source
202 Number Of Owners Antall eiere Ownership Control
203 Number Of Owners With Unspecified Type Antall eiere med uspeisfisert type Ownership_Control
204 Number Of Institutional Owners Antall institusjonelle eiere Ownership_Control
205 Number Of Personal Owners Antall personlige eiere Ownership_Control
206 Number Of Personal Male Owners Antall manlige personlige eiere Ownership_Control
207 Number Of Personal Female Owners Antall kvinnelige personlige eiere Ownership_Control
208 Number Of State Owners Antall statlige eiere Ownership_Control
209 Number Of International Owners Antall internasjonale eiere Ownership_Control
210 Number Of Industrial Owners Antall industrielle eiere Ownership Control
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212 % Equity Held by owner with rank 2 % eierandel til eier med rank 2 Ownership_Control
213 % Equity Held by owner with rank 3 % eierandel til eier med rank 3 Ownership_Control
214 % Equity Held by owner with rank 4 % eierandel til eier med rank 4 Ownership_Control
215 % Equity Held by owner with rank 5 % eierandel til eier med rank 5 Ownership_Control
216 Sum % Equity  Held                       Sum eierandeler i % Ownership_Control
217 Aggregate % held by Of Owners With Unspecified Type Aggregert fraksjon eid av uspesifiserte eiere Ownership_Control
218 Aggregate % held by Institutional Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av institusjonelle eiere Ownership_Control
219 Aggregate % held by Personal Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av personlige eiere Ownership_Control
220 Aggregate % held by Personal Male Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av personlige mannlige eiere Ownership_Control
221 Aggregate % held by Female Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av personlige kvinlige eiere Ownership_Control
222 Aggregate % held by State Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av staten Ownership_Control
223 Aggregate % held by International (Foreign) Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av internasjonale eiere Ownership_Control
224 Aggregate % held by Industrial Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av industrielle eiere Ownership_Control
225 Herfindahl ownership concentration ratio Herfindahl Ownership_Control
226 Number of owners with more than 5% share Antall eiere med minst 5% andel Ownership_Control
227 Number of owners with more than 10% share Antall eiere med minst 10% andel Ownership_Control
228 Aggregate % held by owners with more than 5% share Andel eid av eiere med minst 5% andel Ownership_Control
229 Aggregate % held by owners with more than 10% share Andel eid av eiere med minst 10% andel Ownership_Control
230 Largest owner is Unspecified Største eier er uspesifiserte Ownership_Control
231 Largest owner is Institutional Største eier er institusjonell Ownership_Control
232 Largest owner is Personal Største eier er personlig Ownership_Control
233 Largest owner is State Største eier er statlig Ownership_Control
234 Largest owner is International (Foreign) Største eier er internasjonal Ownership_Control
235 Largest owner is Industrial Største eier er industriell Ownership_Control
13601 Share owned by CEO Andel av selskapet eid av CEO Ownership_Control
Aggregated ownership data using ultimate ownership as source
14002 Number Of Owners Antall eiere Ownership Control
14003 Number Of Owners With Unspecified Type Antall eiere med uspeisfisert type Ownership_Control
14004 Number Of Institutional Owners Antall institusjonelle eiere Ownership_Control
14005 Number Of Personal Owners Antall personlige eiere Ownership_Control
14006 Number Of Personal Male Owners Antall manlige personlige eiere Ownership_Control
14007 Number Of Personal Female Owners Antall kvinnelige personlige eiere Ownership_Control
14008 Number Of State Owners Antall statlige eiere Ownership_Control
14009 Number Of International (Foreign) Owners Antall internasjonale eiere Ownership_Control
14010 Number Of Industrial Owners Antall industrielle eiere Ownership Control_
14011 % Equity Held by owner with rank 1 % eierandel til eier med rank 1 Ownership_Control
14012 % Equity Held by owner with rank 2 % eierandel til eier med rank 2 Ownership_Control
14013 % Equity Held by owner with rank 3 % eierandel til eier med rank 3 Ownership_Control
14014 % Equity Held by owner with rank 4 % eierandel til eier med rank 4 Ownership_Control
14015 % Equity Held by owner with rank 5 % eierandel til eier med rank 5 Ownership_Control
14016 Sum % Equity  Held                       Sum eierandeler i % Ownership_Control
14017 Aggregate % held by Of Owners With Unspecified Type Aggregert fraksjon eid av uspesifiserte eiere Ownership_Control
14018 Aggregate % held by Institutional Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av institusjonelle eiere Ownership_Control
14019 Aggregate % held by Personal Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av personlige eiere Ownership_Control
14020 Aggregate % held by Personal Male Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av personlige mannlige eiere Ownership_Control
14021 Aggregate % held by Female Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av personlige kvinlige eiere Ownership_Control
14022 Aggregate % held by State Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av staten Ownership_Control
14023 Aggregate % held by International (Foreign) Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av internasjonale eiere Ownership_Control
14024 Aggregate % held by Industrial Owners Aggregert fraksjon eid av industrielle eiere Ownership_Control
14025 Herfindahl ownership concentration ratio Herfindahl Ownership_Control
14026 Number of owners with more than 5% share Antall eiere med minst 5% andel Ownership_Control
14027 Number of owners with more than 10% share Antall eiere med minst 10% andel Ownership_Control
14028 Aggregate % held by owners with more than 5% share Andel eid av eiere med minst 5% andel Ownership_Control
14029 Aggregate % held by owners with more than 10% share Andel eid av eiere med minst 10% andel Ownership_Control
Aggregated board data
602 Board size Antall styremedlemmer Ownership_Control
603 Directors' mean age Styremedlemmers gjensomsnittelig alder Ownership_Control
604 Directors' age dispersion Styremedlemmers standardavik i alder Ownership_Control
605 Number of female directors Antall kvinnelige styremedlemmer Ownership_Control
606 Number of employee-elected  directors Antall ansattvalgte styremedlemmer Ownership_Control
607 Number of female employee-elected  directors Antall ansattvalgte kvinnelige styremedlemmer Ownership_Control
608 Number of female stockholder-elected Antall aksjonærvalgte kvinnelige styremedlemmer Ownership_Control
609 Mean male director age Mannlige styremedlemmers gjennomsnittelige alder Ownership_Control
610 Mean female director age Kvinnelige styremedlemmers gjennomsnittelige alder Ownership_Control
Group structure data
14502 Group ID Konsern ID Ownership_Control
14503 is Parent er morselskap Ownership_Control
14504 is Subsidiary er datterselskap Ownership_Control
14505 is Joint Control er felleskontrolert Ownership_Control
14506 is Associated er tilknyttet selskap Ownership_Control
14507 is Independent er uavhengig Ownership_Control
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NAICS NAICS Industry sector Industry 
code label code sector
1 Agriculture and hunting 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining
2 Forestry and logging 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining
5 Fishing, fish farming, incl. services 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining
10 Coal mining and peat extraction 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining
12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining
13 Mining of metal ores 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining
14 Other mining and quarrying 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining
27 Basic metals 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
28 Fabricated metal products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
30 Office machinery and computers 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
32 Radio, TV sets, communication equip 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-tr. 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
33 Instruments, watches and clocks 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
25 Rubber and plastic products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
24 Chemicals and chemical products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
35 Other transport equipment 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
22 Publishing, printing, reproduction 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
20 Wood and wood products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
19 Footwear and leather products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
18 Wearing apparel., fur 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
17 Textile products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
16 Tobacco products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
15 Food products and beverages 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
23 Refined petroleum products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products
40 Electricity, gas and steam supply 3 Energy
11 Oil and gas extraction, incl. serv. 3 Energy
45 Construction 4 Construction
91 Membership organizations n.e.c. 5 Service
74 Other business activities 5 Service
73 Research and development 5 Service
72 Computers and related activities 5 Service
71 Renting of machinery and equipment 5 Service
37 Recycling 5 Service
80 Education 5 Service
99 Extra-territorial org. and bodies 5 Service
85 Health and social work 5 Service
75 Public administration and defense 5 Service
90 Sewage, refuse disposal activities 5 Service
70 Real estate activities 5 Service
92 Cultural and sporting activities 5 Service
55 Hotels and restaurants 5 Service
93 Other service activities 5 Service
95 Domestic services 5 Service
50 Motor vehicle services 5 Service
41 Water supply 5 Service
64 Post and telecommunications 5 Service
66 Insurance and pension funding 6 Financial
65 Financial intermediation, less ins. 6 Financial
67 Auxiliary financial intermediation 6 Financial
52 Retail trade, repair personal goods 7 Trade
51 Wholesale trade, commission trade 7 Trade
63 Supporting transport activities 8 Transport
62 Air transport 8 Transport
61 Water transport 8 Transport
60 Land transport, pipeline transport 8 Transport
9 Multisector
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Variable Abbrev. Definition (item number and acctg. variable name from Appendix 4.A1)
After Tax Earnings 
After Extr. Items NE 39 Result for the year
Operating Earnings 
After Tax NOE 35 Operating result
Total Debt D [91 Provisions] + [98 Other long-term liabilities] + [109 Current liabilities]
Current Debt CD 109 Current liabilities
Working Capital WC [78 Current assets]-[109 Current liabilities]
Current Assets CA 78 Current assets
Dividends Div 105 Dividends
Operating Earnings 
Before Interest After 
Tax
EBI
{ [19 Results of operations] + [20 Income from subsidiaries] + [21 Income from other group entities] 
+ 
[22 Income from associates] + [23 Interest received from group companies] + [24 Other interest 
received] + 
[25 Other financial income] + [26 Changes in marked value of financial current assets] } 
 * { 1- ( -[34 Tax on ordinary result] / [33 Operating results before tax]  or 28% if null )}
Total Assets A [63 Fixed assets] + [78 Current assets]
Owners Equity EQ 87 Equity
Sales S [11 Sum operating income] + [24 Other interest received] + [25 Other financial income]
Company's Age Age
[current year] - [13421] 
or [year firm entered our sample if null] 
or [1983 defined as 1994 minus average age of firms in 2000=11.99 years, the first year founding 
date is reported, if a firm is in our sample in 1994 but has no age reported]
Year Founded Year Founded
[13421] 
or [year firm entered our sample if null] 
or [1983 defined as 1994 minus average age of firms in 2000=11.99 years, the first year founding 
date is reported, if a firm is in our sample in 1994 but has no age reported]
Estimated Tax EstTax -( [34 Tax on ordinary result] / [33 Operating results before tax] ) or 28% if null




   , , , 
2 Manufacturing, chemical products; 3 Energy
4 Construction; 5 Service
6 Financial; 7 Trade
8 Transport; 9 Multi Group
Inventory Inv 64 Inventory
Accounts Receivable AR 69
Deposits, Cash, Other Cash [76 Bank Deposits, Cash] + [77 Other current assets]
Debt to Assets DtA D / A
Current Debt to Debt CDtD CD / D
Dividend Payout DIVtE Div  / NOE
Assets to Sales AtS A / S
Assets to Employees AtEm A / EmFill
Assets to Employees StEm S / EmFill
Sale Growth gS annual growth St / St-1
replace with null if S or lag1.S is 0 i.e. no reporting, 
Asset Growth gA annual growth At / At-1
replace with null if A or lag1.A is 0 i.e. no reporting, 
Earnings Growth gNOE annual growth NOEt / NOEt-1replace with null if S or lag1.S is 0 i.e. no reporting, 
Working Capital to 
Assets WCtA WC / A
Investments in 
Depreciable Assets INVEST
([46  Intangible assets] -  [45 Deferred tax asset]) +  [51 Tangible fixed assets]  - [15 Depreciation of 
fixed assets and intangible assets] - [16  Write-down of fixed assets and intangible assets]  - (lag1.46  
-  lag1.45 +  lag1.51) 
replace with null if DA or lag1.DA is 0 i.e. no reporting, note 15 16 are reported with negative sign
Investment to 
Depreciable Assets INVEST tDA
INVEST / {[lag1.46  Intangible assets] - [lag1.45 Deferred tax asset] + [lag1.51 Tangible fixed 
assets]} 
should not adjust for inflation as book values are not adjusted: 
replace with null if DA or lag1.DA is 0 i.e. no reporting, 
note 15 16 are reported with negative sign
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Variable Abbrev. Definition (item number and acctg. variable name from Appendix 4.A1)
Employees Employees
We use consolidated statement data for companies that report consolidated assets that are at least 
85% of non consolidated assets in any year. If consolidated employees are never reported, we use non 
consolidated data (and v.v.). For listed we use consolidated statements unless no positive values are 
ever reported; then we use non consolidated statements.  Zeros are replaced by null values as the use 
of zeros did not exhibit consistent pattern in data (we did not find information in zeros; however, for 
firms with just non consolidated statements we do not replace zeros with nulls). Then missing (or 
gaps in time series) but not zero values are filled in with the latest positive value around the gap.
Average Employees AvgEm Average of [Employees]
Depreciation to 
Depreciable Assets DDA
- [15 Depreciation of fixed assets and intangible assets] / (lag1.46  -  lag1.45 +  lag1.51) 
calculated if DA and lag1.DA are not Null
Writeoff to Depreciable 
Assets WDA
- [16  Write-down of fixed assets and intangible assets] / (lag1.46  -  lag1.45 +  lag1.51) 
calculated if DA and lag1.DA are not Null
Degree of Tangibility of 
assets TANG [51 Tangible fixed assets] / A
Non-debt Tax Shield NDTS
[15 Depreciation of fixed assets and intangible assets]  / 
{ [19 Results of operations] + [20 Income from subsidiaries] + [21 Income from other group entities] 
+ 
[22 Income from associates] + [23 Interest received from group companies] + [24 Other interest 
received] + 
[25 Other financial income] + [26 Changes in marked value of financial current assets] }
Tax Exhaustion 
Dummy TEDum 1 if CF<=0
Cash Flow CF 19 + 15 + 16 - (64 - lag1.64) - (65 - lag1.65) + (102 - lag1.102)  - 103
Leverage Lev Financial debt / (Book Shareholders Funds + Financial Debt)
Size category Size IIf([EmFill]<1,0,IIf([EmFill]<5,1,IIf([EmFill]<10,2,IIf([EmFill]<20,3,IIf([EmFill]<50,4,IIf([EmFill] 100 5 IIf([E Fill] 200 6 IIf([E Fill] 500 7 IIf([E Fill] 1000 8 IIf([E Fill] 1000 9)))))))))) < , , m < , , m < , , m < , , m >= ,
isConsolidated isConsolidated 1 if we use consolidated statements. Note that we use consolidated if they are available and in no year consolidated total assets are less than 85% of non consolidated assets.
ROA ROA ROA: [EBI]/IIf([A]=0,Null,[a])
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Category Var nr Variable Name
VPS 
exist Description ("_D" stands for direct "_U" stands for ultimate)
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.01 HoldLarge1_D x the largest owner (rank ties split by a uniform random number)
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.02 HoldLarge2_D x 2nd largest owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.03 HoldLarge3_D x 3rd largest owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.04 HoldLarge4_D x 4th largest owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.05 HoldLarge5_D x 5th largest owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.06 HoldLargeSum2_D x the sum of the 2 largest holdings
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.07 HoldLargeSum3_D x the sum of the 3 largest holdings
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.08 HoldLargeSum4_D x the sum of the 4 largest holdings
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.09 HoldLargeSum5_D x the sum of the 5 largest holdings
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.10 HoldLargeOuts_D Largest outside owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.11 HoldSmallOuts_D Smallest outside owner share
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.12 Herfindahl_D x Herfindahl index 
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.13 NrOwners_D x Number of Owners
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.14 NrOwnersIns Number of Inside Owners
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.15 HoldMean_D x Mean owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.16 HoldMedian_D x Median owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.17 TypeLarge1_D x Type of owner with rank 1, (includes VPS)
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.18 HoldLarge1_U the largest owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.19 HoldLarge2_U 2nd largest owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.20 HoldLarge3_U 3rd largest owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.21 HoldLarge4_U 4th largest owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.22 HoldLarge5_U 5th largest owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.23 HoldLargeSum2_U the sum of the 2 largest holdings
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.24 HoldLargeSum3_U the sum of the 3 largest holdings
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.25 HoldLargeSum4_U the sum of the 4 largest holdings
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.26 HoldLargeSum5_U the sum of the 5 largest holdings
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.27 HoldLargeOuts_U Largest outside owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.28 Herfindahl_U Herfindahl index 
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.29 NrOwners_U Number of Owners
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.30 HoldMean_U Mean owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.31 HoldMedian_U Median owner
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.32 Block5NR_D x Number of owners with more than 5% share
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.33 Block10NR_D x Number of owners with more than 10% share
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.34 Block5SH_D x Share owned by owners with more than 5% share
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.35 Block10SH_D x Share owned by owners with more than 10% share
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.36 Block5NR U Number of owners with more than 5% share_
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.37 Block10NR_U Number of owners with more than 10% share
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.38 Block5SH_U Share owned by owners with more than 5% share
7.1.  Ownership concentration 7.1.39 Block10SH_U Share owned by owners with more than 10% share
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.01 HoldUnsp_D x Fraction of unspecified owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.02 HoldInst_D x Fraction of institutional owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.03 HoldPers_D x Fraction of personal owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.04 HoldStat_D x Fraction of state owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.05 HoldIntl_D x Fraction of foreigner owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.06 HoldIndu_D x Fraction of industrial owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.07 dLargeType0_D dummy: is unspecified type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.08 dLargeType1_D dummy: is institutional type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.09 dLargeType2_D dummy: is personal type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.10 dLargeType3_D dummy: is state type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.11 dLargeType4_D dummy: is foreigner type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.12 dLargeType5_D dummy: is industrial type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.13 SumHold_D x total percentage of shares accounted for
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.14 HoldUnsp_U Fraction of unspecified owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.15 HoldInst_U Fraction of institutional owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.16 HoldPers_U Fraction of personal owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.17 HoldStat_U Fraction of state owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.18 HoldIntl_U Fraction of foreigner owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.19 HoldIndu_U Fraction of industrial owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.20 SumHold_U total percentage of shares accounted for
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.21 dLargeType0_U dummy: is unspecified type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.22 dLargeType1_U dummy: is institutional type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.23 dLargeType2_U dummy: is personal type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.24 dLargeType3_U dummy: is state type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.25 dLargeType4_U dummy: is foreigner type the largest cumulative owner type
7.2.  Owner types 7.2.26 dLargeType5_U dummy: is industrial type the largest cumulative owner type
7.3.  Inside owners 7.3.01 InsHold_CEO CEO Share, 0 if the entry missing for a company
7.3.  Inside owners 7.3.02 InsHold_BDexCEO Board ex CEO share, 0 if the entry missing for a company
7.3.  Inside owners 7.3.03 InsHold_BD Board share (incl. chairman), 0 if the entry missing for a company
7.3.  Inside owners 7.3.04 InsHold_all All insider share (CEO+board ex CEO), 0 if the entry missing for a company
7.3.  Inside owners 7.3.05 InsHold_Large1 Largest insider, 0 if the entry missing for a company
7.3.  Inside owners 7.3.06 InsHold_Large2 2nd largest insider
7.3.  Inside owners 7.3.07 InsHold_Large3 3rd largest insider
7.3.  Inside owners 7.3.08 InsHold_Large4 4th largest insider
7.3.  Inside owners 7.3.09 InsHold_Large5 5th largest insider
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Category Var nr Variable Name
VPS 
exist Description ("_D" stands for direct "_U" stands for ultimate)
8. Board composition 8.01 bd_size board size (# directors), excludes va: temporary and obs: observers
8. Board composition 8.02 bd_size_exempl board size excluding employees (# directors): always zero in 03 and 05 due to data availability
8. Board composition 8.03 bd_avg_age mean director age
8. Board composition 8.04 bd_avg_age_m mean male director age
8. Board composition 8.05 bd_avg_age_f mean female director age
8. Board composition 8.06 bd_sd_age director age dispersion (std of director age)
8. Board composition 8.07 bd_nr_empl number of employee directors
8. Board composition 8.08 bd_nr_fem number of female directors
8. Board composition 8.09 bd_nr_fem_stockh number of female stockholders elected
8. Board composition 8.10 bd_nr_fem_empl number of female employee elected
8. Board composition 8.11 dCEOdirector dummy: is CEO a director (but not chair, just any director, excluding "va", including "obs" etc.; for some 
directors the type in unknown but all those boards are larger than 1 person)
8. Board composition 8.12 dCEOchBD dummy: is CEO the chair, reported just if both ceo and chair are known
8. Board composition 8.13 BD_Turn
board turnover excluding employees and temporary (va, ar):  all_t1:size now; all_t0: size last period; same: 
match of members with full id length; short_t1: members with incompl id now; short_t0: members with 
incompl id last period; unchanged: same +min(short_t1, short_t0).  turnov: 1- 
unchanged/[0.5*(all_t1+all_t0)]. Reset to null if size in t1 or t0 is 0 or null. OLD:(new members/year start 
members) or ([a129_bd_turn_s3_1].[All]-[Same])/[a129_bd_turn_s3_1].[All]
8. Board composition 8.14 disCHsame dummy: is chairman same this year, 1 if the same
8. Board composition 8.15 dbd_nr_fem_empl
dummy: is female employee elected on board [this is missing and seem not to be provided by the data 
providers- ask Pal to verify]
8. Board composition 8.16 disCEOsame dummy: is new CEO this year, 1 if the same
8. Board composition 8.17 dCEOknow dummy is CEO known
8. Board composition 8.18 dCHBDknown dummy is chairman of board known
9. Ranking and Misc 9.03 HoldTypeRank1 x type with the largest aggregate holding (direct owners and includes VPS)
9. Ranking and Misc 9.06 CFShareEst
we use estimated share (C) if share info not available, but rank is available:
A= min (share)
B= min (100%-SumShares)/(2n), 1/2*A), where n is n umber of missing owners
C= B + B/(100*Rank)
for calculations: if A missing, replace by 100, if SumShares>=100, replace by 99.99, if Sumshares Missing, 
replace by 0
missing shares replaced by C
9. Ranking and Misc 9.07 bd_nr_empl_perc if bd_nr_empl>0 then bd_nr_empl_perc=bd_nr_empl/bd_size; else bd_nr_empl_perc=0;
9 Ranking and Misc 9 08 bd nr fem stockh
if bd_nr_fem_stockh>0 then bd_nr_fem_stockh_perc=bd_nr_fem_stockh/bd_size_exempl; else .   . _ _ _ bd_nr_fem_stockh_perc=0;
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